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Abstract 
Throughout history, governments across the world have persisted with policy implementation that 
restricts international trade, including the trade of agricultural products. Although differing across 
countries in terms of the policy instruments used, market volatility within agricultural markets has 
been an unwanted product of this intervention and, in the opinion of Williamson (2008), has had an 
economic growth-retarding effect. Largely considered as a given, however, is that when governments 
intervene in markets, price wedges develop between the prices facing domestic market agents and 
the prices that would have prevailed in a free market without intervention. These price wedges are 
known in the literature as distortions, as they distort the incentives of market agents to transact.  
While the contrasting stances of developed nations’ governments and developing nations’ 
governments towards their respective agricultural sectors has been widely documented in the 
literature, empirical studies quantifying the distortions to agricultural producers’ incentives caused by 
the polar policy stances have been dominated by three key global studies. Two of these studies have 
been conducted under the direction of the World Bank, and the other is an ongoing study by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
The World Bank study, headed by Kym Anderson, was concluded in 2009 and included a complete set 
of distortion estimates for South African primary agriculture and selected secondary agricultural 
industries. These distortion estimates were estimated on aggregate commodity level from 1965 until 
2005,1 and their long-term trends were documented by Kirsten, Edwards and Vink (2009). However, 
due to the intense data requirement, these estimates were never estimated in a disaggregated format 
per agricultural industry/commodity, which implies that there is limited knowledge of the distortions 
facing the individual market agents in each of the covered industry value chains.  
Knowledge of the incentives facing industries, as well as value chain agents within industries, is vital 
in the formulation of effective agricultural policy. However, just as important as the magnitude of the 
distortions is the identification of the key drivers impacting the size of the distortions facing aggregate 
industries or specific value chain agents within industries.  
This study is the second comprehensive analysis of the distortions to agricultural producers’ incentives 
in South Africa. The core analysis of this study reapplies the Anderson et al. (2006) empirical 
framework for the time period 2005 until 2014, as was applied by Kirsten et al. (2009) in order to 
estimate the distortions faced by agricultural producers. In addition to the aggregate application, the 
                                                          
1 Estimates were based on actual data from 1965 to 2004. Forecasted data was used in order to obtain 2005 
estimates. Therefore, this study uses actual data from 2005 to 2014, thus covering 10 complete years.  
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disaggregated approach to measuring distortions to individual agents’ incentives in a vertical value 
chain is seminally applied in the South African context. The methodology developed by Briones Alonso 
and Swinnen (2015) is applied to the South African wheat value chain for the marketing years starting 
in October 2000 and ending in September 2014.  
The results of the study highlight the opposing incentives faced by primary agricultural producers 
depending on the trade status of their commodity. The long-term depreciation of the South African 
Rand was found to be largely responsible for this, with producers of exportable commodities facing 
positive incentives to produce (positive distortions) as opposed to producers of importables being 
faced with negative incentives to produce (negative distortions). Furthermore, within the wheat value 
chain, the study’s results provided critical insight into the manner in which the market power “bulge” 
at processing level harmed both producer incentives as well as the incentives of consumers to 
consume wheat flour. The results highlight the need for effective market regulation within the wheat 
industry, as well as question the core competitiveness abilities of the respective value chain agents.  
It is recommended that policy makers and market regulators thus consider the implicit impact of the 
long-term depreciation of the South African Rand on agricultural producers’ incentives, while also 
focusing on the phasing out of inter-industry distortion differences in order to realise potential 
efficiency gains. Furthermore, orchestrating an adequate link between the competitiveness and 
market power of agents within a value chain in relation to their estimated incentive distortions could 
form an integral part in unpacking the drivers of the inter- and intra-industry distortion differences. 
Once the key drivers of the respective disparities are identified, a far more informed approach to 
attempting to eliminate the differences and ensure efficient resource use will be enabled.  
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Opsomming 
Dwarsdeur die geskiedenis het regerings die wêreld oor volhou met beleid  wat handel in 
landbougoedere aan bande gelê het. Hoewel die beleidsinstrumente wat gebruik is verskil het in 
verskillende lande,  het dit omtrent oral en altyd aanleiding gegee tot onbestendigheid van markpryse 
wat op sy beurt, volgens Williamson (2008), ekonomiese groeie negatief beinvloed het. Wat egter 
grootliks as ’n gegewe beskou kan word, is dat wanneer regerings in markte ingryp, ontwikkel 
pryswigte (price wedges) tussen die pryse wat agente in binnelandse markte teëkom en die pryse wat 
in ’n vryemark sou geheers het sonder staatsingryping. Hierdie pryswigte staan in die literatuur 
bekend as verwringings, aangesien hulle die aansporings van die markagente om sake te doen, 
verwring.  
Dit is duidelik uit die literatuur dat die benadering van die regerings van ontwikkelende en van 
ontwikkelde lande teenoor hulle onderskeie landbousektore verskil. Verder word die kwantifisering 
van hierdie  verdraaiings deur drie belangrike studies gedomineer. Twee van hierdie studies is deur  
die Wêreldbank aangepak, terwyl die Organisasie vir Ekonomiese Samewerking en Ontwikkeling 
(OESO) ’n deurlopende studie aan die gang hou.  
Die studie deur die Wêreldbank onder Kym Anderson is in 2009 voltooi en het ’n volledige stel 
skattings van beleidsverwringings  vir Suid-Afrikaanse primêre landbou en geselekteerde sekondêre 
landboubedrywe ingesluit vir die periode 1965 tot 2005,2 en die langtermyn tendense is deur Kirsten, 
Edwards en Vink (2009) gedokumenteer. As gevolg van die intense datavereiste is hierdie beramings 
egter nooit  gedisaggregeer per landboubedryf/kommoditeit gedoen nie, wat impliseer dat daar 
beperkte kennis is oor die omvang van die verwringings (of aansporings) waarmee die individuele 
markagente te doen kom te doen kry.  
Kennis oor hierdie aansporings is noodsaaklik vir die formulering van doeltreffende landboubeleid. 
Net so belangrik as die omvang van die verdraaiings is egter die identifisering van die belangrikste 
drywers wat ’n invloed het op die omvang van die verwringings waarmee die totale bedrywe of 
spesifieke waardekettingagente binne die bedrywe te doen kom.  
Die huidige studie volg op hierdie  analise van die verwringings van landbouprodusente se aansporings 
in Suid-Afrika, en volg ook die  empiriese raamwerk van Anderson et al. (2006), maar nou  vir die 
tydperk vanaf 2005 tot 2014. Hier word die aggregaat sowel as die gedisaggregeerde verwringings  in 
’n vertikale waardeketting in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks geskat. Die metodologie wat deur Briones 
                                                          
2 Ramings is gebaseer op werklike data vanaf 1965 tot 2004. Voorspelde data is gebruik om die ramings vir 2005 
te bereken. Hierdie studie gebruik dus werklike data vanaf 2005 tot 2014, om dus 10 volledige jare te dek.  
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Alonso en Swinnen (2015) ontwikkel is, is op die Suid-Afrikaanse koring- waardeketting toegepas vir 
die bemarkingsjare wat in Oktober 2000 begin het en in September 2014 geëindig het.  
Die resultate van die studie bring na vore die kontradiksies in aansporings (en dus in verwringings) 
waarmee primêre landbouprodusente te doen kom, grootliks as gevolg van die langtermyn 
depresiasie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Rand met produsente van verhandelbare kommoditeite wat 
positiewe aansporings het om te produseer (positiewe verwringings), teenoorprodusente van 
invoerbare produkte wat negatiewe aansporings het om te produseer (negatiewe verwringings). 
Verder bied die studie kritiese insigte oor die koring- waardeketting en spesifiek in die manier waarop 
markkonsentrasie op prosesseringsvlak beide produsent-aansporings sowel as die aansporings van 
verbruikers om koringmeel te verbruik, benadeel het. Die uitslag bring die behoefte aan doeltreffende 
markregulering binne die koringbedryf na vore, asook die kwessie van die kern 
mededingendheidsvermoëns van die onderskeidelike waardekettingagente.  
Daar word aanbeveel dat beleidmakers en markreguleerders dus die implisiete impak van die 
langtermyn depresiasie van die Suid-Afrikaanse Rand op landbouprodusente se aansporings in ag 
neem, terwyl daar ook gefokus word op die uitfasering van die diskriminasie teen produsente om 
sodoende potensiële doeltreffendheidsvoordele te realiseer. Verder kan die skep van sterk skakels 
tussen die mededingendheid en markkrag van agente binne ’n waardeketting’n integrale rol speel in 
die uitpak van die drywers van inter- en intrabedryfsverskille. As die belangrikste drywers van die 
onderskeie ongelykhede eers geïdentifiseer is, sal ’n baie meer ingeligte benadering tot die 
uitskakeling van die verskille en doeltreffende hulpbrongebruik gevolg kan word. 
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 Introduction  
1.1 The Political Economy of Agriculture 
The economic benefits of specialisation and trade are well known, yet governments persist in 
introducing measures that restrict international trade, including trade in agricultural products. While 
these restrictions differ from country to country, they contribute to volatility in global agricultural 
markets, consequently altering countries’ terms of trade. As Williamson (2008) notes, this volatility in 
the long-run terms of trade has a growth-retarding effect.  
In this regard, the governments of developed countries have tended to protect their farmers from 
import competition in order to counteract the competitive pressures to shed labour (Anderson, 2009). 
Not only have these protective measures had a negative impact on domestic consumers of agricultural 
products and exporters of other products, but they have also depressed international prices of 
agricultural products, thus hurting both foreign producers and traders of agricultural products. As a 
result, both national economic welfare as well as global economic welfare have been reduced. 
On the other hand, governments of developing countries have tended to implement policies that 
directly or indirectly tax farmers, while at the same time pursuing import-substituting industrialisation 
(Anderson, 2009). As a result, producers face less of an incentive to produce – and this is compounded 
by the disincentive effect of subsidies for rich countries.  
As economies industrialise and develop economically, their policy stances undergo gradual shifts, from 
negatively assisting agricultural producers to positively assisting them, as well as from subsidising food 
consumers to taxing them (Anderson, 2009). While the historical trends in policy stances between the 
two country groups have been documented extensively, empirical measurements of the extent to 
which policy shifts have succeeded in moving towards a least distorting policy environment have been 
limited to a handful of studies. These studies have been undertaken predominantly by the World Bank 
and by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  
Although the policy stances in developed and developing countries differ, both by their nature and 
the degree to which they distort agricultural incentives, the gradual policy developments within 
individual countries over time have had, and continue to have, a pronounced effect on the long-run 
growth and distribution of global welfare (Anderson, 2009). Furthermore, in addition to the economic 
growth implications, distortions to agricultural incentives have knock-on effects on consumers 
through the price of food. Consequently, policy stances not only influence economic growth, but also 
influence poverty and income inequality due to the importance of food prices in these parameters.  
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While policy intervention in agricultural markets has been reduced drastically over the past 25 to 30 
years, the reduction of this intervention was only prioritised once agricultural commodities were duly 
included in the framework of international negotiations, specifically in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Prior to the inclusion of agricultural commodities in international 
negotiations during the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), signed in 1994, individual 
countries had been left free to determine their respective agricultural policies, even when these 
policies have had a disruptive effect on world markets (Butault, 2011). Preceding the URAA, the 
Haberler (1958) Report to the GATT highlighted the presence of these policy-induced distortions and 
cautioned that they could worsen, which they did, as shown by Anderson and Hayami (1986). The 
signing of the URAA agreement in 1994, together with the concurrent establishment of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), paved the way for the majority of signatory countries to shift their policy 
stances towards reducing agricultural support and progressively decoupling this support from the level 
of production (Butault, 2011).  
1.2 Background to the Study 
Given the extent to which policy had distorted global agricultural markets, empirical studies were 
forthcoming that focused on measuring the government-imposed distortions that had created gaps 
between the domestic prices of agricultural products and the would-be free market prices. However, 
these studies were often limited to specific countries, with tailored methodologies aligned to the 
respective research objectives. This research stance made international comparisons of these country-
specific studies near impossible and consequently failed to contribute meaningfully to the body of 
literature on policy-induced price distortions.  
Since the late 1980s, three key inter-country studies have applied respective uniform methodologies 
to empirically measure the policy-imposed distortions on commodity level that arise due to the 
complex web of agricultural policies.  
The seminal study conducted by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) covered a small range of developing 
countries (18 in total), excluding South Africa, which at the time remained sanctioned by the global 
community. The findings of this study proved ground-breaking in answering the age-old question 
about why agriculture had historically been supported in developed countries and taxed in developing 
countries, while also providing empirical estimates of the implicit taxation of agriculture in developing 
countries.  
The OECD has provided estimates of policy support for its member countries and selected emerging 
economies, including South Africa, on an annual basis. The most notable and widely published 
measures from the OECD annual reports are the estimates of market price support (MPS), the nominal 
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protection co-efficient (NPC) and the producer support estimates (PSE). Furthermore, the OECD’s 
estimates have empirically quantified the effects of specific policies within its focus countries. These 
empirical estimates are currently available for the past 30 years since 1986.  
The most comprehensive study using a uniform methodology was conducted under the directorate of 
the World Bank and headed by Kym Anderson. Following on from the methodology derived by 
Anderson et al. (2006), a global study was conducted across 40 developing countries, together with 
the OECD countries and Europe’s transition economies. At the time (2009), this group of countries 
accounted for around 90% of global agricultural production. The study was aggregated into key 
regions of the world where distortions to agricultural incentives were calculated from 1955 to 2007 
and reviewed on a country basis. The initial study included a comprehensive investigation of the 
distortions to agricultural incentives in South Africa, conducted by Kirsten et al. (2009); however, the 
subsequent update of the empirical database to 2011 by Anderson and Nelgen (2013) did not 
incorporate updating the South African estimates.  
Kirsten et al.'s (2009) empirical findings for South Africa were largely aligned with the political 
environment in which policies were made in South Africa during the Apartheid political regime, with 
high protection of the agricultural tradable sector throughout the 1960s and 1970s, peaking in the 
1980s. Following the transition to democracy in the 1990s, distortions declined rapidly in the 
agricultural sector and, by the end of the period (2000 to 2004), the policy environment was such that 
resource allocation had shifted against the agricultural sector.  
Since the Kirsten et al. (2009) distortion estimates up to and including the year 2005, no empirically 
aligned attempt has been undertaken to provide updated estimates for South African agriculture. 
Furthermore, with the exception of the Anderson and Nelgen (2013) empirical update, the application 
of the broad Anderson et al. (2006) methodology on country level has significantly dried up 
internationally. An update of these distortion estimates is therefore due for the South African 
agricultural sector, as well as for the countries not covered in the Anderson and Nelgen (2013) update.  
A common thread throughout the estimates published by the OECD, as well as those published as a 
result of the Krueger et al. (1988) and Anderson (2009) studies, is that policy stances are either seen 
as assisting or hindering producers or consumers of agricultural products. Consequently, the distortion 
estimates in these studies are generally aggregated into their net effect on each of these two 
economic groups at various levels of aggregation, including individual commodity level, commodity 
group level, industry level as well as macro-economic level. Such aggregation enables the 
decomposition of results from the macro-economic level back down to the individual commodity level 
in order to analyse the contributions of the individual commodity or industry component to the 
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greater aggregated measure. However, all three of the above frameworks of estimates fail to allow 
decomposition from the individual commodity level down to individual agents in the value chain. For 
example, if South African wheat producers as a collective are seen to receive assistance under the 
policy environment using the aggregate measure, it could still mean that certain agents within the 
broader producer group are being taxed under the current policy setting. Such a situation would 
logically prevail if the magnitude of the support to agents within the broader producer category is 
larger than the magnitude of the taxation of agents within this category.  
Consequently, and in essence, the distortion estimates published in their various forms in the 
documented studies hide how the policy assistance/hindrance incident on specific agricultural 
commodities or industries is distributed throughout the respective commodity value chains. Such an 
omission from inter-country studies is understandable due to the detailed value chain data required 
in order to decompose commodity/industry-level distortion estimates. Although not necessarily 
internationally comparable, such a decomposition – as has been undertaken by Briones Alonso and 
Swinnen (2015) for the Pakistani wheat flour value chain – is indeed possible when limited to a specific 
country and commodity or group of commodities.   
An extension of the base nominal rate of assistance framework used by Anderson (2009) allows for 
policy welfare impacts to be disaggregated within producer and consumer groups. The results of this 
extension provides estimates of the welfare impacts of policies per agent in a vertical value chain 
operating under the producer and consumer “umbrellas”. Welfare estimates on a per agent basis, 
rather than on an aggregate producer or consumer group basis, have important implications for the 
analysis of the economy and political economy. Furthermore, disaggregated estimates assist in the 
design of policies targeting the poorest groups along value chains (Briones Alonso & Swinnen, 2015).  
To date, no such disaggregated empirical approach has been published within a South African 
agricultural context. The South African wheat industry is ideally poised for such an investigation, given 
the constant hype around the market concentration of the industry at processing level and the 
perceived declining ability of producers to competitively produce wheat.  
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
This study is the second comprehensive analysis of the distortions to agricultural incentives in the 
South African economy, the other being the study by Kirsten et al. (2009). The objectives of this study 
were five-fold. The first was to provide an overview of the theory of policy-induced price distortions 
in agriculture within the context of the political economy of agriculture. The second objective followed 
on the first and involved providing an overview of the major global studies that have attempted to 
comparably measure the distortion effects of countries’ agricultural policies. The third objective was 
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to update the agricultural incentive distortions estimates for South Africa from the year 2005 until 
2014 using the Anderson et al. (2006) methodology, as was applied by Kirsten et al. (2009) for South 
Africa for the period from 1955 to 2005. This update focused only on updating the empirical measures 
of distortions to agricultural producers’ incentives and did not include any estimates of policy 
distortions facing consumers of agricultural products or non-agricultural sectors.  
The results of the update will enable the latest 10-year trend of agricultural producer distortion 
estimates to be analysed for South Africa per agricultural commodity, in contrast to the trends 
available from the Kirsten et al. (2009) study. The fourth objective was to apply the disaggregated 
nominal rate of assistance approach of Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) to the South African wheat 
industry in order to determine the policy welfare impacts for three key individual agents along the 
value chain. The time period of this coverage included the marketing years from October 2000 to 
September 2014. The final objective was to incorporate the results from both the aggregate update 
as well as the disaggregated nominal rate of assistance extension into the recommendation of better-
targeted agricultural policy – particularly trade policy.  
1.4 Outline of Applied Study Method 
The empirical methodology followed in this study is centred around the calculation of agricultural 
producer distortion estimates. These distortions are estimated through the calculation of nominal 
rates of assistance (NRA) for a representative range of agricultural commodities. The magnitude of 
the NRAs per commodity or agricultural industry provide an internationally comparable indication of 
the distortions facing producers within the respective industries.  
In addition to the aggregate commodity/industry NRAs to be calculated, the base NRA methodology 
was further expanded and tailored in order to quantify the distortions facing various agents within a 
vertical value chain. This disaggregated empirical approach was applied to the South African wheat 
value chain in order to quantify the distortions facing wheat grain producers, wheat flour millers as 
well as wheat flour consumers.  
1.5 Outline of the Study 
In Chapter 2, an overview of the motives and patterns of government intervention in markets is 
provided, followed by a discussion of the structural transformation of the agricultural sector 
accompanying economic growth. Such an overview is important to contextualise the environment in 
which policy intervention in agricultural markets occurs, while also providing theoretical explanations 
for why intervention in agricultural markets is deemed necessary. This chapter also provides a review 
of the theory of policy-induced price distortions, before discussing and critiquing the three major 
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inter-country attempts to measure price distortions in agriculture and their applicability to the South 
African case.  
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the methodology of Anderson et al. (2006) from which 
the analytical framework used in this study originates. In addition, the methodology extension by 
Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) is outlined, and its link to the base methodology of Anderson et 
al. (2006) is made explicit. While the review in the first part of Chapter 3 incorporates methods of 
measuring distortions to both agricultural producers and consumers, the empirical focus of this study 
remains producer focused.   
The first part of Chapter 4 provides details on how the Anderson et al. (2006) methodology was applied 
to the South African agricultural sector, with an emphasis on the sources of the data used and 
adaptions that were made from the Kirsten et al. (2009) study. This is done on a commodity group 
level and ensures adequate clarity around the data used in the study, as well as the methodology 
applied in the study. Furthermore, it serves as a precursor to the second part of the chapter, which 
discusses how the extended methodology of Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) was applied to the 
South African wheat industry.  
Chapter 5 presents and discusses the results and findings of the study and is structured in two parts. 
First, the results using the general commodity framework of Anderson et al. (2006) for all commodities 
covered in the study are presented together with the disaggregated results from the wheat value chain 
analysis. This is followed by a discussion of the key trends seen over the past decade in the distortion 
estimates of South African agricultural producers, and a comparison with prior time periods. 
Furthermore, the policy assistance estimates for the three selected agents in the wheat value chain 
are analysed and their trends are compared to the market conditions that have prevailed within the 
wheat industry.  
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the conclusions drawn from the research findings of the study. The policy 
implications of these findings are highlighted, followed by recommendations for further research.  
1.6 Delimitations of the Study 
As alluded to in the study objectives, the focus of this study was purely on the calculation of distortion 
estimates for selected primary agricultural producers in South Africa, together with distortion 
estimates for three key agents in the wheat value chain. Although the literature review extends to 
motivations for and calculations of distortions to agricultural product consumers and non-agricultural 
products, distortion estimates for these two market groups are not estimated in this study. However, 
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an understanding of their empirical measurement relative to producer distortion estimates is critical, 
and thus is addressed adequately in both the literature review and the study methodology.  
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 Theoretical Motivation and Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
Understanding the political economy of agriculture and the rationale behind government intervention 
in agricultural is a fundamental starting point to conceptualising the theory of price distortions. Once 
we know why governments intervene in agricultural markets, we are better poised to evaluate the 
methods of measuring this intervention, as well as to design policies that ensure minimum distortions 
to the incentives of agricultural producers. The next section of this chapter will provide an overview 
of government intervention in agricultural markets, followed by a review of the theory of price 
distortions in Section 3. The final part of Section 3 will outline the applicability of this theory to 
agriculture in order to motivate the rationale behind empirical measurements of policy-induced price 
distortions in agriculture.   
The motivation for this rationale is followed in Section 4 by a review of three key global inter-country 
studies that have measured policy-induced distortions in agricultural markets and shaped the 
empirical scene. The final part of Section 4 provides a discussion of the South African context in the 
light of the Anderson (2009) study. This is followed in Section 5 by a discussion of the value chain 
approach to measuring distortions and a brief outline of the South African wheat industry’s transition 
through history. Section 6 concludes.  
2.2 Government Intervention in Agricultural Markets – Motives and Patterns 
Historically, the field of the political economy of agricultural protection and distortions has been 
dominated by the conceptual question of why agriculture is supported in rich, industrialised countries 
but taxed in poor, industrialising countries (Swinnen, 2009). Krueger et al. (1988, 1991) completed the 
answer to this puzzling question in the late 1980s/early 1990s through the first inter-country empirical 
study of its kind. However, an understanding of the theoretical motive for government intervention 
in markets remains an imperative starting point in the discussion on the evolution of the theory of 
agricultural protection (De Gorter & Swinnen, 2002).  
As highlighted by De Gorter and Swinnen (2002), governments across countries are actively involved 
in the allocation of resources between agriculture and the rest of the economy. This is done in order 
to (1) increase social welfare, primarily through the correction of market failures, and (2) redistribute 
incomes, primarily through commodity policies (Rausser, 1982, 1992). However, in the context of 
agricultural protection and distortions it is not merely the motive for government intervention in 
agriculture that is of relevance, but more so the pattern that this intervention takes on across 
countries at differing stages of development and over time.  
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Schultz (1978) proposes a typology for incentive altering government intervention in agriculture based 
on the impact of this intervention on agricultural output. Firstly, there are government policies that 
take on a neutral stance with regard to the opportunity cost of agricultural production. Secondly, there 
are those policies which over-value agricultural production and tend to exhibit a strong agricultural 
bias. Schultz's final “policy category” is a policy setting in which agricultural production is inherently 
undervalued and where policies tend to exhibit a strong non-agricultural sector bias. Based on this 
typology, Schultz (1978) was able to expand on his previous proposition, presented in the first 
Elmhurst Memorial Lecture to the International Association of Agricultural Economists. This 
proposition was that the level of agricultural output within countries largely was not a technical 
consideration, but rather had to do with the manner in which governments view and treat agriculture 
(i.e. “what governments do to agriculture”) (Bale & Lutz, 1981).  
In striving to understand the “development paradox” (i.e. taxation of agriculture in low-income 
nations and support of agriculture in high-income nations), Anderson (1986) points to the starting 
point as being an examination of the structural changes that occur in an economy throughout its 
growth. In addition, he suggests that a further analysis is required to determine how these changes 
alter the incentives of interest groups with policy influence.  
2.2.1 Structural Transformation Accompanying Economic Growth 
Stark contrasts exist between a pre-industrial agricultural sector in a low-income nation and a highly 
industrialised agricultural sector in a developed nation. As outlined by Bonnen and Schweikhardt 
(1998), farmers in low-income countries are typically a large majority of the population, as well as of 
the labour force, making national policy intervention directed at subsidising farmers virtually 
impossible to finance. Furthermore, the low per capita income and price-inelastic demand for food in 
low-income nations hampers any attempts to subsidise or protect farmers, as such intervention has 
inflationary consequences through rising food costs. The upward pressure on food prices is followed 
by economywide wage increases, while the monetary cost to protect farmers exceeds the revenues 
of the state.  
Engel’s Law predicts that the income elasticity of demand for food will decline in countries that 
experience income and GDP growth. This is consistent with the early writings of JS Mill and TW Schultz 
in this field, as well as the empirical conclusions reached by Anderson (1987) and Krueger et al. (1988, 
1991). Consequently, as nations transition towards an industrialised agricultural sector with higher 
productivity, agriculture’s share in GDP and in employment decreases, since the pace at which total 
national output is growing exceeds the pace at which the farming sector’s output grows. The outcome 
of this elasticity-GDP growth relationship is that, as nations proceed on their economic growth paths, 
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the price of food relative to non-food is likely to decline (i.e. deteriorating long-run terms of trade 
against the agricultural sector) (Anderson, 1987). Furthermore, in the case where an economy is not 
growing, the declining share of agriculture’s contribution to national output as well as employment is 
compounded due to the induced domestic price effects of declining international food prices 
(Anderson, 1987).  
The results of the above process are (1) downward pressure on agricultural product prices and (2) 
retarded growth in the demand for food. When combined, these two results initiate significant shifts 
in resource allocation. Firstly, within the agricultural sector, resources flow away from the low-
productivity farming sector towards the commercial, productive farming sector. Secondly, as the non-
agricultural sectors experience rapid growth rates compared to the agricultural sector, the 
opportunity cost of remaining in the agricultural sector in terms of the aforementioned rapidly 
growing non-agricultural income increases. This rise in opportunity cost effectively pulls resources out 
of the agricultural sector and into non-agricultural sectors within the economy (Schultz, 1945).  
Furthermore, throughout the structural transition towards an industrialised agricultural sector, 
political pressures are created to minimise the effects on farmer welfare resulting from the downward 
pressure on farm income (Bonnen & Schweikhardt, 1998). Accompanying this structural 
transformation is the development of economic characteristics within agricultural sector markets. 
Through their interaction with one another, these characteristics lead to agricultural sector markets 
becoming far more economically vulnerable as opposed to the other, non-agricultural sectors of the 
economy. It is this interaction accompanying the development of agriculture that serves as the 
backdrop for the so called “farm problem”. 
Starting from after World War 1 (WW1) and the Great Depression, the early writing by Galbraith and 
Black (1938) and later additions by Schultz (1945) provided explanations for the economic vulnerability 
of agricultural markets and how this vulnerability accompanied development. Bonnen and 
Schweikhardt (1998:9) concisely summarise the “farm problem” in the form of three questions:  
• Why are farm sector markets so unstable?  
• Why is the farm sector plagued by low returns?  
• If microeconomic theory is correct, why does the farm sector not rapidly adjust to low prices 
by shifting resources out of the sector?  
The three prevailing characteristics accompanying the development of agriculture that are inherent 
in the “farm problem” are therefore instability, low returns and asset fixity. The mere prevalence of 
these characteristics distinguishes the industrialised farming sector in a high-income nation from that 
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of a pre-industrialised farming sector in a low-income nation. However, the presence of all three these 
characteristics in unison, as well as their interaction, renders the industrialised farming sector in a 
high-income nation unique compared to the other economic sectors. It is this uniqueness of the 
industrialised agriculture sector in high-income nations that warrants a distinctive policy prescription 
being tailored for the agricultural sector aimed at alleviating the farm problem.  
According to Bonnen and Schweikhardt (1998:8), the switch from political intervention taxing farmers 
to political intervention supporting farmers only occurs once the economic structure of a nation is 
such that:  
• The wealth of the nation has increased substantially as a result of the development process.  
• The transmitted effects of increased food costs as a result of protective farm policies only have 
a minor effect on the cost of living and consequently on the nation’s wage bill.  
• The proportion of the nation’s labour force being subsidised through government’s protection 
of agriculture is within the taxing capacity of the state.  
• There is intense interest in the public policies affecting the few commodities being produced 
by highly specialised farmers due to the resulting welfare implications of these policies.  
• The number of farms has declined significantly, to the extent that the transaction costs of 
organising farmer interest groups mandated with influencing government policy towards 
agriculture are markedly reduced.  
In summary, the “development paradox” of the taxation of agriculture in pre-industrialised 
agricultural sectors and the support of agriculture in industrialised agricultural sectors is best 
understood through understanding the structural transition of the agricultural sector throughout the 
economic development process. Pre-industrialised and industrialised agriculture sectors are 
inherently different in a multitude of ways and consequently require dissimilar policy prescriptions. 
Therefore, critical to analysing the impact of such policy interventions on agricultural incentives is first 
to conceptualise the context of the farm problem and to fully understand the intrinsic undercurrents 
of the “development paradox”.  
2.3 Origins and Overview of Policy Induced Price Distortions 
2.3.1 Theoretical Base  
The theory of price distortions is built around Samuelson's (1939) theory of trade and welfare, 
according to which, under perfect competition with no monopoly power in trade, a laissez-faire policy 
management stance is deemed Pareto optimal (Bhagwati, 1969). Theoretically, under the Pareto 
optimality of the laissez faire policy-management stance, an economy will operate with technical 
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efficiency. This is where the marginal rate of transformation in domestic production (DRT) is equal to 
the foreign rate of transformation (FRT), which is further equal to the marginal rate of substitution in 
consumption in the domestic market (DRS). This relationship is captured in Equation (2.1) (Bhagwati, 
1969).  
 
Where Equation (2.1) does not hold, a market is observed to be distorted. However, as Bhagwati 
(1969) highlights, departures from full optimality (Equation (2.1)) characterise a market with 
imperfections, in which four broad variations (distorted situations) of Equation (2.1) manifest. The 
variations are as a result of either (1) endogenous distortions, (2) autonomous policy-imposed 
distortions, (3) instrumental policy-imposed distortions or, alternatively, (4) as a result of non-
operation on the efficient production possibility frontier. Consequently, under Bhagwati's (1969) 
generalised framework, a total of 12 (4 x 3) distortionary situations shift the economic system away 
from Pareto optimality. The four broad variations of Equation (2.1) as described by Bhagwati (1969) 
are provided below: 
1. 𝐹𝑅𝑇 ≠ 𝐷𝑅𝑇 = 𝐷𝑅𝑆   
2. 𝐷𝑅𝑇 ≠ 𝐷𝑅𝑆 = 𝐹𝑅𝑇  
3. 𝐷𝑅𝑆 ≠ 𝐷𝑅𝑇 = 𝐹𝑅𝑇  
4. 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟.   
 
2.3.2 Welfare Aspects of Policy Distortions 
From a practical standpoint, the theoretical underpinnings of a policy-induced price distortion are best 
understood by graphically analysing the contrasting impact of policy support for/taxation of imported 
commodity groups as opposed to exported commodity groups. As highlighted by the OECD (2016a), a 
key theoretical assumption when quantifying policy intervention in agricultural markets is that these 
markets are competitive and consequently exhibit the characteristics of competitive markets (perfect 
information, large number of firms, product homogeneity, and free entry and exit).  
The implication of the presence of these characteristics is that price arbitrage will prevail, where 
market agents will continue to exploit price differentials across markets so that there is a stable 
tendency for the domestic prices of the traded goods to align with external prices for the same goods. 
Under this theoretical context, the persistence of a price differential between domestic and external 
markets is as a result of government intervention in the respective domestic markets. Therefore, 
intuitively, this price differential is a central aspect when quantifying the magnitude of government’s 
 𝐷𝑅𝑇 = 𝐹𝑅𝑇 = 𝐷𝑅𝑆 (2.1) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
13 
 
distortionary impacts in markets, either as a result of government measures imposed at the national 
border (tariffs, exports subsidies, quotas etc.) or otherwise as a result of direct market intervention in 
the domestic market (price controls, marketing boards etc.) (OECD, 2016a).  
The use of a partial equilibrium framework concisely depicts the welfare consequences of policy-
induced price transfers as a result of positive market price differentials (domestic price > border price) 
and negative price differentials (domestic price < border price) between imported and exported 
commodities. Such a framework enables both the direction of the welfare transfers as well as the 
benefiting market agents to be determined. 
2.3.2.1 Price-increasing Policy Intervention 
The theoretically prevailing market situations under positive market price differentials in the case of 
an imported commodity and an exported commodity are depicted in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 
respectively. In both figures, the lines DD and SS are representative of the domestic commodity 
demand and the domestic commodity supply respectively. 
 
In the case of an imported commodity (Figure 2.1), the domestic market will be in equilibrium when 
the domestic price is equal to the import price (MP). At this price (MP), QP1 will be supplied by 
domestic suppliers and QC1 will be demanded by domestic consumers. The supply shortfall (QC1 - QP1) 
will be met by imports of the commodity into the domestic market.  
  
Figure 2.1. Price-increasing policy intervention in the case of 
an imported commodity.  
Source: OECD (2016a) 
Figure 2.2. Price-increasing policy intervention in the case 
of an exported commodity. 
Source: OECD (2016a) 
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A policy environment in which the domestic price is raised to a higher level than the import price 
induces producers to respond by increasing supply while inducing decreased consumption by 
consumers. At the new policy raised the domestic price (DP), the supply shortfall is reduced on the 
domestic markets, with import volumes consequently falling to QC2 – QP2. 
The market price differential (MPD = DP – MP) resulting from the policy intervention can thus be used 
in quantifying the welfare transfers that occur as a result of the intervention. In Figure 2.1, the area 
TPC is representative of the welfare transfer to commodity producers from consumers through the 
price mechanism, while the area OTC is representative of transfers from consumers to other market 
agents. The recipients of these other transfers are dependent on the specific policy tool being 
employed by governments in order to raise domestic prices to the higher domestic price level.  
In the case of an exported commodity (Figure 2.2), the increased domestic price (DP) as a result of 
policy intervention shifts the equilibrium away from the would-be equilibrium in the absence of 
intervention (domestic price = export price (XP)). In doing so, the higher policy-induced equilibrium 
price reduces the domestic consumption of the commodity to quantity QC2 (from QC1), while 
increasing the domestic supply of the commodity to QP2 (from QP1). These polar quantity shifts 
increase the domestic market surplus, which consequently raises commodity exports to QP2 - QC2 
(from QP1 - QC1).  
As in the case of an imported commodity, the positive MPD also forms the basis when quantifying the 
welfare transfers that occur through the price mechanism as a result of the policy intervention. In the 
export case, the transfers to producers from consumers (TPC) is far smaller than in the import situation 
and is largely overshadowed by the transfers to producers from taxpayers (TPT). The TPT transfers 
represent the proportion of producer price support that is borne by tax payers through budgetary 
outlays.  
As noted by the OECD (2016a), the critical distinction between the import and export situations under 
a positive MPD is that, under the import situation, only part (TPC) of the total transfers (TPC + OTC) 
are received exclusively by producers, whereas under the export situation, all transfers (TPC + TPT) 
are received exclusively by producers. Furthermore, under the import situation, the transfers received 
exclusively by producers are financed entirely by consumers, whereas under the export situation, the 
transfers received by producers are jointly financed by consumers and tax payers.    
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2.3.2.2 Price-decreasing Policy Intervention 
In contrast to Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 depict the prevailing market 
situations under negative market price differentials in the case of imported commodities and exported 
commodities. Such negative differentials could be brought about, for example, by government setting 
administrative limits on domestic food prices as well as subsidising imports (OECD, 2016a).  
The case of an imported commodity (Figure 2.3) where the domestic price (DP) has been pushed below 
the import price (MP) due to policy intervention results in increased consumption of the importable 
commodity (QC1 to QC2), coupled with decreased production (QP1 to QP2) of the commodity. As a 
result, the supply shortfall on the domestic market worsens from its prior value of QC1 - QP1 to QC2 - 
QP2 as producers and consumers respond to price incentives. The import volume required to meet 
this shortfall consequently increases. This is in contrast to the positive MPD policy setting. 
Furthermore, under a negative MPD policy setting, welfare transfers flow towards consumers rather 
than towards producers. These welfare flows come from taxpayers (area OTC in Figure 2.3) as well as 
from producers (area TCP in Figure 2.3).  
Where policies that decrease the domestic market price are introduced for an exported commodity, 
the decreased domestic market price lowers the incentives of producers to produce the exported 
commodity while raising the incentives of consumers to consume the exported commodity. 
Consequently, the supplied quantity of the commodity on the domestic market drops to QP2 (from 
QP1), while the demanded quantity increases to QC2 (from QC1). These shifts have a domestic surplus-
reducing result and subsequently lower the quantity exported to QP2 - QC2 (from QP1 - QC1). The 
welfare transfers are in contrast to the positive MPD policy setting, where it is observed how welfare 
  
Figure 2.3. Price-decreasing policy intervention in the 
case of an imported commodity.  
Source: OECD (2016a) 
 
Figure 2.4. Price-decreasing policy intervention in the case 
of an exported commodity. 
Source: OECD (2016a) 
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transfers rather flow to consumers from agricultural producers through the price mechanism (area 
TPC in Figure 2.4) as well as from budgetary transfers (area TPT in Figure 2.4), which are also financed 
by agricultural producers. Therefore, where the policy environment is supressing the domestic prices 
of exported commodities, consumers welfare is being increased solely at the expense of the welfare 
of producers (OECD, 2016a).  
2.3.3 Applicability to Agriculture 
A market price distortion is something that governments impose through intervention that creates a 
gap or wedge between the marginal social return to the sellers and the marginal social cost to the 
buyer in a specific transaction (i.e. the gap between the price paid and the price received) (Bhagwati, 
1971). In essence, the market mechanism becomes distorted, as not all agents in the economy are 
faced with the same price ratios (Kawamata, 1974). The resulting price wedge that develops 
represents an economic cost to society, which is able to be quantified using welfare measurement 
techniques such as those pioneered by Harberger (1971), in which changes in volumes directly 
affected by such price distortions are evaluated. The discussion in Section 2.3.2 graphically depicted 
the theoretical base of these measurement techniques in a partial equilibrium context.  
Lerner's (1936) symmetry theorem shows that, in a two-sector model, an import tax and export tax 
have the same impact on the export sector. Vousden (1990:46) proves the applicability of the theorem 
in a multisector model by showing that a multisector model is unaffected, regardless of whether the 
model is under imperfect competition domestically or internationally, or whether some of the sectors 
only produce non-tradables (Anderson et al., 2008). In the light of Vousden's (1990) multisector 
finding, Anderson et al. (2008) highlight the relevance of the symmetry theorem within the agricultural 
sector. The scenario of the identical impact on the incentives to produce exportables of an import 
tariff-protecting import-competing farm industries and an export tax taxing agricultural exporters is 
used by Anderson et al. (2008) to emphasise the applicability of the symmetry theorem.  
For this reason, as Anderson et al. (2008) note, it is relative prices and relative rates of assistance 
between the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors that affect agricultural producers’ incentives. 
Consequently, the total effect of distortions within the agricultural sector will not depend only on 
agricultural policy measures, but also on the magnitude of distortions generated by policy measures 
that alter incentives in non-agricultural sectors. In addition to the direct incentive effects of 
distortions, there are a range of other developments affecting producer and consumer incentives that 
are flow-on consequences of the distortion. Examples include the large-country trade argument, 
whereby domestic distortions in terms of a specific traded commodity within a large country 
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contribute to altering the world (distortion-free) price, which consequently reduces/increases the 
negative impact of the distortion within the specific country. 
2.4 Price Distortions in Agriculture: Review of Past Studies 
2.4.1 Historical Perspective  
The disarray in world agriculture, as once described by Johnson (1973), encapsulates the practical 
implications for global agriculture of the opposing governmental policy stances towards agriculture in 
developing and developed nations. While the taxation of the agricultural sector in developing nations 
has been motivated by objectives such as those discussed in Section 2.2.1, the depression of 
developing nations’ agricultural price incentives has historically been compounded, and continues 
(albeit to a lesser extent) to be compounded, through depressed international prices for farm 
products. This international price depression is as a result of the supportive agricultural protectionist 
policy stances of countries in the developed world towards their respective agricultural sectors 
(Anderson, 2010). In addition to this, the industrialisation strategies adopted by numerous developing 
countries over the past 50 to 60 years have been characterised by purposefully over-valued domestic 
currencies, together with the pursuance of import-substituting industrialisation strategies through 
restrictions on imports of manufactured goods. This import substitution, as highlighted by Krueger et 
al. (1988, 1991), indirectly taxes producers of other tradable products in these countries, the majority 
of these producers being farmers (Anderson, 2010).  
Consequently, Johnson's (1973) state of disarray in global agriculture is still of relevance today, albeit 
to a lesser extent, and is induced through the overproduction of agricultural products in high-income 
nations together, with the underproduction of these products in low-income nations. Furthermore, as 
outlined by Anderson (2010), the markets for agricultural products have been thinned and 
consequently have been made volatile due to the fact that less international trade of agricultural 
products has occurred than would otherwise have been the case under free trade. The past 20 to 25 
years have witnessed widespread agricultural price and trade policy reform globally, in line with the 
broader policy reform agenda. Such reform has contributed to the reversal of the “disarray” in 
agriculture and the drive towards free trade.  
Empirically, the measurement of the changing agricultural policy environment of global agriculture is 
underpinned by the measurement of distortions to agricultural incentives over time (price 
distortions). The analysis hereof yields the extent to which policy reforms have been successful or 
unsuccessful in reversing the “disarray” in global agriculture. Most early studies (see FAO, 1973, 1975; 
OECD, 1987; USDA, 1987, 1988) focused on developed countries and predominantly had a “trade 
distortion” focus. A three-part focus was implied by this policy focus, in which (1) specific commodities 
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were focused upon, (2) price as opposed to non-price policies were analysed and (3) a short- and 
medium-term policy horizon were considered, rather than a long-term structural and technological 
policy horizon (Josling & Valdes, 2004). Consequently, Josling and Valdes (2004) highlight how these 
early studies considered policies that directly impacted on prices, while ignoring factor markets as well 
as exchange rate misalignments. Furthermore, the partial nature of these early policy studies ignored 
the impact of non-agricultural policies on the agricultural sector, which was revealed through the work 
of Krueger et al. (1988) in developing countries to have been a significant omission.  
While many country-specific studies have been conducted throughout the developing world, three 
key cross-country studies/projects since the late 1980s have been pivotal in shaping the agricultural 
price distortions analysis landscape in developing countries. These include, firstly, the seminal multi-
country study by Krueger et al. (1988, 1991) under the direction of the World Bank, covering the period 
1960 to 1984 for a range of 17 developing countries. Secondly, estimates of consumer and producer 
support levels have been (since 1986), and continue to be, provided annually by the Secretariat of the 
OECD, predominantly for its member countries (OECD, 2015). Lastly, complementing the previous two 
studies is the most recent empirical quantification of the extent of policy intervention, conducted by 
Anderson (2009) under the direction of the World Bank for the years 1950 to 2007, with a subsequent 
update to the year 2011 by Anderson and Nelgen (2013).   
For comparative reasons, each of the three studies is reviewed in the rest of Section 2.4, using a three-
point structure. The premise and coverage of each project is first highlighted, followed by a summary 
of the methodology applied before the key findings are presented and discussed.  
2.4.2 World Bank Study by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 
2.4.2.1 Premise and Coverage of the Project 
Four stylised facts about agricultural policies in developing countries served as the theoretical 
motivation for this project. At the time, the view of Krueger et al. (1988) was that the interaction 
among these stylised facts had not been appreciated sufficiently.  
The first of these facts was the observation that the majority of developing countries had adopted 
growth strategies characterised by policies directed at import substitution and the protection of 
domestic producers against competing imports. The second stylised fact concerned overvalued 
exchange rates that had been maintained throughout the developing world as a result of country-
specific exchange control mechanisms in combination with import-licencing mechanisms. The third 
fact highlighted the previously documented trend in the literature that agricultural marketing boards, 
export taxation as well as export quotas had been used by developing countries to suppress the prices 
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of agricultural commodities. The last of these stylised facts was the observation that input 
subsidisation had been used as an attempt by developing countries’ governments in order to offset 
part of the disincentives facing producers (Krueger et al., 1988).  
With the recognition that agriculture is taxed in most developing countries, the premise of the World 
Bank-endorsed project (see Krueger, 1992; Krueger et al., 1988, 1991; Schiff & Valdes, 1992) 
evaluating the political economy of agricultural pricing policy was to determine the magnitude of this 
taxation within countries. Using a uniform methodology, comparative studies were conducted in 18 
developing countries for the time period from 1960 to 1985, which for most developing countries was 
the first 25 years after colonial rule (Anderson, 2010). Furthermore, this period in the international 
economic environment was one of significant volatility in the prices of major global agricultural goods 
(Krueger et al., 1991). This seminal project covered on average 4.3 agricultural products for each of 
the countries for the time period studied, which altogether accounted for 6% of global agricultural 
output at the time (Anderson, 2010:198). Importantly, the project was not only undertaken to 
determine the effects of distortionary policy on agricultural commodity prices, but also to explain how 
political factors and market forces affected government intervention in the agricultural sector 
(Krueger et al., 1991).  
2.4.2.2 Methodology  
Under the notion that most agricultural commodities are tradable, and that the majority of countries’ 
shares in world trade are too insignificant to influence world prices, the price at which countries are 
able to trade agricultural commodities globally is exogenously determined. Consequently, Krueger et 
al. (1991:261) state that, in the case such as the above:  
… the border prices of the commodities examined can be used as reference prices to 
measure the impact of sector specific or direct price interventions on agricultural prices.  
Furthermore, a significant underpinning in the determination of comparable undistorted commodity 
prices was that international commodity prices first needed to be adjusted for transport costs in order 
to make these prices comparable to domestic producer prices. Given this, Krueger et al. (1991) 
highlighted that, in unregulated markets, the reasonable assumption would entail that, once adjusted 
for transport, handling and storage costs as well as for quality differences, domestic producer prices 
would be closely linked to the border price for agricultural commodities.  
The essence of the Krueger et al. (1988) distortion estimates was thus underpinned by the theoretical 
premise aligned with that in the price distortion literature discussed in Section 2.3.1, where, in its 
simplest form, a market distortion was shown to be a situation where Equation (2.1) no longer holds. 
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Empirical estimates were consequently constructed as part of this study in order to quantify the 
magnitude of both direct and indirect policy impacts on agricultural commodity prices. 
Direct impacts included policy intervention that was focused directly on either the inputs into the 
agricultural sector or, alternatively, the outputs from the sector. Contrastingly, the indirect impacts 
were far more complex to estimate and were deconstructed by Krueger et al. (1988) into three main 
components: (1) the real exchange rate depreciation required in order to eliminate the non-
sustainable portion of the current account deficit; (2) the size of the real exchange rate depreciation 
as a result of the removal of trade policy interventions; and (3) the increase in relative prices between 
agricultural and non-agricultural tradable products, as a result of trade policy interventions mainly 
protecting non-agricultural industry.   
The total intervention affecting the agricultural sector was consequently taken to be the sum of the 
direct and indirect policy impacts, with the exception of some adjustments in country-specific cases. 
The intervention estimates were measured using nominal protection rates for the commodities 
covered. These were computed as the proportional difference between the domestic producer price 
(relative to non-agricultural prices) and the border price (after transport, handling, quality and storage 
adjustments) measured at the official exchange rate (Krueger et al., 1988).  
2.4.2.3 Key Findings 
The study by Krueger et al. (1988) reasserted the a priori literature conclusions in terms of policy 
discrimination against agriculture in developing nations. However, the most notable finding from this 
seminal study was the magnitude of this discrimination and the manner in which it had remained 
constant over the study period.  
The study found that, on average, direct government intervention in the agricultural sector had 
resulted in agricultural prices being depressed by around 8%, while indirect intervention had resulted 
in a depression of prices for the period covered of around 23% (Krueger, 1992:61). Furthermore, in 
addition to the sheer magnitude of the discrimination, the study’s findings emphasised the importance 
of exchange rate policy and the protection of non-agricultural industry in the discrimination against 
agriculture. What arose from this was the general notion that the impact of economywide direct 
interventions in agriculture by far outweighed the direct policy effects on agriculture, regardless of 
whether the direct effects were positive or negative (Krueger et al. 1988). In terms of the policy 
stances between agricultural importables and agricultural exportables, Krueger et al. (1988:264) 
summed up the general trend for the two time periods of their study (1975 to 1979 and 1980 to 1984) 
using Malaysian rice and rubber producers as an example, as follows:  
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Indeed, the degree of discrimination against exportables in favour of import competing 
crops is remarkable: contrast Malaysian rice, receiving the equivalent of 38 and 68 
percent nominal protection over the two time periods, with Malaysian rubber, taxed at 
the equivalent of 25 and 18 percent. Direct pricing policy led to an increase in the relative 
price of rice of 84 percent in 1975-79 and 105 percent in 1980-84 (relative to rubber).  
Although extreme, the Malaysian rice/rubber case highlights one of two significant findings of the 
study with regard to sector-specific agricultural interventions. Firstly, there was a stark contrast 
between the direct policy stances towards imported food products and exported crops, as it was 
observed that food imports on average were subsidised, while exports were taxed. Secondly, the 
study’s findings indicate that, in around 70% of the studied countries, food production had been 
protected through direct policies. Such findings were labelled as ironic by the authors of the study, as 
for the study period, most of the covered countries had foreign exchange shortages, therefore it was 
puzzling that agricultural policies were in effect compounding this foreign exchange shortage by 
reducing the amount of foreign exchange earned (Krueger, 1992). Considering the country-specific 
studies and the ensuing analysis, Krueger (1992) outlines several key conclusions that can be 
extracted.  
Firstly, from the data evidence for the period, it was revealed how greater discrimination against 
agriculture was directly related to slower economywide economic growth (see Table 3-1 in (Schiff & 
Valdes, 1992)). As a result, this evidence largely helped refute the argument once present in the 
literature, namely that discrimination against agriculture leads to more resources being available for 
industrial development and spurs economic growth.  
Secondly, the revenue gain for governments from the discriminative policies was short lived and 
consequently does not hold water as a motive for such policy stances. Furthermore, Krueger (1992) 
points to evidence that, under the situation where government revenue was the motive, pricing 
policies would have taken a different stance from that which prevailed. This stance would have been 
characterised, firstly, by the efficient allocation of resources amongst agricultural commodities and, 
secondly, the uniform taxation of all commodities. Such a stance would have ensured maximum tax 
revenue gain for governments.  
Thirdly, as discussed by Schiff and Valdes (1992), the only goal of agricultural pricing policy that was 
shown by the evidence to be realised was the stabilisation of domestic commodity prices within the 
studied countries relative to international commodity prices. However, Krueger et al. (1988) question 
the relative cost of this stability, while Krueger (1992) emphasises how such an objective of price 
stability is able to be achieved independently of efforts to raise or lower average prices paid to 
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farmers. Consequently, the pursuance of such an objective is insufficient in explaining why domestic 
prices received by farmers were so much lower than international prices of the equivalent commodity 
over the studied time period.  
Fourthly, as the Malaysian rice/rubber example portrayed for Malaysia, foreign exchange shortages 
were experienced by most of the project countries. However, discriminative agricultural policy stances 
persisted across the studied countries, in which the average reduction in export earnings as a 
proportion of actual earnings within countries was 29%. Krueger (1992) consequently questions the 
willingness of policy makers over the time period to self-constrain their respective country’s abilities 
to import essential goods and services into their countries.  
The last of the key conclusions from the study concerned the relatively small magnitude of the income-
distribution effects as a result of the policy discrimination. Schiff and Valdes (1992a), through their 
analysis of income distribution, refuted the proposition that agricultural pricing policies had been 
undertaken in order to ensure improved access to food for lower-income consumers. This refutation 
is aligned with the assertion of Krueger (1992) that, as a result of the majority of the poor coming from 
rural areas in the countries studied, discrimination against agricultural commodities produced by this 
proportion of the population would naturally have an adverse impact on income distribution. For 
selected countries within the project for which the necessary data was available, the above assertion 
was reinforced by the data.  
In summary, the findings of this seminal study uncovered the various mechanisms through which the 
economic policy environment affects the agricultural sector and successfully quantified these impacts. 
In addition to the stark contrasts that prevailed in the policy stances towards imported food products 
and exported crops in developing countries, a notable finding was the manner in which indirect, 
economywide policies generally dominated the effects of direct agricultural policies in the developing 
countries studied (Krueger et al. 1988). This was reinforced through the policy bias towards the 
protection of industry, as well as the currency overvaluations characteristic of the developing world 
during the period. 
2.4.3 Ongoing Project by The Secretariat of the OECD 
2.4.3.1 Premise and Coverage of the Project 
The early 1970s were characterised by a sharp rise in agricultural commodity demand and prices, 
which was followed by accelerated inflation and a worldwide recession towards the late 1970s/early 
1980s (Huff & Moreddu, 1989). This economic environment, together with the macroeconomic 
policies at the time, contributed to the depression of agricultural incomes (Huff & Moreddu, 1989). In 
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response to depressed agricultural incomes, many OECD member governments introduced a variety 
of policy measures targeted at assisting agricultural producers. As a result of these policy measures, 
the OECD agricultural economy became isolated from world markets while its member countries’ 
agricultural expenditures skyrocketed. In addition to this, consumers faced higher food prices (Huff & 
Moreddu, 1989).  
In 1982, the OECD ministerial council committed to reforming agricultural policies in order to more 
fully integrate agricultural trade within the open, multilateral trading system. In the light of this 
commitment, OECD countries were advised to pursue a gradual reduction in protection and a 
liberalisation of trade, while continuing to maintain a balance between countries as well as between 
commodities (OECD, 2016a). In order to monitor the progress of this, the ministerial council requested 
the OECD to develop a framework that would be able to measure the progress of the reduction in 
protection and liberalisation of trade.  
The resulting study (mandated in 1987 by OECD ministers) has since (from 1986) calculated annual 
quantitative measures of assistance to producers and consumers for OECD member states, as well as 
for selected non-OECD countries in recent times. The utility of quantitative support indicators that are 
comparable across time and between countries is indicated by the OECD (2016b) to be three-fold.  
Firstly, the indicators can be used in order to monitor and evaluate the levels and composition of 
agricultural support with respect to the policy reform agenda. Such monitoring includes measuring 
the extent of reform between countries and individual commodities over time. Furthermore, the 
relative success or failure of specific policy reform efforts, such as various CAP reforms as well as 
progress in relation to the 1982 OECD Ministerial Council agreement, can be established.  
Secondly, through using a consistent and comparable method to calculate the nature and extent of 
support, the OECD indicators ensure a common base for policy dialogue. In 2016 the indicators were 
calculated and published for 47 countries (27 EU members were treated as a single entry), which 
enhanced their international comparability and their use as a tool for policy dialogue amongst a broad 
range of institutions and organisations, both within the OECD member states as well as outside of the 
OECD member states.  
The final utility aspect of the quantitative support indicators is the purpose that the data serves as an 
input into modelling. This aspect ensures research usability of the indicators and enables empirical 
modelling to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of specific policies in delivering their targeted 
outcomes. As cautioned by the OECD (2016b), the support indicators alone are unable to quantify the 
relative success or failure of specific policies against their stated objectives; however, the economic 
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information from which the indicators are constructed serves as a critical building block in this type of 
analysis.  
Although initially being established in order to measure the reduction of agricultural protection within 
OECD member states, the OECD’s annual Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation reports have 
continued to increase both in scope as well as country coverage. By 2008, the OECD reports covered 
30 countries in total, which at the time accounted for just more than 25% of the global agricultural 
output when valued at undistorted prices (Anderson, 2010). By 2016, the country coverage had 
reached 50 countries, including 34 OECD countries, seven non-OECD EU member states and nine 
emerging economies, including South Africa. 
2.4.3.2 Methodology 
A common element identified by the OECD regarding agricultural policies is that these policies 
generate transfers to agriculture. Under the methodology applied by the OECD, agriculture is seen as 
a supported sector and is deemed to be the main beneficiary of policy transfers (OECD, 2016b). As 
graphically depicted in Figure 2.1 to Figure 2.4 , the main sources of these policy transfers and the 
consequent economic groups bearing the cost are consumers of agricultural products and taxpayers 
in the respective economies. Furthermore, underlying the key measurement aspects of agricultural 
support is the perspective from which agricultural producers are viewed – either as individual 
entrepreneurs or, alternatively, as a collective sector (OECD, 2016b).  
Preceding the calculation of the agricultural support indicators is the definition of the policy measures 
that are to be included in the measurement of support. Policies are differentiated according to which 
of the three economic groups (agricultural producers individually, agricultural consumers, agricultural 
producers collectively) receive the policy transfer concerned. As stated by the OECD (2016b:25), a 
specific policy measure will only be included in the measurement of support if the policy “provides a 
transfer whose incidence is at farm level” and “is directed specifically to agricultural producers or 
treats agricultural producers differently from other economic agents in the economy”.   
Based on the above policy differentiation, policies are grouped into three broad economic groups, 
namely producer support estimates (PSE), general services support estimates (GSSE) and consumer 
support estimates (CSE). Each of these broad groups contain sub-indicator measures that are used in 
calculating the broader indicator. The total support estimate (TSE) is the sum of these three economic 
groups and provides an estimate of the annual value of transfers from policy measures that support 
agriculture. All four of the above indicators are published as monetary indicators as well as percentage 
indicators, with varying interpretations. However, a detailed discussion of these does not fall within 
the scope of this review of the methodology and is discussed extensively in OECD (2016c).  
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2.4.3.3 Key Findings 
The overall burden of one country’s economy as a result of its support of agriculture is measured by 
the TSE as a percentage of GDP (%TSE). According to the OECD's 2016 Agricultural Policy Monitoring 
and Evaluation report, most of the covered countries have persisted with positive %TSEs (with some 
exceptions), although steady decreases in the %TSEs have been a common trend since the mid-1990s. 
This is in line with the declining share of the agricultural sector within countries’ economies as they 
undergo economic development (OECD, 2016b).  
The composition of the aggregate TSE remains dominated by the PSE, which for the majority of 
countries represents more than 80% of the TSE (2013 to 2015 period) (OECD, 2016b:42). On average, 
the GSSE represented 12% of the TSE calculated for the period from 2013 to 2015. However, this 
somewhat lower average compared to the mid-1990s is largely due to a relative decline in GSSE of TSE 
as a result of China’s extraordinary increase in PSE for the period. The CSE represents the final 
component of the TSE and, in most countries in the study, has maintained a negative value over time, 
which is indicative of the implicit tax placed on consumers as a result of agricultural policies (OECD, 
2016b). 
The PSE – the largest component of the TSE, has tended to follow a declining trend over the past 
twenty years, with market price support (MPS) remaining the driving component of the PSE. MPS does 
not burden the state budget directly; rather, this type of support for agricultural producers is as a 
result of transfers from consumers of agricultural commodities to the producers thereof. From a policy 
distortions perspective, the OECD (2001) highlights how MPS are one of three forms of support that 
are deemed to have significant potential to induce distortions in production and trade. Analysis of the 
average %PSE between OECD countries and emerging countries aligns itself with the historical trends 
of agricultural policy in the literature, as well as with the broader OECD policy reform agenda initiated 
in 1982.  
During the mid-1990s, OECD countries were generally providing significant support to agricultural 
producers, whereas emerging countries were generally taxing their agricultural producers or providing 
extremely low levels of support to them (OECD, 2016b). Such a situation is aligned with the 
explanation in Section 2.2.1, where the historical observation was shown to be that pre-industrialised 
agricultural sectors in the developing world are generally taxed, whereas industrialised agricultural 
sectors in the developed world are supported.  
Since the mid-1990s, the support provided to farmers in the emerging countries as opposed to the 
OECD countries included in the study exhibited opposite trends. In line with the OECD ministerial 
agreement reached in 1982, OECD countries’ average support levels for agriculture have continued to 
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decline and have roughly halved in the period from the mid-1990s to 2015. In contrast, and aligned 
with the relationship between agricultural support levels and economic development, emerging 
countries’ support for agriculture has increased from the low and negative levels observed in the mid-
1990s to average levels. These average levels in 2015 were surprisingly higher than the average of the 
OECD countries, although this was largely due to the massive levels of support provided to agricultural 
producers in China and Indonesia. 
2.4.4 Anderson-led World Bank Project 
2.4.4.1 Premise and Coverage of the Project 
The World Bank’s project on “Poverty alleviation through reducing distortions to agricultural 
incentives” was grounded on five premises (Anderson et al., 2006). Firstly, it was observed that more 
than two-thirds of the world’s poor people were from developing countries and, furthermore, that 
they depended directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods. Secondly, as shown by Dollar 
and Kraay (2002, 2004), poverty can be alleviated by economic growth. Their findings show that, on 
average, growth benefits the poor as much as anyone else in society. Thirdly, price and trade policy 
interventions by governments have been shown by Bhagwati (1969) to have comparative static 
welfare costs, while also being shown to be growth inhibiting, amongst others by Winters (2002, 
2004). Furthermore, Reardon and Timmer (2006) show how these interventions by government were 
and still are becoming increasingly costly through their blunting effect on producers’ responsiveness 
to consumers’ shifting preferences towards the quality, variety and safety attributes of food. The 
fourth premise of the project was the theme consistently present in the literature that, in most 
developing countries, farming incomes have been supressed by policies, while in most developed 
countries, farming incomes have been raised. This has had a knock-on effect in developing nations of 
further supressing the earnings of farming households. Lastly, as Anderson et al. (2006) state, the 
apparent objective of the government interventions in both the developed and developing world 
could be achieved more efficiently and effectively using alternate instruments to the ones currently 
chosen.  
With the backdrop of the five premises discussed above, Anderson et al.'s (2006) empirical framework 
was constructed in order to evaluate the degree to which the last two premises still hold. In line with 
the broader policy agenda of moving towards free trade, the empirical framework was designed in 
order to measure the progress of individual economies towards a low-distorting policy environment. 
Where large distortions still remained, the framework allowed for the nature of these distortions to 
be determined, while also being able to predict what the relative contributions would be of policy 
reform by developing countries, developed countries as well as own policy reforms to a specific 
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country’s agricultural distortions. Furthermore, the potential contributions to reducing these 
distortions by agricultural policy reform relative to non-agricultural reform were also a product of the 
empirical framework. Theoretical explanations could then be constructed on a country-specific level 
in order to account for the historical patterns of distortions throughout various stages of development.  
The study initially covered a total of 70 products across 75 countries, which were representative of 
90% to 96% of global GDP and global agricultural GDP for the time period 1955 to 2007. A subsequent 
update of the developed countries in the sample and a select few developing countries was 
undertaken by Anderson and Nelgen (2013), covering the period 1955 to 2011. This update also 
expanded the coverage to 82 countries using the data provided on an annual basis by the OECD 
(methodology outlined in Section 2.4.3.2), as well as FAO data and the World Bank’s pink sheets.  
2.4.4.2 Methodology 
The methodology constructed by Anderson et al. (2006) draws inspiration from and builds on the 
OECD measurement methods, as well as the methodology employed by Krueger et al. (1988). Aligned 
to the theoretical base of price distortions, this methodology is centred on the measurement of 
government-imposed distortions that create a wedge between the domestic price (distorted price) of 
the specific commodity and the like tradable commodity’s border price (undistorted price) (Anderson, 
2010). In the case of a non-traded product, the undistorted price is seen as the farm commodity price 
that would have prevailed in the absence of domestic subsidies and taxes.   
Nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) and consumer tax equivalents (CTEs) characterise the empirical 
indicators representing the policy assistance or taxation experienced of producers and consumers of 
agricultural products respectively. A series of ratios are then applicable in order to extract the 
dynamics of the policy impact from the calculated indicators and to analyse the consequent trends 
over time.  
2.4.4.2.1 Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRA) 
The NRA for each farm commodity is representative of the percentage by which government policies 
have directly raised gross farm incomes above what these incomes would have been in the absence 
of intervention. Using the value of production at undistorted prices as weights, the weighted average 
NRA for all covered agricultural commodities is calculated across countries. This is done by using an 
estimate of the NRA for the 30% of non-covered products, in conjunction with the empirical estimates 
of the covered products. Within the covered commodities, a further distinction is made between 
exportable commodities, import-competing commodities and non-tradable commodities. This 
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distinction enables the NRAs to be calculated according to the trade status of commodity groups and 
thus assists in identifying trade or anti-trade policy biases.  
On the intuition that government policy intervention in non-agricultural sectors also alters the 
incentives of agricultural producers – predominantly through factor markets, NRAs are also estimated 
for the non-agricultural economic sectors of the respective country economies. With these estimates, 
the impact of all government policies on agricultural producers, both directly and indirectly, is able to 
be estimated and presented as the total rate of assistance to agriculture (Anderson et al., 2008). 
Similar to the policy biases that can be identified between agricultural commodities based on trade 
status, comparisons between the NRAs of agricultural commodities and non-agricultural commodities 
allow policy biases between the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector to be identified and 
quantified.  
2.4.4.2.2 Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) 
Although the predominant focus of this methodology is on the policy implications for agricultural 
producers, consumers may concurrently be either taxed or subsidised under the existing policy 
environment. Therefore, CTE measures are calculated to encompass the deviation between the price 
paid by consumers for food products (adjusted to farmgate level) and the international price at the 
country’s border for the food products.  
In the absence of any policy-induced distortions in the domestic economy, the adjusted farmgate 
consumer price for a specific agricultural product will be equal to the price received by the producer 
of the product. However, distortions – typically as a result of transfer policies and various forms of 
taxes and subsidies – result in price differences between what consumers pay and what producers 
receive (Anderson, 2010). By using the value of production as weights, the weighted average of CTEs 
across commodities and countries is able to be determined and used to reflect the extent to which 
the policy environment is affecting consumers.  
2.4.4.3 Key Findings 
The findings by Anderson (2009) on policy-induced distortions in the developed and developing world 
are characteristic of the contrasting policy stances towards agriculture accompanying the various 
stages in economic development (Section 2.2.1). However, in line with the broader global policy-
reform agenda, the study noted a convergent trend between developed and developing countries’ 
policies during the years subsequent to 1985. Key to conceptualising this convergence is 
understanding the contrasting policy environment that had developed in the developed and 
developing world from the late 1950s until 1985, as opposed to that which prevailed post-1985.  
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As stated by Anderson (2010), the nominal rates of assistance, as well as the relative rates of assistance 
to the covered countries arising from the study, highlight several points of interest masked by the two 
contrasting time periods.  
2.4.4.3.1 Time Period 1950 to 1984 
Firstly, the agricultural sectors throughout the developed world were already heavily assisted in the 
late 1950s, for which agricultural NRAs in excess of 20% were calculated by Anderson (2009). These 
rates of assistance to agriculture doubled over the period up to 1984, with the only slight dip in this 
upward trend occurring in the mid-1970s as a result of food price spikes (Anderson, 2010). In contrast, 
the developing world was heavily taxing agriculture, which was reflected in the calculated average 
NRA of around -20% for the period prior to 1985.  
In addition to the aggregate NRA trend prior to 1985, the intra-sectoral trends uncovered in the study 
highlighted how both export-producing farmers as well as import-competing farmers in developed 
nations were assisted under the prevailing policy environment. This finding was consistent with the 
prior findings of Krueger et al. (1988) for the same time period, although suggesting far greater levels 
of support and taxation by including policy intervention in the non-agricultural sector in the empirical 
measurement. 
A comparison of the NRAs between import-competing farmers in developed countries and their 
developing country counterparts shows how developed farmers producing import-competing 
products experienced NRAs that on average were three times those experienced by their developing-
country equivalents. Furthermore, export-producing farmers in developed nations also received policy 
assistance during this period, albeit significantly less than their import-competing countrymen. On the 
other hand, during the same time period, export-producing farmers in developing nations were 
heavily taxed, while import-competing producers in these nations were increasingly assisted. The 
above trends are reflected in the negative trade bias index values corresponding to the same time 
period (see Table 4 in Anderson, 2010).  
Lastly, as alluded to by Anderson (2010), the pro-agricultural policy strengthening in the developed 
world was enhanced by the decline in manufacturing protection in the developed nations in the study, 
starting from 1955. This policy enhancement was reflected in the relative rates of assistance (RRA) 
measures calculated in the study, where the RRA on average rose more for the developed world than 
the agricultural NRA average. The strengthening of this pro-agricultural policy stance in the developed 
world consequently increased competition in world agricultural markets, which implied that farmers 
in developing countries were harmed by both their own countries’ agricultural policies as well as the 
non-agricultural policies of developed countries (Anderson, 2010).   
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2.4.4.3.2 Time Period Post-1984  
Characterising the policy shift in the developing world post-1984 is a reversal of the net taxation of 
agriculture (negative NRA) to positive support for agriculture (positive NRA). This reversal was driven 
by the substantial reduction in the taxation of export agriculture and the increased protection of 
import-competing agricultural producers in developing countries (Anderson, 2010). Consequently, the 
aggregate trade bias index for developing countries for the quarter of a century from 1985 steadily 
became less negative in the face of agricultural export protection declining at a faster rate than 
agricultural import protection was growing. Similarly, the anti-trade bias decreased somewhat in 
developed nations. Anderson (2009), however, alludes to the fact that, due to the anti-trade biases 
that still exist in developed and developing countries, non-uniform rates of assistance are prevalent 
across commodities. This non-uniformity points to resources not being put to their best use within the 
global farming sector.   
Contrasting the rates of assistance to the agricultural sectors with those of the non-agricultural sectors 
in developing countries culminates in the relative rate of assistance (RRA) measure. As depicted in the 
results of Anderson (2009), the weighted average RRA for developed nations improved from a level 
worse than -50% in the late 1970s to just above zero in the later years of the period (2000 to 2004). 
However, the explanation for this reversal hinges on the degree to which non-agricultural NRAs have 
declined, which has consequently driven a more significant improvement in the RRA than the 
disappearance of negative NRAs for agricultural products.  
Although not as extreme as in developing countries, developed countries also saw an improvement in 
their weighted average RRA. However, this improvement came from the opposite direction to that of 
developing countries and was deemed an improvement, as RRAs started to move downwards and 
closer to a zero value, which characterises an economy with no pro- or anti-agricultural bias. 
Consequently, it can be concluded that it was rather global trade liberalisation that drove the 
improvement in the RRAs across all of the studied countries as opposed to agriculture-specific policy 
(Anderson, 2010).  
2.4.4.3.3 Global Summary 
In summary, the findings of Anderson (2009) are aligned with the theoretical trends in the way 
agriculture is treated throughout the various stages of economic development. Through a more 
inclusive empirical method, the study particularly reinforces the findings for the developing countries 
covered by Krueger et al. (1988) for the equivalent period leading up to 1984. These findings are 
consistent with the broader trend in the developing economy observed throughout the study period. 
Furthermore, the trade liberalisation trend – also displayed in the findings of the OECD (2016b) for 
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post-1985 until more recently – is also pivotal to the findings of Anderson (2009), particularly in the 
developing world, where a complete reversal of taxation was found in the agricultural sector. The 
trends for these two country groups in the empirical results of Anderson (2009) for the period from 
1955 until 2007 (also applicable up until 2011 for the selected updated countries) generally converge 
on a minimal policy-distorting environment. This convergence has occurred with developed nations 
being seen to have reduced agricultural sector support and developing nations seen to have reduced 
taxation.  
2.4.4.4 The South African Context 
It is imperative to interpret the historical changes in distortions to South African agricultural producer 
incentives in the context of the significant structural changes that were initiated by key policy drivers 
during the time period 1955 to 2005. According to Kirsten et al. (2009), these structural changes were 
initiated sequentially, first by the initial voting power of white farmers who were able to use this power 
to attract favourable policy treatment from the government. This was followed by the impact of 
sanctions on the South African economy and increased isolation from the global sphere, which meant 
that the deregulation and liberalisation steps taken throughout the 1980s were aimed at the domestic 
market. The third major initiator of structural change was that of the effect of democratisation on the 
South African economy, ushering in a new political leadership structure and wider macroeconomic 
policy reform. Most recently, the impact of multilateral trade liberalisation has been and continues to 
be a key driver of the evolving economic structure.  
The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) indicators for South African agriculture in the period of the study 
by Kirsten et al. (2009) on average reflect the change in policy that accompanied the structural 
changes seen in the South African economy during the half a decade leading up to 2005. Kirsten et 
al.'s (2009) NRA estimates reflect the trend towards trade liberalisation and portray a change in policy 
stance from one with a strong anti-trade bias in the 1970s and 1980s to a more liberal stance in the 
1990s and early 2000s. Furthermore, when comparing importable and exportable product groups, the 
quantitative import controls in place for most of the period between 1960 and 1994 are reflected in 
the positive NRA estimates for importables. However, as noted by Kirsten et al. (2009), the NRAs for 
importable products were significantly reduced to close to zero percent in the period 1995 to 2005, in 
line with South Africa’s obligations under the Marrakech Agreement on Agriculture. On the other 
hand, as liberalisation measures were introduced after 1995, the South African export portfolio 
experienced a shift away from a yellow maize- and fresh fruit-dominated portfolio. All measures to 
support exports and shield against export losses were abolished, yielding a decline in the average NRA 
for exportable agricultural products.  
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The trade liberalisation trend initiated in the mid-1990s was reflected in low levels of aggregate 
distortions in agriculture up to the end of the studied time period. While indicating that economic 
policies on average had a neutral impact on aggregate agricultural production, Kirsten et al. (2009) 
highlight the significant variation between agricultural industries. This variation between the mid-
1990s and 2005, during which some agricultural industries were being taxed and others protected, 
suggests that there was scope for efficiency gains to be realised within the agricultural sector through 
the phasing out of inter-industry NRA differences (Kirsten et al., 2009).  
The results estimated by Kirsten et al. (2009) on the nominal rate of assistance and relative rate of 
assistance reaffirmed the general perception of the time, namely that, since the mid-1990s, South 
African agriculture had on average been operating in an undistorted environment. However, the 
general update of the agricultural distortions database by Anderson and Nelgen (2013) failed to 
incorporate a South African component. Consequently, no empirical indicators of the incentives facing 
agricultural producers for the most recent 10 years post-2005, besides those published by the OECD, 
are available for South Africa. Therefore, when wanting to contrast the recent decades of South 
African agricultural producer-incentive trends with those faced by producers for the previous five 
decades, an update of the distortion estimates using the globally comparable methodology of 
Anderson et al. (2006) is the empirically wise choice.  
2.5 Value Chain Approach to Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives 
2.5.1 Motivation for a Disaggregated Model  
The methodology developed by Anderson et al. (2006) is able to indicate the degree to which 
agricultural producers (NRA) and product consumers (CTE) are taxed or subsidised under various 
policy environments. These measures are able to be calculated for specific commodities, as well as for 
aggregated groups such as exportable commodities or import-competing commodities. Furthermore, 
as will be empirically highlighted in Chapter 3, these indicators are able to be aggregated into sectoral 
indicators, where the split between the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector culminates 
in the relative rate of assistance (Equation (3.11)), which indicates the anti- or pro-agricultural bias of 
the current policy environment.  
However, Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) dissect the NRA measure of Anderson et al. (2006), 
which represents the distortions to producers, and CTE, which represents the distortions faced by 
consumers and emphasises the fundamental point that, within each of the “producer” and 
“consumer” groups, there are a large number of agents throughout the value chain. Using the example 
of the NRA measured at the level of processed sugar, Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) highlight 
that there are both farmers of raw sugar cane as well as sugar-processing companies within the 
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“producers” category. Consequently, it is not clear from the broad NRA indicator developed by 
Anderson et al. (2006) how the specific policy environment affects specific groups, such as farmers, 
throughout the value chain. A similar intuition holds in the case of the “consumers” category, for which 
the CTE indicates the distortions being faced. In the case of sugar, consumers include both households 
and the general food industry. Each of these groups is part of the CTE indicator, although the 
aggregated measure fails to provide specific information on the distorting effect of the current policy 
environment on each group’s welfare.  
The difficulty of determining the policy impact of groups within the “producers” and “consumers” 
categories gives rise to the need for an indicator of the disaggregated nominal rate of assistance in 
order to disentangle the aggregate distortions faced by various groups throughout the value chain.  
2.5.2 The South African Wheat Industry  
Wheat cultivation and wheat milling are two of the oldest agricultural activities and industries in South 
Africa, and can be traced back to the first European settlers in the Western Cape (Mncube, 2013). 
After maize, wheat represents one of the most important grain crops in South Africa, with the wheat 
industry contributing significantly to agricultural GDP (Meyer & Kirsten, 2005). Furthermore, milled 
wheat flour as an input for bread continues to grow in importance, with bread firmly poised as one of 
the main staple foods in South Africa.  
The wheat value chain in South Africa was extensively regulated between 1937 and 1996, with the 
Wheat Board in place as the main intermediary between wheat grain producers and wheat grain 
processors. The centralised Wheat Board operated a single marketing channel for wheat, fixing wheat 
prices while also controlling imports and exports (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). This control enabled 
the manipulation of import and export prices by the Board, thus protecting the local supply chain from 
market forces.  
Shortly after the institution of the first democratic government in South Africa, the marketing of 
agricultural products changed dramatically with the introduction of the Marketing of Agricultural 
Products Act, No. 47 of 1996. These changes included the closure of multiple industry control boards, 
including the Wheat Board, together with commodity tariffication (Mncube, 2013). Allowing 
international market forces to prevail enabled international competitors to enter the domestic market 
and to play a significant role in the wheat industry supply chain (Van der Merwe et al., 2016).  
One of the unintended consequences of the abolition of the Wheat Board is highlighted by Cock (2009) 
as being the concentration of ownership and regulation across the entire wheat-to-bread value chain. 
This concentration was driven primarily by the necessity for higher efficiency in an open market, as is 
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evident from the decline in wheat buyers – from 137 mills in 1997 to 65 mills in 2011 (Van der Merwe 
et al., 2016). This market concentration is reflected in the four biggest milling companies accounting 
for more than 95% of all flour sales in the domestic market (Mncube, 2013). 
Although it has a competitive advantage in the wheat milling industry, wheat production in South 
Africa remains internationally uncompetitive (Van der Merwe et al., 2016). However, Van der Merwe 
et al. (2016) show how the increased market concentration following the abolition of the Wheat Board 
coincided with the decreased competitiveness of wheat producers. Their findings conclude that the 
decline in competitiveness of wheat farmers is due to farmers’ inability to adapt to the free market 
system without the significant protection as was provided during the Wheat Board era. They 
furthermore raise concerns about the policy environment in which wheat producers have to operate.  
Given the high level of concentration in the wheat milling industry, and the consequent regulatory and 
market control that this concentration yields, collusion between firms was inevitable. Mncube (2013) 
methodically evaluates these conditions that are conducive to collusive, while documenting the details 
of the wheat flour cartel that was active from 1999 to 2007. However, neither Van der Merwe et al. 
(2016) nor Mncube (2013) seek explanations for possible policy drivers of the competitiveness of 
agents within the wheat value chain.  
The motivation for the current study was primarily concerned with updating the aggregate distortion 
estimates for primary agricultural production in South Africa, and then disaggregating these estimates 
per agent in the wheat value chain. However, with the recent history of the wheat industry being 
characterised by cartels at the processing level, together with declining competitiveness in wheat 
production, disaggregated policy distortion estimates will provide key insights into the policy 
environment under which the collusion and decline in competitiveness have been occurring.  
2.6 Conclusion  
Given the reasons why governments intervene in agriculture in the context of the political economy 
of agriculture, the empirical theory of price distortions proves critical in quantifying this intervention. 
While multiple studies that have attempted to quantify these intervention-driven price distortions 
have been reviewed, the superior coverage of the Anderson-led World Bank study positions it ideally 
to be applied in a study updating policy-induced price distortions in South African agriculture. 
Furthermore, the clearly defined vertical structure of the South African wheat value chain enables a 
disaggregation of the aggregate commodity-distortion estimates per agent in the wheat value chain, 
using the Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) framework.  
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Therefore, from the review of the literature, three aspects with regard to the available distortion 
estimates for primary agriculture in South Africa are important. Firstly, an update of the distortion 
estimates database – initially constructed by Kirsten et al. (2009) under the Anderson-led World Bank 
project – is due for South Africa for the years post-2005. Secondly, there is a need to assess the reasons 
for the variation in the updated commodity distortion estimates for primary agricultural producers 
post-2005. Lastly, due to the omission of a commodity-specific value chain distortion estimate study 
in the South African literature, the South African wheat value chain is ideally positioned for the 
pioneering of such a disaggregated approach. Thus, the basis of the current study is a combination of 
a distortion estimates update on the basis of the Anderson et al. (2006) methodology, as used by 
Kirsten et al. (2009), together with the application of the disaggregated distortion estimate 
methodology of Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) in the wheat value chain. 
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 Study Methodology  
3.1 Introduction  
The theoretical discussion and review of past attempts at measuring policy-induced distortions in 
agriculture have highlighted the relevance of the Anderson et al. (2006) methodology for the South 
African agricultural context. As concluded in Chapter 2, and considering that the period of the Kirsten 
et al. (2009) study ended in 2005, an update of the agricultural distortion estimates is due for South 
Africa, using the Anderson et al. (2006) methodology. Furthermore, Chapter 2 highlighted how a 
disaggregated approach to this measurement per commodity would uncover key insights into the 
manner in which individual agents within a specific commodity value chain are affected by the policy 
environment. The first part of this chapter outlines the methodology designed by Anderson et al. 
(2006) that was applied by Kirsten et al. (2009) and was applied selectively in this study. This is 
followed by an explanation of the methodology of the disaggregated approach as applied by Briones 
Alonso and Swinnen (2015), which was applied as an extension to the Anderson et al. (2006) 
framework for the South African wheat industry. The final part of the chapter highlights the key 
indicators from the two methodologies and concludes.  
3.2 General Commodity Framework 
3.2.1 Direct Agricultural Distortions  
In the situation of many firms producing a homogenous product using just primary factors while 
operating in a small, open, perfectly competitive market, economic welfare would be maximised if the 
following relationship holds (Anderson et al., 2008):  
 
 
In Equation (3.1), DFP represents the domestic farmgate price for a product, CPP represents the 
consumer product price for the product, and E × P is the domestic currency price for foreign exchange 
multiplied by the foreign currency price for the specific product in the international market. 
Furthermore, the relationship in Equation (3.1) only holds in the absence of externalities, product 
processing, marketing margins, exchange rate distortions and domestic and international trading 
costs. The result of any government-imposed diversion from the above equality in the absence of 
market failures or externalities would have a welfare-reducing impact on the small economy 
described. Consequently, the analytical framework developed by Anderson et al. (2006) sets out to 
measure any government-imposed diversion from the equality in Equation (3.1).  
 𝐷𝐹𝑃 = 𝐶𝑃𝑃 = (𝐸 × 𝑃) (3.1) 
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3.2.1.1 Nominal Rate of Assistance & Consumer Tax Equivalent (NRA & CTE) 
3.2.1.1.1 Distortions Imposed at the National Border. 
Considering a situation where an ad valorem import tariff (tm) is the only distortion, its distorting effect 
on producer incentives is able to be determined by the nominal rate of assistance to farm output as a 
result of border price support (NRABS). The NRABS is the unit value of production at the distorted price 
less the unit value of production at the undistorted price expressed as a fraction of the undistorted 
price. This relationship is depicted mathematically in Equation (3.2). 
 
 
The NRA as depicted in Equation (3.2) differs from the PSE as calculated by the OECD in that the PSE 
is expressed as a fraction of the distorted value, whereas the NRA is expressed as a fraction of the 
undistorted value (E × P).  
The parallel impact of an ad valorem import tariff (tm) on consumer incentives is represented by a 
consumer tax equivalent (CTE) for the specific agricultural product in question for final consumers. 
The CTE relationship is contained in Equation (3.3).  
 
 
Had the border price intervention been an import subsidy rather than a tariff, tm in Equation (3.2) and 
Equation (3.3) would have a negative value, reflecting the decreased price faced by importers and 
consumers. The opposite intuition to that in Equation (3.2) and Equation (3.3) holds in the case of an 
export subsidy (sx) or export tax (-sx).  
3.2.1.1.2 Domestic Producer and Consumer Price-distorting Measures 
While border price intervention is one source of incentive distortions, direct interventions for farmers 
by government in the form of a production subsidy (sf) or tax (-sf) also distort producer incentives. 
Similarly, on the consumption front, a consumption subsidy (cc) or tax (-cc) distorts the incentives of 
consumers. In the presence of such interventions, and in the absence of any other distortions, the 
nominal rate of assistance to farming output conferred by the domestic price intervention (NRADS) can 
be determined as in Equation (3.2), except that sf replaces tm. However, in the case of a direct 
production intervention (sf or -sf), the CTE is zero. Similarly, in the case of a direct consumption 
intervention (cc or -cc), the NRADS is zero. Combining the distortions imposed at the national border 
 
𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑆 =  
𝐸 × 𝑃(1 + 𝑡𝑚) − 𝐸 × 𝑃
𝐸 × 𝑃
= 𝑡𝑚 (3.2) 
 𝐶𝑇𝐸 =  𝑡𝑚 (3.3) 
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and those as a result of direct production or consumption intervention yields a total rate of assistance 
to output and the total consumer tax equivalent, as depicted in Equation (3.4) and Equation (3.5).  
 
 
 
3.2.1.1.3 Exchange rate-driven price distortions  
In a multi-tier exchange rate system, the cost of foreign currency for importers is typically higher than 
the price at which exporters are forced to surrender their foreign exchange earnings at (Anderson et 
al., 2008). Consequently, according to Bhagwati (1978), a wedge is created that changes the 
equilibrium exchange rate (“E” in Equation (3.1) and Equation (3.2)) from the level that otherwise 
would have prevailed in the market for foreign exchange without the government-induced distortion.  
The surrendering of foreign exchange by exports represents an implicit tax on exporters that 
consequently reduces their incentive to export and hence reduces the available foreign currency 
flowing into the country. This reduction in foreign currency supply results in a higher price being paid 
for it by the demanders of foreign currency – typically importers. This higher demanded price creates 
an opportunity for rent extraction by governments, who are able to auction off their stock of foreign 
currency at a higher price than the surrendered price (Anderson et al., 2008).  
In addition to a simple dual exchange rate system in which importers and exporters are charged 
different rates, government is also able to incentivise/disincentivise exporters from different 
industries by raising/lowering the price at which these exporters are made to surrender their foreign 
exchange earnings. Similarly, government is able to incentivise certain groups of importers by charging 
a lower price for the foreign exchange that the government releases to them. When determining the 
magnitude at which importers and exporters are taxed via a dual foreign exchange rate system, 
Anderson et al. (2008) point to the gap between the surrender price of exporters and the purchase 
price of importers as being a robust indication.  
Therefore, in line with the methodology being discussed, the relevant exchange rate, “E”, for 
calculating the NRA and CTE for a specific tradable product is dependent on the specific rate applying 
to the specific product after taking into consideration a dual or multiple exchange rate policy. 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑜 =  𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑆 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑆 (3.4) 
 𝐶𝑇𝐸 = 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐵𝑆 + 𝑐𝑡 (3.5) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
3.2.1.1.4 Nature of Trading Costs and Input  
3.2.1.1.4.1 Trading Costs  
In the case where a product is unable to be traded internationally due to excessive trade costs, the 
domestic price fluctuates between the CIF import price and the FOB export price. As a result, any trade 
policy measure such as a tariff or subsidy or exchange rate-induced distortion does not distort 
incentives (NRA = 0 and CTE = 0). However, direct producer and consumer taxes and subsidies affect 
the domestic prices faced by producers and consumers and consequently distort incentives (Anderson 
et al., 2006). In this case, the extent of the influence on incentives is dependent on the price elasticity 
of demand (ŋ) and supply (Ɛ), and the NRA and CTE calculations are adapted as in Equation (3.6) and 
Equation (3.7). 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1.1.4.2 Intermediate Input Use  
Where intermediate inputs are used in production in conjunction with primary inputs, any 
intervention in the production, consumption or trade of these intermediate inputs influences the 
incentives of producers. In some instances, distortions for outputs and inputs are offset (Rausser, 
1982) through additional intervention elsewhere in the value chain, such as in a situation that could 
prevail in which farm inputs are subsidised but final products are taxed at export. As Anderson et al. 
(2006) highlight, all the offsetting measures by government could theoretically be brought together 
in an effective rate of direct assistance to the farm value-added measure, of which the NRAo as well as 
the sum of nominal rates of direct assistance to farm inputs (NRAi) are components. In terms of 
measuring distortions to input costs, on the basis of knowledge of input–output coefficients of inputs, 
the NRA for each input can be summed in order to obtain a combined measure for all inputs (NRAI). 
Considering that the NRAo is obtained from Equation (3.4), the NRAi can be added to it in order to 
obtain a measure for the total nominal rate of assistance to farm production (NRA). This relationship 
is depicted in Equation (3.8). 
 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐷𝑆 =  
𝑠𝑓
1 +
𝜀
𝜂
 (3.6) 
 𝐶𝑇𝐸 =
−𝑠𝑓
1 +
𝜂
𝜀
 (3.7) 
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3.2.1.2 Aggregating Direct NRAs for the Agricultural Sector 
At this point, the empirical framework being reviewed has provided a step-wise approach to 
determining the total nominal rate of assistance to farm production (NRA) of a specific commodity 
(Equation (3.8)). In conjunction with this, the computation of consumer tax equivalents has been 
reviewed. However, from a macroeconomic policy perspective, an aggregate measure of distortions 
faced by the agricultural sector is needed.  
Following from the results of the commodity-specific calculations, an aggregate measure is able to be 
calculated for the total agricultural sector of tradable covered products (NRAagt), as well as the 
exportables (NRAagx) and import-competing (NRAagm) sub-sectors, using weighted averages 
(Anderson et al., 2008). This firstly requires the classification of each farming industry into either 
import-competing or export-producing categories. Furthermore, the value share of production for 
each commodity of the total primary agricultural production value (valued at farmgate undistorted 
prices) is required in order to calculate the relative weights. Once this has been done for all covered 
products, the NRAag can be obtained by summing the weighted average calculation of covered 
products to the NRA assumed for non-covered products.  
3.2.1.3 The Trade Bias Indicator 
Once the NRAagx and NRAagm have been calculated, the degree to which the policy regime has an anti-
trade bias within the agricultural sector can be determined. From a resource-competing perspective, 
the agricultural subsector with the highest nominal rate of assistance will be incentivised to bid mobile 
resources up that would otherwise have been employed in the alternate subsector. Consequently, the 
relative degree to which the exportables and import-competing subsectors are incentivised/ 
disincentivised under the current policy regime can be determined via the trade bias index (TBI) 
contained in Equation (3.9). 
 
Intuitively, the TBI takes on a value of zero when there is equal assistance for the import-competing 
and exportables subsectors. In the extreme case of an anti-trade policy bias, the lower bound of 
Equation (3.9) approaches -1 (Anderson et al., 2008). 
 𝑁𝑅𝐴 = 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑜 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑖   (3.8) 
 
𝑇𝐵𝐼 = [
1 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑎𝑔𝑥
1 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑎𝑔𝑚
− 1] (3.9) 
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3.2.2 Non-Agricultural Distortions 
The Lerner (1936) Symmetry Theorem furthermore highlights how farmers’ incentives are also 
influenced, albeit indirectly, by government assistance to/taxation of non-agricultural production 
within the economy. From a mobile resources perspective, the higher the nominal rate of assistance 
to non-agricultural production (NRAnonag), the higher the incentive is for producers in non-
agricultural sectors to bid up the value of mobile resources that would otherwise have flowed to 
agriculture (Anderson et al., 2008). Consequently, if NRAag is less than NRAnonag, it is likely that fewer 
resources would be employed in agriculture than would otherwise have been employed under free 
market conditions.  
Anderson et al. (2008) highlight the protection of industrialists from import competition via tariff and 
non-tariff barriers as having one of the most pronounced negative effects on farmers. Apart from the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors, other primary sectors, such as forestry, fisheries and mining, 
are less prone to distortions, although certain exceptions do exist. However, in the services sector of 
the economy, which typically is the largest sector and is often characterised by non-tradable, public 
sector-provided services, distortions are near impossible to measure (Anderson et al., 2008). 
Consequently, the methodology of Anderson et al. (2006) in its calculation of a NRAnonag assumes all 
services to be non-tradable along with the non-tradable commodities from non-agricultural sectors, 
and furthermore assumes no distortions to be present in this aggregated group. 
The tradable portion of non-agricultural sectors’ production can be divided into the production of 
commodities that are import competing and those that are exportables. Individual nominal rates of 
assistance to import competing (NRAnonagm) and exportables (NRAnonagx) can be calculated for each 
product and then aggregated into subsector measures. Furthermore, using the same approach to the 
weighted average calculation as was used when calculating the NRAag, the nominal rate of assistance 
for all tradable non-agricultural products (NRAnonagt) can be calculated, with production value shares 
at border prices being used as weights in the calculation.  
3.2.3 Agricultural Assistance vs Non-Agricultural Assistance 
In addition to the comparison of NRAs between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, Anderson et 
al. (2006) compute a total rate of assistance to agricultural output (TRAag) by subtracting the direct 
rate of assistance to non-agricultural sectors (DRAnonag) from the direct rate of assistance to 
agriculture (DRAag). The DRAnonag and DRAag are simply the aggregates of the nominal rates of 
assistance for both tradable and non-tradable non-agricultural and agricultural products respectively. 
The direct rate of assistance to agriculture is contained in Equation (3.10). 
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From Equation (3.10), it follows that agriculture could be assisted or harmed by the existing policy 
regime even if DRAag is greater than zero, because DRAnonag could be greater than DRAag. 
Consequently, the need arises for a measure of agricultural assistance relative to non-agricultural 
assistance. Anderson et al. (2008) propose the relative rate of assistance (RRA) measure depicted in 
Equation (3.11). 
The RRA indicates the extent to which the current policy environment within a country has an anti- or 
pro-agricultural bias. A value of zero indicates a neutral bias, whereas a strong anti-agricultural trade 
bias is indicated as the RRA approaches the lower bound of -1. As the RRA approaches its upper bound 
of +1, a pro-agricultural trade bias is depicted.  
3.3 Disaggregated Value Chain Extension 
3.3.1.1 Adaptation of NRA and CTE  
Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) present Equation (3.12) as a means for calculating the nominal 
rate of assistance to a specific agenti in a vertical value chain. 
 
In Equation (3.12), Poi represents the actual domestic price of output “o”, Poi* is the undistorted 
domestic price, Qoi is the quantity of output sold, Pji is the actual domestic input price of input “j”, Pji* 
represents the undistorted price of input “j” and Qji is the quantity of input “j” that is needed to 
produce output “o”. The conversion rate from input “j” to output “o” is represented by 𝑄𝑗
𝑖 𝑄𝑜
𝑖⁄ . In the 
case of an agent such as a wheat miller, this conversion rate will be less than 1, whereas in the case of 
an agent such as a commodity trader it will be equal to 1.  
In Equation (3.12), the NRAio indicates the extent of distortions to output prices expressed as a 
percentage of the undistorted output price, in line with the base methodology of Anderson et al. 
(2006) (E × P in Equation (3.2)). Similarly, the NRAIi is representative of the extent of the total 
 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑎𝑔 = 𝐷𝑅𝐴𝑎𝑔 − 𝐷𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔 (3.10) 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐴 = [
1 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑎𝑔𝑡
1 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑡
− 1] 
 
(3.11) 
 
𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑖 =
𝑝𝑜
𝑖 − 𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗
𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗
+
∑ (𝑝𝑗
𝑖∗ − 𝑝𝑗
𝑖) ×
𝑄𝑗
𝑖
𝑄𝑜
𝑖⁄𝑗
𝑝𝑜
𝑖∗
   
 
            = 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑜
𝑖 + 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑖  
(3.12) 
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distortions to input prices for all inputs “j” used to produce output “o”. Consequently, the total 
nominal rate of assistance to agenti (NRAi) is the sum of NRAio and NRAIi. Considering this, aggregating 
the NRAs of all agents under the “producers” category yields the total nominal rate of assistance to 
commodity producers (NRAP). 
In terms of measuring the distortions that consumers face, Anderson et al. (2006) propose the use of 
CTEs (Equation (3.3) and Equation (3.5)). Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) draw on this 
methodology, but utilise an NRA equivalent measure in which the nominal rate of assistance to 
commodity consumers (NRAc) is obtained through Equation (3.13).  
 
In Equation (3.13), 𝑝𝐼
𝑐 is the domestic price paid by consumers for the commodity, whereas 𝑝𝐼
𝑐∗ 
represents the undistorted price that would have been paid by consumers of the specific commodity 
in a free market.  
The relationship of the 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐶  to Anderson et al's. (2006) CTE measure is contained in Equation (3.14).  
 
3.3.1.2 Value Chain Price Linkages  
In a vertical value chain with multiple agents operating, the logical assumption is made in the 
methodology of Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) that the price paid by the subsequent agent 
(agent “j”) handling the traded commodity is equal to the price received by the previous agent (agent 
“I”) who handled and sold the commodity. Consequently, the market price of the output received by 
agent “I” (𝑝𝑜
𝑖  𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3.12)) is equivalent to the price of the input paid by agent “j” (𝑝𝐼
𝑗).  
A wheat value chain example assists in understanding the above relationship. Consider the two 
primary agents in a simple wheat value chain, namely farmers and traders. The farmgate price that 
farmers receive for their wheat (𝑝𝑜
𝑓) is equivalent to the price that wheat traders pay for their input 
of wheat (𝑝𝐼
𝑡). A similar intuition holds throughout the value chain when linking market prices, 
although, when the commodity is transformed via processing, for example, the conversion rate of the 
inputs to outputs (𝑄𝑗
𝑖 𝑄𝑜
𝑖  𝑖𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3.12))⁄  has to be considered.  
3.4 Conclusion 
Although comprehensive and in some instances conceptually challenging, the review of the Anderson 
et al. (2006) general framework is characterised by its output of nominal rates of assistance indicators. 
 
𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐶 =
𝑝𝐼
𝑐∗ − 𝑝𝐼
𝑐
𝑝𝐼
𝑐∗  (3.13) 
 𝐶𝑇𝐸 = −𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑐 = −𝑁𝑅𝐴𝐼
𝑐 (3.14) 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
44 
 
While many considerations need to be acknowledged during the empirical application of this 
methodology, the presence of the Kirsten et al. (2009) application to South Africa aids in acting as a 
coherent base from which to extend the empirical analysis. Furthermore, the presentation and linking 
of the Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) disaggregated extension to the Anderson et al. (2006) base 
framework enable adequate integration of the two methodologies into a single study to achieve the 
stipulated objectives. Chapter 4 provides an in-depth explanation and discussion of how the respective 
theoretical frameworks were applied and integrated in the current study. In addition, Chapter 4 
highlights the intense data collection that preceded the application of the integrated framework, with 
a strong focus on the challenges involved.  
  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
45 
 
 Data and Methods 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided a theoretical motivation for government intervention in agricultural markets and 
highlighted how this intervention distorts these markets. From the review of the three major 
international studies concerned with measuring these distortions, the empirical method (Anderson et 
al., 2006) used in the study by Anderson (2009) was identified as a suitable framework to be used in 
updating the agricultural distortion estimates for South African agricultural producers. In addition to 
this update, the disaggregated value chain methodology of Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) was 
identified as being a relevant method when wanting to analyse how the aggregate distortion estimates 
of the Anderson et al. (2006) methodology are distributed amongst agents within the broader 
producer and consumer groups. A case was subsequently made for the need for such a disaggregated 
analysis for the South African wheat flour value chain.  
Following from the theoretical motivation and framework selection in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 provided 
a detailed discussion of the key indicators of the Anderson et al. (2006) methodology, with a strong 
focus on their empirical calculation. The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) and consumer tax equivalent 
(CTE) formed the fundamental base of this framework, from which other empirical indicators, such as 
the trade bias indicator (TBI) and relative rate of assistance (RRA), could be derived. Linked to the 
Anderson et al. (2006) methodology, and central to the uniqueness of this thesis going forward, was 
the proposition of the Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) value chain approach in disaggregating the 
broad distortion estimates characteristic of the Anderson et al. (2006) approach.  
The rest of this chapter is structurally split into two broad sections. Section 4.2 provides a detailed 
discussion on how the Anderson et al. (2006) methodology was selectively applied in this project. A 
key precursor to this discussion is to highlight the sources of the data used and the general trend 
exhibited by this data. Furthermore, due to the nature of the first phase of this study being an update 
of the aggregate distortion estimates for South Africa originally estimated by Kirsten et al. (2009) 
under the larger Anderson (2009) study, contrasts are constantly made between the data and trends 
of the current study and those of the study by Kirsten et al. (2009).  
Section 4.3 outlines the step-wise application of the methodology of Briones Alonso and Swinnen 
(2015) in empirically estimating the nominal rates of assistance of market agents within the South 
African wheat flour value chain. Due to this disaggregated application being the first of its kind for a 
South African agricultural commodity, no contrasts can be drawn to previous studies. Consequently, 
the disaggregated method is contrasted with the aggregated method of the wheat industry reported 
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in Section 4.2. In addition, comparisons are drawn between the current application of this framework 
and its seminal application by Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) in the Pakistani wheat flour value 
chain.  
4.2 Aggregated Distortion Estimates  
4.2.1 Agricultural Product Selection 
The primary step in empirically estimating agricultural distortions is to identify the individual 
agricultural commodities for which these estimates are to be constructed. Aligned with the framework 
of Anderson et al. (2006), which prescribed global coverage of all major food items together with key 
country-specific farm products, the Kirsten et al. (2009) study covered all major livestock, field crop 
and horticultural products contained in the first column of Table 4.1. On average, this product 
coverage accounted for 69% of total primary agricultural production value at distorted prices for the 
years 1955 to 2005, which was acceptable given the Anderson et al. (2006) stipulated target of 70%.  
Table 4.1. Summary of agricultural product selection in the current study vs the previous study.  
 
Products covered by Kirsten et al. (2009) 
for 1955–2005 
Trade status 1955–
2005 
Included in 
update 
Trade status 2005–
2014 
Livestock products 
• Beef 
• Mutton  
• Poultry 
   
Imported ✓ Imported 
Imported ✓ Imported 
Imported ✓ Imported 
Field crops 
• Wheat grain 
• Yellow maize grain 
• White maize grain 
• Sunflower seed  
Field crop products 
• Wheat flour 
• White maize flour 
• Sunflower oil  
   
Mainly imported ✓ Imported 
Exported & imported ✓ Exported & imported 
Exported & imported ✓ Exported 
Non-tradable ✓ Mainly non-tradable 
   
Exported ✓ Mainly exported 
Exported ✓ Exported 
Mainly imported ✓ Mainly imported 
Fruit & sugar products (exportables) 
• Apples export 
• Table grapes export 
• Oranges export 
• Raw sugar 
• Refined sugar 
Fruit & sugar (non-tradables) 
• Apples non-trade, processing 
• Apples non-trade, domestic sales 
• Table grapes non-trade 
• Oranges non-trade 
   
Exported ✓ Exported 
Exported ✓ Exported 
Exported ✓ Exported 
Exported   
Exported   
   
Non-tradable ✓ Non-tradable 
Non-tradable ✓ Non-tradable 
Non-tradable ✓ Non-tradable 
Non-tradable ✓ Non-tradable 
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For comparative purposes, the product selection of the current update is strongly governed by its 
predecessor’s selection. All agricultural products covered by Kirsten et al. (2009) are included in the 
current update, with the only product omissions being raw and refined sugar which were omitted due 
to the unavailability of reliable import tariff data. The significant manner in which border protection 
measures affect distortion estimates, including products for which border protection measures are 
unreliable, hampers the credibility of the combined distortion trends being evaluated. Consequently, 
the current update calculates distortion estimates for approximately 80% of field crops and animal 
products and approximately 65% of horticultural products. In addition to this primary product 
coverage, distortion estimates are also calculated for selected directly related lightly processed 
products. The current study’s product coverage is summarised and correlated with the Kirsten et al. 
(2009) selection in the third column of Table 4.1.  
4.2.1 Time Period Covered  
The time period of the broader Anderson (2009) project had a targeted start date of 1955 and a 
targeted finish date of 2005. However, Kirsten et al.'s (2009) South African dataset was only 
consistently available from 1965 until 2004. As a result, comparable distortion estimates could only 
be computed for this period, while some data extrapolation allowed for the end period to be extended 
to 2005.  
Due to the 2005 data extrapolation issue in Kirsten et al. (2009), the current update covers the 10- 
year period from and including the year 2005 up to and including the year 2014. Where extrapolated 
2005 data was used by Kirsten et al. (2009), this was replaced with actual data in the current update. 
The main restricting factor governing the end period of the update was the availability of data from 
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) post-2014 at the time of writing. 
While other data sources can be used, this will considerably jeopardise the consistency of a large 
number of datasets that were obtained from the FAO for the Kirsten et al. (2009) study.  
4.2.2 Determination of Trade Status  
It is vital to clearly identify the trade status of each covered product. This identification directly affects 
the composition of the aggregate distortion measures, which have a direct link to indexes such as the 
trade bias index presented in Equation (3.9). An evaluation of a product’s annual import volumes as 
opposed to its export volumes yields one of three trade status results.  
Firstly, a domestically produced product is classified as import competing if its annual import volume 
exceeds its annual export volume. The opposite classification of exportable holds when a domestically 
produced product’s export volumes exceed its import volumes. Lastly, in the case where a 
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domestically produced product’s annual import and export volumes are negligible, the product is 
classified as a non-tradable.  
For most products, this classification will have changed over time and could have moved through each 
of the three classification categories. Such variation results in the product mix composing the trade-
based aggregate distortion indicators changing over time. However, such compositional changes are 
strictly as a result of the definition of the aggregate indicators. Practically speaking, the composition 
of the two components (𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑎𝑔𝑥  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑁𝑅𝐴𝑎𝑔𝑚) of the trade bias indicator represented in Equation 
(3.9) could be constructed from different product distortion estimates on a year-to-year basis.  
The second column of Table 4.1 contains the trade status classification of each product as contained 
in the Kirsten et al. (2009) study. As can be seen, some commodities such as apples were explicitly 
split into two separate products according to the market for which they were produced. This split was 
warranted by the inherent differences in the product produced for export as opposed to the product 
that was consumed domestically. These intra-commodity product splits were maintained as product 
groups in the current update, while the trade status of all covered products in the update were 
determined using the above method. These trade status descriptions are contained in the fourth 
column of Table 4.1.  
4.2.3 Key Data Sources 
4.2.3.1 Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics (FAOSTAT) 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), through its FAOSTAT database, 
provides agricultural statistics covering a wide range of indicators – from commodity-production 
statistics to land-use patterns and trade data. The database’s coverage includes nearly 400 agriculture- 
related products traded from 245 countries in a time series form from 1961 until 2014 (FAO, 2017). 
Due to its extensive coverage, the FAOSTAT data was utilised to obtain multiple time-series datasets 
required for the update of the distortion estimates, especially in cases where industry-provided data 
was not available or where Kirsten et al. (2009) had prioritised the use of FAO data.  
A further benefit from using the FAO (2017) time-series data is the provision of the meta-data, which 
describes the exact harmonised system (HS) codes of the individual products that make up the broader 
product groups available from the FAOSTAT database. This proved critical in the current study, as 
some of the time-series data was only available from FAOSTAT up to 2013. The provision of the meta-
data enabled 2014 values to be calculated where required by making use of TRADEMAP data from the 
International Trade Centre (ITC), which is available up to HS six-digit level from the year 2001 until 
2016.  
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4.2.3.2 International Trade Centre (TRADEMAP and Market Map) 
The International Trade Centre (ITC) has a number of individual, open-access databases that provide 
trade statistics for international business development. Throughout this study, both the Trade Map 
(TRADEMAP) and Market Access Map (MACMAP) platforms provided by the ITC were used to obtain 
trade data, as well as data on border protection rates. Trade Map provides indicators on export 
performance, international demand, alternative markets and competitive markets for more than 5 
300 products of the Harmonised System (HS) covering 220 countries and territories (ITC, 2017a). On 
the other hand, Market Access Map provides information on border protection rates applied by more 
than 200 countries and faced by 239 countries and territories per HS product code (ITC, 2017b).  
4.2.3.3 South African Abstract of Agricultural Statistics 
The South African Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) annually publishes the 
Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. The publication contains important agricultural indicators, as well 
as meaningful information on, amongst others, livestock, horticulture and field crops (DAFF, 2016). 
The source of the information is predominantly the Directorate of Statistics and Economic Analysis 
(DSE) of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, with some industry organisations’ 
statistics being used in conjunction with the DSE.  
Due to its time period coverage of 1955 to 2016, a large number of the data time series used in this 
update were sourced from the abstract. This was aligned with the data collection approach by Kirsten 
et al. (2009), which implied consistency of the update with the previous distortion estimates.  
4.2.4 Data Collection Part 1: Quantities  
Production and consumption quantities, as well as trade quantities, were employed in the 
measurement of commodity-specific distortion estimates. Aligned with the data sources used by 
Kirsten et al. (2009), the two primary sources of this secondary data for the updated 10-year period 
were FAOSTAT and the 2016 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. In the instances where FAO data was 
only available up until 2013, TRADEMAP data was matched to the FAO data using the metadata 
provided for each data category by the FAO. Similarly, where the 2016 Abstract did not contain the 
required trade data, TRADEMAP was used as the source of this data.  
In specific commodity cases where none of the key data sources were sufficient, industry organisations 
were contacted and the necessary data was obtained directly from them. This was also done in cases 
where Kirsten et al. (2009) had utilised industry-specific data in order to maintain consistency and 
comparability between the current update and its predecessor. These “special” cases are highlighted 
per broad commodity group in Table 4.2. As can be noted from Table 4.2, all wheat and maize quantity 
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data, as well as the majority of the sunflower data, was obtained from the South African Grain 
Information Service (SAGIS). The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) provided 
import and export quantities for mutton as well as production and consumption data for poultry, as 
this was only available in an aggregated white meat form in the 2016 Abstract.  
Table 4.2. Data sources of quantity data for the respective covered products. 
*South African Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
**South African Grain Information Service 
 
4.2.5 Data Collection Part 2: Domestic Variables 
Once the physical quantities had been obtained in the first part of the data collection, the domestic 
financial variables per individual product were collected. The key domestic variables included, firstly, 
the respective wholesale prices for the primary and processed goods, together with a transmission 
factor from each product’s primary form into the processed form. With the exception of field crops 
and field crop products, the predominant source of the required domestic financial variables was the 
2016 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. In the cases where the required data was unavailable or 
published in an aggregate form in the Abstract, Statistics South Africa (SSA), the South African Futures 
 Data Source  
 
FAO -
STAT 
TRADE - 
MAP 
Abstract Industry Other Comment 
Livestock products 
• Beef 
• Mutton  
• Poultry 
      
 ✓ ✓    
  ✓  ✓ Imp & Exp – DAFF* 
 ✓ ✓  ✓ Prod & Cons -DAFF 
Field crops 
• Wheat grain 
• Yellow maize grain 
• White maize grain 
• Sunflower seed  
Field crop products 
• Wheat flour 
• White maize flour 
• Sunflower oil  
      
   ✓  All Quantities – SAGIS** 
   ✓  All Quantities - SAGIS 
   ✓  All Quantities - SAGIS 
  ✓ ✓  Prod, Imp, ∆Stock - SAGIS 
      
✓      
     n/a 
✓      
Fruit & sugar products (exportables) 
• Apples export 
• Table grapes export 
• Oranges export 
Fruit & sugar (non-tradables) 
• Apples non-trade, processing 
• Apples non-trade, dom. sales 
• Table grapes non-trade 
• Oranges non-trade 
      
  ✓    
  ✓    
  ✓    
      
  ✓    
  ✓    
  ✓    
  ✓    
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Exchange (SAFEX) and the Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (BFAP) were contacted directly in 
order to obtain the data.  
In addition to the wholesale prices per product, the consumer tax on primary and processed products 
was obtained as a proportion of the base selling price. As was included in the calculations by Kirsten 
et al. (2009), value added tax (VAT), which was introduced in 1991, was included as the primary 
consumer tax. For the period, the VAT percentage remained consistent at 14%, with staple foods and 
unprocessed vegetables and fruits being excluded from the tax.  
Direct subsidies for individual agricultural products were unavailable for use in the study. However, as 
was consistent with the previous model of Kirsten et al. (2009), non-product-specific subsidies net of 
abnormal taxes for primary agriculture were obtained.  
Table 4.3 concisely summarises the sources of part 2 of the study’s data collection. As can be seen, 
BFAP-supplied data was only used for the wholesale price of poultry and sunflower oil, as these values 
were unavailable in the abstract of agricultural statistics. SAFEX and SSA were jointly used for field 
crops and field crop products, as this was consistent with the data sources used by Kirsten et al. (2009) 
and proved to be a more reliable source than the aggregated data available in the abstract.  
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Table 4.3. Data sources of domestic variables for the respective covered products.  
*Wholesale prices sourced from the Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy. 
4.2.6 Data Collection Part 3: International Variables 
4.2.6.1 CIF Import and FOB Export Prices  
The final phase of data collection firstly involved obtaining the cost insurance freight (CIF) import 
prices, as well as the free on board (FOB) export prices, of each covered primary product and the 
covered processed products. Critical for identifying the correct price in relation to the covered product 
was the explicit identification in the study of the Harmonised System (HS) code of each product. This 
international system of product classification ensures that the same products for which Kirsten et al. 
(2009) calculated distortion estimates were used consistently during the current study’s update of 
these estimates.  
In some instances, the primary product classification of the model incorporated two traded products. 
In these instances, the HS codes of each of the defined primary products were used to obtain average 
per unit trade prices and average trade volumes. This enabled trade-weighted average prices to be 
calculated for each of the covered primary agricultural products based on trade volumes. The same 
 Data source  
 
STATS 
SA 
SAFEX Abstrac
t 
Industr
y 
Other Comment 
Livestock products 
• Beef 
• Mutton  
• Poultry 
      
  ✓    
  ✓    
    ✓ W/S Price – BFAP* 
Field crops 
• Wheat grain 
• Yellow maize grain 
• White maize grain 
• Sunflower seed  
Field crop products 
• Wheat flour 
• White maize flour 
• Sunflower oil  
      
 ✓     
 ✓     
 ✓     
 ✓     
      
✓      
✓      
    ✓ W/S Price - BFAP 
Fruit (exportables) 
• Apples export 
• Table grapes export 
• Oranges export 
Fruit (non-tradables) 
• Apples non-trade, processing 
• Apples non-trade, dom. sales 
• Table grapes non-trade 
• Oranges non-trade 
      
  ✓    
  ✓    
  ✓    
      
  ✓    
  ✓    
  ✓    
  ✓    
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methodology was applied in the case of processed agricultural products, where the term “processed” 
in most instances incorporated multiple HS-classified product groups.  
The identification of the individual HS product codes and the collection and calculation of trade-
weighted average prices proved to be the tedious part of the data analysis. The presence of the 
FAOSTAT database somewhat alleviated the task, although multiple Excel spreadsheets still had to be 
utilised to process the raw data into the desired format required for the model. Furthermore, the 
previously mentioned issue of the FAO database only providing values up to and including the year 
2013 meant that a further step was required in order to ensure the 10-year coverage of the study was 
maintained. This final step involved using the metadata supplied by the FAO for each published 
product group in order to match the HS codes of the products grouped in the FAO product 
classification with individual product data available in the ITC Trade Map database. The individual 
product ITC data was then combined using trade-weighted averages in order to correlate it with the 
published FAO data. A five-year overlap was calculated using ITC data to ensure that the medium-term 
trend in the data matched that of the FAO data, which had been used for the previous nine years of 
the model’s coverage.  
4.2.6.2 International Reference Price  
For internationally traded products, the international reference price per product was of vital 
importance, as it served as the base from which the free market price was calculated. This free market 
price served as a major input into the ultimate calculation of the distortion estimates central to this 
study. With the exception of products such as traded maize, which have a fixed-point reference price 
that is internationally quoted, the majority of products’ international prices were obtained from the 
FAOSTAT database. These international reference unit prices were derived by the FAO by dividing the 
global value of trade of a specific product by the global volume of trade in the product. In the case of 
fixed-point international reference prices, industry organisations such as SAGIS and SAFEX (in the case 
of maize) were used as the source of the data in the study.  
As was the case with the import/export prices obtained from the FAO, the unavailability of data post-
2013 proved challenging. For consistency, the FAO metadata consequently was used in the same 
manner as it was used in the import/export price determination in order to determine a global 
reference price from the ITC Trade Map database that correlated with the utilised FAO data.  
In order to convert the international reference price per product to a value that could be compared 
to the domestic market price, the reference point of the international price needed to be the same as 
that of the domestic price. For products such as maize, which have an international reference point 
(Gulf of Mexico) as well as a domestic reference point (Randfontein), a more precise comparison could 
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be made. In this case, the international trading costs separating the two reference points could be 
calculated and added (subtracted) to (from) the domestic (international) price in order to accurately 
compare the two prices. The international trading costs were assumed to be the sum of the freight 
costs between the two reference points together with the processing and handling costs per traded 
unit.  
However, the majority of products covered in the study did not have fixed-point reference prices, 
which consequently prescribed the use of average values throughout. Consequently, average CIF 
import and FOB export prices were used, together with average trading cost values. By their nature, 
the FAO international reference prices without fixed reference points are already average values, thus 
enabling direct comparisons to be made between them and the trade cost-adjusted domestic prices.3 
4.2.6.3 Adjustments in Product Quality  
Throughout the study, international product comparability was maintained as far as was possible 
through ensuring product homogeneity. In doing this, dealing with the different product quality levels 
between domestically produced products and internationally traded products was the major 
challenge. These different quality levels hampered equal price comparisons, as was described in 
Section 4.2.6.2. For example, over the study period’s years, the poultry industry was characterised by 
cheap imports and several cases of dumping. This put the domestic industry under tremendous 
pressure and caused a clear division between the quality of the domestically produced product and 
the imported product.  
Consequently, the data on the imported product needed to be adjusted in order to accurately reflect 
its inferior quality. While exceptionally difficult to quantify, in the case of poultry, Kirsten et al. (2009) 
estimated the imported product to be inferior by a proportion of 15% from 1998 to 2005. Therefore, 
a negative adjustment of the same magnitude was included in the current study in order to reflect the 
continued inflow of lower quality poultry products over the period.  
Quality adjustments were also made for imported and exported processed products. However, all 
adjustments made were aligned with those made by Kirsten et al. (2009), as there was no major 
motive driving a change in these quantified adjustments.  
4.2.6.4 Trade Subsidies and Taxes  
As discussed in the theoretical Section 2.3.2 and methodology Section 3.2.1, governments impose 
measures at the national border that distort agricultural incentives. These measures typically take on 
                                                          
3 In cases where average price values were used, trade-weighted averages of freight rates to South Africa’s top 
five trading partners were calculated and utilised as inputs into the model.  
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the form of trade subsidies and taxes. Therefore, accurate measurement of the magnitude of these 
subsidies and taxes on each of the covered primary and processed products in the study was a critical 
aspect in calculating the eventual distortion estimates.   
The HS code classification of each of the covered products enabled accurate subsidy and tariff values 
to be obtained. These values were primarily sourced from the ITC Market Access Map database per 
individual HS product code, and where possible were verified against industry published data. The AVE 
methodology was applied in the calculation of the subsidy and tariff values.  
A similar case to that of the import/export price calculations arose where the primary product 
classification in the model (based on FAO product groups) included multiple HS product code 
classifications. In this case, however, the issue was compounded by the fact that, at times, each HS-
classified product had a different pool of trading partners as well as being governed by dissimilar tariffs 
or subsidies. Consequently, a trade-weighted average based on volume was firstly calculated in order 
to determine the average tariff or subsidy per product according to HS code. Thereafter, where 
multiple HS-classified products made up a single product group in the model, the trade-weighted 
averages of the individual HS-classified products needed to be combined. This was also done using a 
trade-weighted average based on volume.  
The two-step weighted average calculation proved to be an exceptionally tedious task, as it was 
conducted for the primary product groups as well as for the processed product groups. In some cases, 
the processed product groups in the model included FAO product data and classifications that 
incorporated up to five HS product groups.  
4.2.6.5 Exchange Rate  
South Africa has adopted a floating exchange rate system, implying that the exchange rate is 
determined by market forces. Although the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) possesses the power 
to participate in the market, this is seldom done. As a result of the floating nature of the South African 
exchange rate, the exchange rate-driven price distortions as discussed in Section 3.2.1.1.3 are not 
applicable to the time period covered by the study.  
Due to international commodity prices being included in the model, with US dollars as the monetary 
unit, as opposed to domestic market prices in South African rand as the monetary unit, the exchange 
rate between the two currencies was consequently needed. The annual average exchange rate 
expressed in rand per US dollars was obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB, 2017a). 
This average exchange rate series was used consistently throughout the study across all covered 
agricultural products.  
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4.2.7 Noteworthy Data Trends 
4.2.8 Calculation of Primary Distortion Indicators  
Using the methodological framework discussed in Section 3.2.1.1, the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) 
of each covered agricultural product in the primary and processed form could be calculated. Critical 
to this phase of the calculations was to correctly identify the trade status of the product in each year, 
as the NRA formula varied subtly depending on whether the product was classified as an importable 
or exportable in the specific year. In order to minimise the possibility for error, both the importable 
trade scenario NRA as well as the exportable trade scenario NRA were calculated for each product. 
Using the prior identified trade status as discussed in Section 4.2.2, an automatic selection formula 
was used in the Excel spreadsheet to select the correct NRA value for each product based on the 
product’s trade status for the specific year.  
The above calculation procedure was carried out for bsoth the primary and processed form of each 
product covered in the study, thus yielding two NRA estimates per product. This enabled NRAs 
between individual products and broader product groups to be compared with one another. However, 
in order to obtain an estimate of the total distortions present in the agricultural sector, further 
refinement of these individual indicators was needed in order to obtain a sector-wide representative 
indicator.  
4.2.9 Calculation of Combined Indicators 
The individual product distortion indicators discussed in Section 4.2.8 were able to provide an 
indication of the policy support provided to the respective primary agricultural industries. However, 
given that the primary objective of the study was to evaluate the policy-induced price distortions at 
an aggregate sector level, the individual product indicators had to be combined into representative 
aggregate indicators.  
From the output of the model, individual product estimates of NRAs for on average 71% of the total 
value of primary agricultural production (valued at distorted prices) were available. Thus, the 
remaining 29% of non-covered primary agricultural production needed to have distortion estimates 
assumed in order to generate a representative aggregate indicator of the entire agricultural sector. 
These NRA “guesstimates” for the non-covered products were obtained through a continuation of the 
series “guesstimated” by Kirsten et al. (2009), which was generated by utilising the preceding 10 years’ 
average value as an indicator of the current year’s NRA value.  
Consequently, the non-covered products could be treated as a single entry into the calculation of the 
sector-wide NRA indicator. As briefly discussed in Section 3.2.1.2, the sector-wide NRA to agriculture 
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(NRAag) is generated through a weighted average of all covered products and non-covered products. 
The weights used in this calculation are each product’s value share of total agricultural production 
valued at farmgate-equivalent undistorted prices. The value shares per agricultural industry were 
obtained from the 2016 Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. The value of non-covered products was 
calculated by subtracting the sum of the covered products’ production value from the total agricultural 
production value.  
The NRA indicators for the importable, exportable and non-tradeable subsectors within the 
agricultural sector were further calculated using the same weighted average method used in the NRAag 
calculation. These results enabled the trade bias indicator for each year of the period to be computed. 
This was done using Equation (3.9), as was discussed theoretically in Section 3.2.1.3.  
4.3 Disaggregated NRAs for SA Wheat Industry 
4.3.1 Value Chain Identification  
In order to disaggregate the NRA indicators throughout a value chain, the vertical structure of the 
value chain first had to be identified explicitly. This implied the identification of each agent within the 
value chain, together with its respective function. Three key agent levels within the South African 
wheat flour value chain were identified for empirical measurements. These were, firstly, wheat grain 
farmers, secondly wheat grain millers and lastly wheat flour consumers. Although sub-agents such as 
wheat grain traders and wheat flour retailers are also an integral part of the vertical value chain, the 
availability of data, especially market price data, enabled only the three core value chain agent’s NRA 
estimates to be calculated.  
Furthermore, as broadly discussed in Section 4.2, the nature of the measurement of the aggregate 
wheat NRA estimate encapsulates the combined assistance to primary wheat production. This 
includes the assistance to both wheat farmers as well as wheat traders, as the point of measurement 
is wheat grain supplied to the market for miller to purchase.  
4.3.2 Determination of Domestic Reference Point  
Given that the nature of the distortion estimates is characterised by the difference between the 
would-be free market price (assumed to be the world price) and the prevailing domestic market price, 
the border price measurement reference point is of great importance. Clear identification of the 
reference point ensures that equal price comparisons can be made. Consequently, all producer prices 
for wheat were first converted to a Randfontein mill door price by adding average marketing costs 
from farm to Randfontein to the producer price series obtained from the South African Grain 
Information Service (SAGIS) price database (SAGIS, 2017). In the case where the published data on the 
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SAGIS website was insufficient due to its time-period limitation, SAGIS was contacted directly in order 
to obtain the archived historical data. 
Similarly, import parity prices for wheat also had to be comparable at a Randfontein mill door-quoted 
price. Grain SA, via its website database, publishes daily import and export parity prices for both 
Randfontein and Durban as reference points (Grain SA, 2017). Using the published Randfontein parity 
price series for Hard Red Winter number 2 (HRW 2) wheat obtained from Grain SA, monthly averages 
could be calculated and compared to the domestic producer prices at the Randfontein mill door point. 
Thus, through the clear identification of the refence point, the price-series inputs into the 
disaggregated model for farmer output and miller input were made comparable. This enabled 
marketing year (October to September) average estimates to be constructed per agent in the wheat 
value chain, which formed the core of the disaggregated model’s output.   
4.3.3 Value Chain Price Adjustments & Linkages 
As discussed in Section 3.3.1.2, the disaggregated NRA methodology assumes that the price linkages 
in the vertical value chain are such that the price paid by the subsequent agent handling the traded 
commodity is equal to the price received by the previous agent who sold the commodity (Briones 
Alonso & Swinnen, 2015). In the case of the farmer–miller agent linkage, this intuition is plausible. 
However, in the case of the wheat flour miller–wheat flour consumer linkage, this intuition is 
somewhat debatable given the presence of retailers linking these final two market agents. Due to the 
coverage of this study not including direct distortion estimates for retailers, mainly due to the lack of 
market information, due adjustments had to be made to the retail price of flour obtained from Stats 
SA (2017).  
However, preceding the retail price adjustment was the transformation of farmer-supplied wheat 
grain into wheat flour by the wheat miller. As highlighted in Equation (3.12) and in the discussion in 
Section 3.3.1.1, the conversion rate of the wheat millers’ inputs into outputs needed due 
consideration. Due to no distinction being made in the bread flour consumer price data between white 
bread flour and brown bread flour, the average extraction rate between the two respective flour types 
was utilised. This approach was aligned with that applied by Kirsten et al. (2009) and resulted in an 
average extraction rate from wheat grain to wheat flour of 0.79 (white 0.76; brown 0.81) being used 
as the conversion factor for millers in this study.  
In addition to the conversion rate of grain to flour, the milling costs involved also needed due 
consideration in order to convert the wheat grain input price (reference point Randfontein mill door) 
to a wheat flour output comparable price. While these costs would naturally tend to vary between 
millers, largely dependent on economies of scale, an average was obtained from the published FAO 
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(2009) international standard and the domestically published NAMC (2004) standard. This yielded a 
value of 18% (FAO 19%; NAMC 17%) of the wholesale wheat flour price per ton of flour.  
Obtaining the output prices necessary for the calculation of Equation (3.12) required knowledge of 
the wholesale price of wheat flour for both the distorted and undistorted situations. Obtaining the 
undistorted wholesale price for wheat flour was done using the average import price per ton of wheat 
flour landed in Durban harbour from the FAOSTAT database. As was the case with wheat grain parity 
prices, the wheat flour wholesale price was then converted to a Randfontein reference price by adding 
the transport differential between Durban and Randfontein obtained from Grain SA (2017) to the 
Durban import price.  
However, the domestic wholesale price for wheat flour was incredibly difficult to obtain, largely 
because of non-co-operation from the National Chamber of Milling with regard to sharing price 
information. This is somewhat understandable, given the structure of the South African wheat milling 
industry, which is conducive to collusion4, and the outcomes of the 2007/2008 Competition 
Commission’s investigation into the wheat flour cartel that was active from 1999 to 2007 (Mncube, 
2013). Given the industry’s unwillingness to share wholesale wheat flour price information required 
certain assumptions to be made in order to work back to a wholesale price for wheat flour from a 
known retail price series of wheat flour obtained from Stats SA (2017). s 
In their empirical calculations of base distortion estimates, Kirsten et al. (2009) encountered the same 
challenge in terms of the availability of wholesale flour price data as was encountered in the current 
study. In overcoming this challenge, the VAT percentage of 14% and a retail margin of 14% were 
deducted from the retail price of the price series for 2.5 kg of bread flour published by Stats SA. This 
method was similarly applied in the current study in order to obtain an estimate of the wholesale price 
of bread flour that would be comparable to the wholesale import parity price of bread flour calculated 
from the FAOSTAT data. All comparisons were carried out on a rand price per ton basis, with the 
necessary exchange rate adjustments being done using the SARB (2017) exchange rate series.  
The final value chain agent group included in the study was the consumers of wheat flour. Given that 
no distortion estimates were attempted for retailers of wheat flour, the price linkage between wheat 
flour output from millers and the price paid for wheat flour by flour consumers differed. However, as 
was highlighted above, this break in the price linkage was of minimal concern due to the fact that 
actual retail price data for wheat flour was available from Stats SA (2017). This ensured that, given the 
assumptions on retail percentage and VAT percentage removal, there was a coherent link between 
                                                          
4 Few large firms with concentrated market power create an enabling environment for collusion to occur.  
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the price series used as the domestic distorted miller output price and the domestic distorted retail 
price of flour. As highlighted earlier in this section, this retail price was taken as being the price of a 
2.5 kg package of bread flour converted to a price per ton basis.  
4.3.4 Calculation of Distortion Estimates 
Following from the value chain identification, as well as the sourcing of historical price data, the final 
stage of the disaggregated empirical procedure was to utilise the disaggregated methodology (Section 
3.3, specifically Equation (3.12) and Equation (3.13)) to combine the respective time series into 
distortion estimates per value chain agent. As with the aggregate distortion estimates discussed in 
Section 4.2, multiple Excel spreadsheets were utilised to generate the empirical results.  
Due to the majority of the input data series being on a per month basis, NRA estimates per value chain 
agent were first computed for each month from the beginning of the year 2000 until the end of 2014. 
The major limiting factor of the time series coverage was the availability of price data from the FAO. 
At the time of writing, complete data series were only available up to and including the year 2014. 
Furthermore, some of the data series used, such as the retail price of flour, were only available as 
calendar year averages. In such instances, the calendar year average was used consistently for each 
month within the specific year.  
The computation of the per month NRA estimates was an important precursor to the calculation of 
annual averages, as it was not calendar year annual averages that were calculated, but rather wheat 
marketing-year averages. Thus, monthly estimates were averaged for the respective 12-month period, 
starting at the beginning of October and ending at the end of September in the following year. For 
example, the NRA estimate for the 2000/2001 marketing year was calculated for the 12 months 
starting in October 2000 and ending in September 2001. Consequently, it is the marketing year starting 
in October 2000 and the marketing year ending in September 2014 that form the lower and upper 
bounds of the disaggregated NRA estimates for the time period covered in this study.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The highly data-intensive nature of this study warranted an adequate explanation of the intrinsic 
elements of the empirical application of both the aggregated and disaggregated distortion estimate 
frameworks applied in this study. Section 4.2 highlighted the mammoth task of collecting multiple 
datasets for all 10 of the broadly covered agricultural commodity groups in order to calculate the 
commodity-specific distortion estimates. As alluded to throughout Section 4.2, this task was not 
without its challenges, which were characterised firstly by the lack of data in the public domain, and 
secondly by the need for extensive data refinement before being able to calculate reliable and 
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accurate distortion indicators. Such challenges led to the complete exclusion of sugar as a covered 
commodity, while the data availability from the FAO governed the end date of the studied period to 
be 2014.  
The challenges experienced during the calculation of the aggregate distortion indicators increased in 
intensity when calculating the disaggregated distortion estimates for the wheat industry. An 
understandably data-hesitant wheat milling industry forced the use of assumptions when calculating 
domestic flour wholesale prices, while data availability from the FAO once again determined the end 
date of the period. Nonetheless, as discussed extensively throughout Section 4.3, each data and 
methodological challenge was strategically overcome so as to ensure that the most comprehensive 
and accurate distortion estimates were calculated.  
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 Presentation & Discussion of Results 
5.1 Introduction 
The motivation behind the measurement of distortion estimates in agriculture, and the methodology 
and application of the empirical framework, have been covered systematically in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 
respectively. The products of this in-depth process make a two-fold contribution to the existing 
empirical literature. The primary contributions of this study are the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) 
estimates for primary agricultural production in South Africa at an aggregated commodity-production 
level for the 10-year period leading up to and including 2014. Arising from this primary contribution 
are a range of disaggregated NRAs for three key levels of value chain agents in the South African wheat 
value chain. While the aggregated estimates are an update of those estimated by Kirsten et al. (2009), 
the disaggregated estimates for the wheat value chain are an advancement in the South African 
empirical field of distortion estimates.  
The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 5.2 presents the results of both the 
aggregated distortion estimates to primary agriculture and the disaggregated estimates for the three 
agents in the wheat value chain. In addition to the distortion estimates, the trade bias index values for 
the time period preceding the studied period, as well as for the studied period, are presented. Section 
5.3 provides an in-depth discussion of the results of the study, with a focus on the trends over the 
most recent 10- (aggregated) and 14- (disaggregated) year period. This discussion is in two parts and 
includes separate but related discussions on the aggregate and disaggregated results. Section 5.4 
concludes.  
5.2 Presentation of Results 
5.2.1 Aggregate NRA to Primary Agriculture 
Figure 5.1 presents the aggregate distortion estimates calculated in this study for the 10-year period 
leading up to and including 2014 in the context of the long-term trend from 1962 calculated by Kirsten 
et al. (2009).  
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Figure 5.1. Aggregate NRAs for primary agricultural production – three-year moving average, South Africa, 
1962 to 2014. 
Source: 1962–2004: Kirsten et al. (2009); 2005–2014: author’s calculations  
Following an initial increase in the total NRA to primary agricultural commodities in the beginning of 
the period, Figure 5.1 depicts a steady decline in NRA to primary agriculture over the most recent 10-
year period. This decline reflects a complete reversal of the NRA to primary agriculture, from a positive 
average of close to 10% to a negative average value in 2014 in excess of 10%. Furthermore, with the 
exception of the negative NRA values experienced for a couple of years in the mid-1960s and 1970s, 
the years post-2008 mark the first sustained period of negative NRA values for aggregate primary 
agricultural production in over 50 years.  
The NRA to exportable agricultural commodities continues to exhibit a volatile but declining trend 
from 2005 to 2014, in line with that observed from the mid-1980s. Over the studied 10-year period, 
the NRA to exportables remained consistently negative, with a trough in 2010 of -18.4%. However, 
subsequent to 2010, a marked improvement in the NRA to exportables is seen, corresponding to an 
almost halving of the NRA from 2010 to a value of -9.5% in 2014.  
Although breaching the zero NRA barrier sporadically since the early 1960s, the NRA to importable 
agricultural commodities has been negative and declining since 2011. Furthermore, with respect to 
the magnitude of the NRA reversals over the studied 10-year period, importables lead the way with a 
decline in NRA values from 16,8% in 2005 to -16% in 2014.  
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5.2.1  Aggregate NRA to Covered Agricultural Commodities 
Table 5.1 contains the three-year moving average NRA values for each covered agricultural commodity 
for the 10-year study period. The mixed trade status commodity group contains commodities that 
were included in both the importables and exportables groups at various times throughout the period 
starting in 1961, depending on their trade status within the specific year.  
Table 5.1. Three-year moving average NRAs per covered agricultural commodity. 
Source: Data compiled by the author.  
*Average based on 2013 and 2014 values only due to time period limitation.  
**Value of production per agricultural commodity used as weights in the total NRA calculation.  
5.2.1.1 NRA to Field Crops 
Figure 5.2 presents the aggregate NRAs for the covered field crops in the study. As was the case with 
the sector-wide NRA presentation in Figure 5.1, the field crop NRAs are presented within the context 
of the long-term trend.  
Agricultural commodity 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*            
Importables 
          
Beef 63,5 70,1 53,8 49,2 28,5 19,3 8,4 -1,5 -6,0 -12,2 
Mutton 11,3 17,5 14,4 2,7 -1,5 -0,9 -0,8 -4,5 -1,8 -0,5 
Poultry 15,0 8,8 -3,8 -9,5 -11,8 -3,4 -5,4 -10,1 -22,0 -27,9            
Exportables 
          
Apples 5,0 14,2 15,2 12,9 7,0 6,6 16,4 19,8 20,9 14,2 
Oranges 6,8 7,9 10,5 11,2 9,5 14,1 18,2 19,9 19,8 20,8 
Table grapes 2,4 11,2 24,2 16,3 8,9 6,6 9,1 14,7 12,1 11,0            
Mixed trade status 
          
Wheat -3,3 -9,6 -9,9 -8,2 -6,5 -5,4 -7,7 -9,3 -14,4 -14,6 
Yellow maize 17,9 27,2 2,8 10,8 23,1 18,2 13,8 9,0 18,8 21,6 
White maize -29,2 -20,8 -23,9 -33,7 -42,9 -44,6 -44,1 -40,0 -35,7 -35,4 
Sunflower -12,5 -13,0 -13,3 -14,0 -13,8 -12,6 -11,2 -11,4 -12,2 -12,8            
NRA importables 16,8 16,6 7,8 3,6 0,0 1,5 -1,7 -6,3 -12,1 -16,0 
NRA exportables -7,2 -0,6 -6,0 -12,0 -17,9 -18,4 -18,0 -14,3 -10,8 -9,5            
Total NRA** 9,7 11,0 5,5 -9,3 -1,5 -5,9 -6,8 -6,5 -11,2 -13,3 
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Figure 5.2. Aggregate NRAs for covered field crops – three-year moving average, South Africa, 1962 to 2014. 
Source: 1962–2004: Kirsten et al. (2009); 2005–2014: author’s calculations  
Although exhibiting a sharp trough in 2003, two years before the start of the studied period, the 
average NRA to yellow maize remained positive throughout the 10-year period. The recent trend from 
2005 to 2014 has been a sideways movement, with NRAs oscillating between the zero and twenty 
percent bounds. Although more volatile, this recent trend of sideways movement in the case of yellow 
maize is similar to that seen from the early 1960s to early 1970s. Notably, the most recent 10-year 
NRA average values indicate a shift away from the previous long-run trend of steady decline in NRA 
values from the mid-1980s to 2003. By the end of 2014, the NRA average to yellow maize stood at 
21,6%, slightly higher than its 2005 value of 17,9%.   
In contrast to yellow maize, the NRA to white maize remained strongly negative throughout the 10-
year period. While the NRAs up until 2009 were aligned with the long-term declining trend initiated in 
the mid-1980s, the white maize NRA for the latter years of the study exhibit a sideways movement at 
around the -40% mark, characterized by a 50-year low of -44,6% in 2010.  
The NRA for both wheat and sunflower seed remained remarkably consistent between 2005 and 2014. 
This is in line with the general trend for all field crops observed in Figure 5.2, namely that of a sideways-
moving trend. The NRAs for both wheat and sunflower converged in the latter years of the period, 
with the three-year average NRA values in 2014 being -14,6% and -12,8% respectively.  
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5.2.1.2 NRA to Livestock 
Figure 5.3 contains the NRAs for the three covered livestock products included in the study, namely 
beef, mutton and poultry.  
 
Figure 5.3. Aggregate NRAs for covered livestock – three-year moving average, South Africa, 1962 to 2014. 
Source: 1962–2004: Kirsten et al. (2009); 2005–2014: author’s calculations  
Although exhibiting a slight increase in the NRA to beef production from 2005 to 2006, Figure 5.3 most 
notably reveals a rapid decline in the NRA average values to beef from 2006 until 2014. The immense 
rate of this decline in NRA is comparable (via its slope) to both the decline seen in the mid-1980s as 
well as that seen in the five years leading up to the year 2000. By the end of the studied period, the 
average NRA to beef stood at -12,2%, a staggering 82,3% lower than the NRA value from where the 
declining trend started in 2006.  
The NRA average estimates for poultry producers declined from 15% in 2005 to -27,9% in 2014. This 
was characterised by an acceleration of the declining trend from 2010, seen throughout the 10-year 
period. In the final four years of the study, the average NRA declined from -3,4% in 2010 to its 2014 
value. This 2014 NRA low of -27,6% is the second lowest experienced by the poultry industry in over 
50 years, with only the 1977 trough of -28,3% yielding a greater negative NRA average value.  
The NRA for mutton producers showed a significant decline in its own right throughout the earlier 
years of the study. However, since 2008, the average NRA has consistently been negative and has 
exhibited a lateral movement very close to zero. This lateral trend very close to zero is unlike any seen 
in the discussed commodity NRAs for the 10-year period studied. In terms of the long-run trend 
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observed in the NRA for mutton, Figure 5.3 is suggestive of the fact that the long-term steady declining 
trend initiated in the early 1970s has perhaps changed to a more lateral trend since the early 2000s.  
5.2.1.3 NRA to Exportable Fruit 
The NRAs for South Africa’s three largest fruit export commodity groups are displayed in Figure 5.4 in 
the context of the long-term trend. However, the spike in the NRA to table grapes in the early 1980s 
compresses the scale of the graph, resulting in the legibility of the most recent 10-year period being 
distorted. Figure 5.5 is therefore included in order to clearly depict the NRA trend in fruit exports for 
the period.  
 
Figure 5.4. Aggregate NRAs for covered fruit exports – three-year moving average, South Africa, 1962 to 2014. 
Source: 1962–2004: Kirsten et al. (2009); 2005–2014: author’s calculations  
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Figure 5.5. Aggregate NRAs for covered fruit exports – three-year moving average, South Africa, 2005 to 2014. 
Source: Author’s calculations 
The NRA to export apples experienced a gradual upward yet volatile trend between 2005 and 2014, 
starting from a NRA value of 5,0% and reaching a value of 14,2% by the end of the period. This 
contributed to a continuation of the positive NRA trend for apples initiated in the year 2000. However, 
a notable dip in the NRA to apples can be seen in 2009 and 2010, with rapid improvement in the three 
years thereafter. 
For the years 2005 to 2014, table grape NRA values exhibited a strong sideways trend at around the 
10% NRA mark. The peak of 24,2% in 2007 was the highest since 1997, but it declined rapidly to the 
2010 trough of 6,6%. This decline in NRA values was significantly more rapid than that observed in the 
NRA to apples and was followed by a more sluggish recovery in the years after the trough than that 
seen in apples.  
From all three of the covered export fruit commodities, oranges produced for export exhibited the 
least volatile and strongest upward trend in estimated NRA values. Over the studied 10-year period, 
the NRA increased from 6,8% in 2005 to 20,8% in 2014, with the only period showing a decrease being 
that from 2008 (11,2%) to 2009 (9,5%). In terms of the long-term trend observed in Figure 5.4, the 
NRA to export oranges turned positive in 1989 and has remained positive ever since, including in the 
most recent period.  
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5.2.1.4 Trade Bias Indicator 
The trade bias indicator (TBI), discussed in Section 3.2.1.3, measures the extent to which the policy 
environment has an anti (-‘ve) or pro (+’ve) trade bias. Figure 5.6 contains the five-year average trade 
bias values for the period studied by Kirsten et al. (2009), as well as for the 10-year period covered in 
this study.  
 
Figure 5.6. Trade bias indicator: Primary agriculture – five-year moving average, South Africa, 1961 to 2014.  
Source: Author’s own calculations (1961 to 2004 data for calculation obtained from Kirsten et al. (2009); 2005-
2014 data obtained from this study) 
The trade bias indicator remained negative for both five-year sub-periods of the study, although it 
demonstrated a possible reversal in the declining trend which started in the time period from 1985 to 
1989. This trend reversal occurred from the 2006–2010 value of -0,15, the lowest level of the five-year 
average in over 50 years. The 2011–2014 sub-period’s value of -0,04 is exactly the same as the 2000–
205 TBI value, although moving upward as opposed to downward. 
This upward movement is driven by the improvement in the NRA to exportable products, together 
with the increased rate at which the NRA to importable commodities decreased (Figure 5.1). 
Therefore, although still negative and anti-trade, the severity of the anti-trade bias over the 2011–14 
sub-period was significantly less due to the NRA to exportables and NRA to importables moving in 
opposite directions. This was comparable to the value in the 2006–2010 sub-period, when the NRAs 
to both the importable and exportable sectors were declining. As will be highlighted in Section 5.3, 
the primary driver behind the improvement in the TBI is the implicit impact of the long-term 
depreciation of the South African exchange rate. What is clear from Figure 5.6, however, is that for 
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the 19 years since 1995, primary agricultural production has persisted, albeit in an anti-trade policy 
environment within the sector.  
5.2.2 Disaggregated NRA for Wheat Value Chain  
The disaggregated NRAs for each of the three covered agents in the South African wheat value chain 
are presented in Figure 5.7.  
 
Figure 5.7. Disaggregated NRA per agent in the wheat value chain – marketing years, South Africa, 2000 to 2014. 
Source: Author’s own calculations.  
The NRA to wheat farmers remained negative for all 14 marketing years, although it came extremely 
close to zero (-1%) in both the 2003/2004 and 2010/2011 marketing years While this trend is similar 
to that observed for wheat in Figure 5.2, the estimates are not directly comparable, as the aggregate 
NRA for wheat includes NRAs for both wheat traders and wheat farmers as opposed to the 
disaggregated NRA measure just for wheat farmers.  
In stark contrast to farmers, the NRA to wheat millers remained highly positive throughout the period, 
while only coming close to zero (4%) in the 2007/2008 marketing year. In addition, the 14-year peak 
of and extraordinary high 95% in 2002/2003 was followed by a five-year rapid decline to the period 
low of 4%. For the last five years of the studied period, the NRA to millers remained significantly 
positive at above 20%, although not coming close to the highs observed in the earlier years of the 
study.  
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As with wheat farmers, the NRA to wheat flour consumers remained negative throughout the 14 
studied marketing years. However, the magnitude of the NRAs for flour consumers were significantly 
more negative than those of farmers, reaching a negative high of -72% in the 2002/2003 marketing 
year. Furthermore, the analysis of the NRA miller trend in relation to the NRA flour consumer trend 
reveals how these estimates moved in opposite directions throughout the period, with NRAs to 
consumers becoming less negative as NRAs to millers became less positive. In the last marketing year 
covered, the NRAs to farmers, millers and consumers were -15%, 27% and -41% respectively.  
5.3 Discussion of Results 
5.3.1 Aggregate Distortion Estimates  
5.3.1.1 South African Rand Exchange Rate  
Of importance in the interpretation and understanding of the aggregated results presented in Section 
5.2 is to have an adequate understanding of the rapid depreciation of the South African rand against 
major international currencies from January 2005 until December 2014. Over this 10-year period, the 
nominal USD/R exchange rate depreciated by 48%, from $0.17/R to $0.09/R (SARB, 2017a). When 
viewed in R/USD, the depreciation over the period is far more extreme, having depreciated 92% from 
R5.97/USD to R11.46/USD. The USD/R depreciation is highlighted by the orange and red arrows in 
Figure 5.8.  
 
Figure 5.8. Nominal monthly average exchange rate, United States dollar per South African rand, January 2000 
to July 2017. 
Data source: SARB (2017a) 
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However, evaluating the strength of the rand purely against the US dollar needs to be done with 
extreme caution. The depreciation of the USD/R seen in Figure 5.8 could in actual fact have been as a 
result of an appreciation of the US dollar’s value, while the value of the rand could have remained 
constant when compared to other currencies besides the US dollar. In order to confidently evaluate 
the nominal value of the rand, the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) of the rand published by 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is typically used. The NEER contained in Figure 5.9 is a weighted 
average exchange rate of the South African rand measured against a basket of currencies comprising 
South Africa’s 20 most important trading partners (SARB, 2017b). If the value of the rand falls against 
the basket of currencies, the indexed rate declines, as opposed to increasing when the value of the 
rand improves against the basket of currencies.   
 
Figure 5.9. Nominal monthly average effective exchange rate, South African rand against 20 most important 
trading partners, January 2000 to July 2017.  
Data source: SARB (2017b) 
Evident from Figure 5.9 is the persistent weakening of the rand compared to South Africa’s major 
trading partners throughout the 10-year study period. This consequently implies that the weakening 
trend of the rand observed from the USD/R exchange rate is far more widespread. It therefore is likely 
that it is the rand weakening, rather than the other currencies strengthening while the rand maintains 
its value.   
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Given that both data series depicted in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 are in nominal terms, the inflation 
differential between South Africa and its major trading partners needs to be considered when 
analysing how the external value of the rand affects South Africa’s trading competitiveness. Although 
primarily an indicator of South Africa’s price and cost competitiveness in international trade in 
manufactured goods, the real effective exchange rate of the rand (REER) adjusts the NEER for the 
inflation differential between South Africa and its major trading partners (Motsumi et al., 2014). Figure 
5.10 depicts the REER as calculated by the SARB (2017c).  
 
Figure 5.10. Real monthly average effective exchange rate, South African rand against 20 most important trading 
partners, January 2000 to July 2017.  
Data source: SARB (2017c) 
An increase in the REER leads to exports becoming more expensive for South Africa’s trading partners 
and imports becoming cheaper for South African importers (IMF, 2017). Consequently, an increase in 
the REER indicates a loss in trade competitiveness, while a decrease indicates a gain.  
Over the 10-year period, the REER index moved from a value of just greater than 100 to a value just 
greater than 80, which is indicative of a 20% gain in international competitiveness. However, over the 
same period the nominal USD/R (Figure 5.8) exchange rate depreciated by 48% while the NEER index 
(Figure 5.9) declined by around 47%. The differential between the REER and NEER implies that 
potential competitiveness gains to be realised via the depreciation of the rand were largely reduced 
due to price levels in South Africa increasing at a faster rate than those of its 20 major trading partners.  
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Moving forward in the discussion of the distortion estimate results for primary agricultural production, 
the linkages of the three key exchange rate indicators and their respective interpretations are vital in 
understanding the trends exhibited in this study’s results. This, together with commodity-specific 
trade policies and trends, provide key insight into the trends exhibited in the NRA.  
5.3.1.2 NRA to Primary Agriculture  
On average, the NRA for South African primary agriculture between 2005 and 2014 reflect a change 
in policy environment from one that incentivised primary agricultural production to one that 
disincentivised primary agricultural production. This shift coincided with the rapid depreciation of the 
rand against major trading partners’ currencies, which in theory would have increased South Africa’s 
competitiveness in the global market, as is evident from Figure 5.10.  
Throughout this period, South Africa’s real agricultural export value more than doubled, with this 
occurring at an increasing rate after 2012 (DAFF, 2016). However, agricultural net exports remained 
extremely volatile throughout the period, reflecting erratic year-on-year agricultural imports. The 
acceleration of agricultural exports after 2012 reflected a positive shift in the policy environment in 
which agricultural exporters were operating. This shift is evident in Figure 5.1 where, post-2011, the 
NRA to primary agricultural exportables has been on an upward trend towards a zero-distorting 
environment.  
Ironically, the policy environment shift facing the exportable sector has predominantly been a passive 
shift driven by the floating exchange rate depreciation and the consequent international 
competitiveness gain. This is in stark contrast to the active policies of the government that were in 
place until 1995 to support exporters and shield against losses, as highlighted by Kirsten et al. (2009). 
Since the removal of these active direct policies, the NRA to exportables has remained in a downward 
trend as markets liberalised. What the NRAs from this study reveal for the primary agricultural 
exportable sector is that this downward NRA trend has possibly been reversed, with the “saviour” 
being the widely negatively perceived depreciation of the rand.  
While the NRA to exportables remained negative throughout the period, the NRA to importables only 
turned negative post-2010, although it had been exhibiting a declining trend for all 10 years of the 
study. However, while a depreciation of the rand would intuitively lead to implicit support for import-
competing commodities on the output side due to the increased rand costs of imported commodities, 
the NRAs fail to reflect this implicit protection. Instead, the NRAs in the last four years exhibit a shift 
from a neutral policy-distorting environment to an environment strongly disincentivising the 
production of import-competing commodities.  
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While the removal of tariff protection seems the logical explanation for such a decline in NRAs, the 
manner in which the depreciating exchange rate has affected the import-competing sector needs dual 
consideration. As highlighted, an exchange rate depreciation on the output side would lead to implicit 
support for the import-competing sector. However, on the input side, the same depreciation would 
increase the costs of imported inputs, thus raising the cost of production. Given this, and without 
sufficient productivity gains, if the relative rise in output prices is lower than the relative rate at which 
input costs are rising, the onset of a cost price squeeze is inevitable (Tweeten & Griffin, 1976).  
Consequently, while attempting to fulfil international trade agreement obligations in terms of the 
movement towards free trade, the removal of import-protection policies is justified from a welfare 
perspective (Anderson & Van Wincoop, 2001). However, the results of the NRA to the importables 
sector in Figure 5.1 amplify an important aspect. Given the global trend of import tariff removal, the 
transformation of an import-competing sector from one that is protected by tariffs to a more open, 
zero-distorted sector needs to be conducted with caution. What the overshooting of the study’s NRA 
to importables below zero is suggestive of is an import-competing agricultural sector having lost 
import protection on the one hand, while concurrently being faced with a cost price squeeze through 
the depreciation of the South African rand. This results in a sector fighting for survival, rather than 
being able to attempt productivity gains.  
An analysis of the NRA trends regarding individual commodities covered in this study aids in 
understanding the aggregated estimates in Figure 5.1. While intense industry knowledge is required 
in order to adequately justify the commodity-specific NRA trends, an analysis of individual commodity 
trends according to border protection measures, as well as in the context of the exchange rate trends, 
aids substantially in the understanding.  
5.3.1.3 Commodity Trend Drivers 
5.3.1.3.1 Field Crops 
Of the four major field crops for which NRAs were estimated in the study, white maize was the only 
commodity classified as exportable. Both wheat grain and sunflower seed remained import-
competing commodities for the entire period, while yellow maize was classified as exportable 
throughout the period except in the years 2006 and 2007, when domestic crop failures drove the need 
for increased imports (SAGIS, 2017).  
The NRA to white maize continued its declining trend, which had started in the mid-1980s, throughout 
the study period. While remaining consistently negative and fluctuating between the -20% and -40% 
bands, the three-year NRA average to white maize rose only slightly during the first three years of the 
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study, reflecting the two-year dip in production in 2006 and 2007. From 2005 (± 6.1 million tons) to 
2006 (± 4.4 million tons), the production of maize in South Africa declined by around 30%, forcing 
surplus stock reserves to be utilised (SAGIS, 2017). Production volumes were even lower in 2007 (± 
4.3 million tons) than in 2006, requiring stock reserves to be supplemented with a small volume of 
imported white maize. 
The decreased domestic production in 2006 and 2007, coupled with increased domestic demand for 
white maize, resulted in an almost doubling of producer prices for white maize between 2005 and 
2007. This, in turn, led to the domestic price moving closer to import parity, which resulted in an 
increase in the NRA average over this period, as depicted in Figure 5.2. Although not as extreme as in 
the earlier years of the study, the decreased production in 2011 and 2013 also raised domestic prices 
through the same price mechanism as in 2006 and 2007. This translated into a slight improvement in 
the NRA average in the latter years of the study, as can be seen in Figure 5.2 by the slight upward 
trend from 2011.  
In stark contrast to the NRA for white maize, the NRA for yellow maize remained positive throughout 
the period. While classified as import competing in 2006 and 2007, the import tariff was only 1,72% 
in 2006 and 0% in 2007 (SAGIS, 2017). Furthermore, domestic production was substantially lower in 
these two years than in the period surrounding 2006 and 2007. However, the domestic producer price 
remained substantially above the referenced world price in 2006, while the domestic price was 
strongly aligned with the world price in 2007. This caused a dip in the estimated NRA average in 2007 
to close to zero, as the theoretical “price wedge” between the domestic and free market price (world 
price) was negligible.  
However, the broad motivation for maintaining support for yellow maize production needs to be 
considered in the light of the final primary use of the commodity being animal feed. Although not 
exhibiting as large support estimates as can be seen in the mid-1980s (see Figure 5.2), the declining 
trend in estimated NRAs to yellow maize production seen up to the early 2000s has evidently been 
halted. The constant support over the past more than 10 years is suggestive of the need to locally 
secure yellow maize supply as an input into the animal feed-processing sector. This ensures an in sorts 
insulation from global yellow maize supply shocks and limits animal protein price inflation being driven 
by global grain shortages.  
Given the constant growth in disposable income of South Africans, and the accompanying shift from 
plant to animal proteins, the security of the primary input into the production of animal proteins will 
naturally grow in prominence. Esterhuizen (2015), for example, points out how the per capita 
consumption of poultry meat (mainly broiler meat) increased by almost 80% between 2000 (21,5 kg) 
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and 2014 (38,5 kg). The reliance of animal protein producers on yellow maize together with soya thus 
implies that it is in the best interests of policies and market conditions to ensure adequate support for 
the production of yellow maize. This plausibly supports the positive NRA for yellow maize estimated 
in this study.  
NRAs for both wheat grain and sunflower seed displayed no drastic trends or sudden reversals in the 
period. However, both of these import-competing crops’ NRAs remained negative, with wheat grain 
turning negative in 2005 and sunflower seed having turned negative in 1994. While sunflower seed 
displayed a slight improvement in NRA over the study period, wheat grain experienced a deterioration 
in NRA, with the NRA at its lowest in 2014 – at -14,6%.  
Although import competing, the implicit protection on the output side of wheat grain production via 
the deterioration of the rand does not seem to have been passed on to primary producers. 
Furthermore, contributing to the decrease in NRA measures is the considerable decline in the import 
tariff of wheat during the period leading up to the studied 10 years. This is evident in the halving of 
the annual average wheat tariff from 16% in 2001 to 8% in 2002, followed by a decrease to 2% in 2005. 
Subsequent to the studied period, however, the wheat tariff was re-instated at a level of 17% in 2015 
and 38% in 2016 (SAGIS, 2017).  
Therefore, a considerable and rapid shift in the market and policy environment in which wheat 
producers were operating prior to and throughout the studied period contributed significantly to the 
steady decline in NRA. All output price protection of wheat producers was removed rapidly, leaving 
them with little time to adapt. Compounding this was the rapid depreciation of the rand, which was 
evidently not passed down to producers on the output side while. on the input side, it was likely to 
have caused considerable inflation in production input prices.  
In addition to this, the gradual decline of the estimated NRA in the study (Figure 5.2) has a tendency 
to underestimate the extent to which wheat producers were being “taxed” by the policy environment 
that they faced. This when considering the higher quality standards of local wheat as opposed to 
imported wheat. As highlighted by Van der Merwe et al. (2016), wheat prices in the local market are 
dictated by the lowest quality import parity price in the global markets. Therefore, a comparison of 
domestically produced, higher quality wheat to inferior quality global wheat would yield a smaller 
price wedge as a comparison between an equivalently high-quality global alternative. This quality 
mismatch results in the distortion estimate of the study being representative of a smaller price wedge 
between the domestic and international market than should be the case.  
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Sunflower seed NRAs showed the most consistent values among all covered commodities throughout 
the period, remaining within the -11% and -14% bound for all the years of the study. In contrast to 
other import-competing commodities, the implicit exchange rate-driven cost price squeeze did not 
drive a decline in NRA values in sunflower production. Furthermore, the import tariff on sunflower 
seed imports remained constant throughout the period, at 9.4% (ITC, 2017b). The consistent tariff 
protection of sunflower producers, together with the industry’s evident resilience against the 
depreciation of the rand, together contributed to the lateral trend of NRAs for sunflower seed, as seen 
in Figure 5.2.  
5.3.1.3.2 Livestock Products 
Although the three covered livestock products were classified as import competing for the period, the 
degree to which producers of the individual livestock commodities competed with imports varied 
significantly. For both beef and mutton, South Africa approached self-sufficiency, with imported 
volumes of beef falling to below 20 000 tons in 2014 and mutton to less than 3 000 tons (ITC, 2017a). 
This occurred while the domestic consumption of beef increased significantly, from 825 000 tons in 
2005 to 1 023 000 tons in 2014, and the consumption of mutton plateaued to a value of 186 733 tons 
in 2014 (DAFF, 2016).  
On the other hand, poultry producers were forced to compete rigorously with imports, while domestic 
consumption grew by in excess of 30% from 2005 until 2014 (DAFF, 2016). This consumption growth 
was accompanied by a growth in imports of 83.5% over the same time period, leading to domestic 
producers losing in excess of 5% market share to imports (ITC, 2017a). The consequent picture for the 
poultry industry over the time period was an industry that moved in the opposite direction to self-
sufficiency, while being faced with increased import competition.  
The large peak and subsequent decline in the estimated NRA to beef production over the period 
stands out clearly in Figure 5.3. However, the extreme NRA highs from 2005 to 2008 need to be 
interpreted with caution, given that the protection for producers was against a small volume of 
imports. These imports were of South American origin and originated from three countries with 
excessively high ad valorem-equivalent tariff5 levels to South Africa with respect to beef. The decline 
in the NRA from 2006 to 2014 corresponds with a trade substitution of the highly tariffed South 
American beef imports with imports from Namibia and Botswana – both with zero import tariffs into 
South Africa.  
                                                          
5 Weighted average tariff (volume) of products HS 0201 and HS 0202, as is consistent with Kirsten et al. (2009). 
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By the end of the period, more than 85% of the small volume of beef imports into South Africa were 
from Namibia and Botswana. This is compared to 0% of imports coming from Namibia and Botswana 
in the period 2005 to 2007 and less than 1% in 2008 and 2009 (ITC, 2017a). Therefore, under a steady 
exchange rate and with a movement to regional self-sufficiency, the NRA to beef production rapidly 
approached zero leading up to 2011. This largely proves that the estimated NRA measure was skewed 
due to the highly tariffed South American imports. 
However, while South African beef producers were experiencing a close to zero (but positive) distorted 
policy environment in 2011, these distortions turned negative in the three years post-2011. Given that 
the average ad valorem tariff for the small volume of imports declined from 24% to 4% from 2011 to 
2014, beef producers all but lost the import protection, albeit on an extremely small volume of 
imports.  
Potentially driving the negative NRAs estimated from 2012 to 2014 is the rapid depreciation of the 
rand from 2012 (Figure 5.8). Given that imports of beef are largely negligible, the depreciation would 
not have resulted in implicit output price protection for beef producers. However, the depreciation 
would have driven input costs up both directly and indirectly through raising the production costs of 
key inputs such as feed. The combination of the above is reflected in the strongly negative NRA for 
beef during the last three years of the study.  
In contrast to beef, the NRA for sheep meat remained close to zero for the majority of the period. Like 
beef, imports of sheep meat all but diminished over the 10-year period, with less than 3 000 tons of 
sheep meat imports in 2014 compared to more than 30 000 in 2005 (Mathole, 2017). However, while 
declining imports occurred together with rising domestic consumption in the case of beef, sheep meat 
imports declined while domestic consumption plateaued.  
The decline from an estimated NRA to sheep meat production of 17.5% in 2006 to -1.5% in 2009 (see 
Figure 5.3) was driven by the reduction in imports and thus smaller measured NRAs. However, in 
contrast to beef, estimated NRAs to sheep meat remained surprisingly close to zero for the last six 
years of the study. The measured NRAs appeared resilient to the rapid depreciation of the rand from 
2012, dipping only slightly to -4.5% in 2012 but then quickly recovering to close to zero in 2013 and 
2014. This resilience in the face of exchange rate depreciation indicates that sheep meat production 
was largely unaffected by increased input costs as a result of this depreciation. This is a unique feature 
of the sheep meat industry when compared to all of the other industries discussed thus far, and is 
possibly due to the extensive, low-input production systems characteristic of sheep meat producers 
in South Africa. However, the sensitivity of inter-industry production costs to exchange rate 
fluctuations would be required in order to confirm this proposition.  
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As highlighted earlier in the discussion, the poultry industry was the only livestock industry of the 
three covered in the study that experienced increased imports over the period. The most significant 
increase in these imports occurred between 2008 and 2012, when poultry imports increased by 83% 
– from 220 034 tons to 403 140 tons. This time period corresponds to an appreciation of the rand and 
a slight decline in the average ad valorem tariff, making it conducive for poultry imports to increase 
rapidly. 
However, the average estimated NRAs between 2009 and 2012 do not reflect a considerably 
deteriorating policy environment for poultry producers. In fact, an improvement in NRAs is seen from 
2009 until 2010, followed by a two-year decline thereafter to a level of -10.1%, 1,7% above the three-
year average estimate in 2009 (see Table 5.1). This suggests that the effect of the appreciation of the 
exchange rate on input costs over this period had significant input cost-relief consequences, which 
counteracted the implicit decrease in protection on the output price side caused by the appreciating 
exchange rate.  
The 2009 to 2012 stabilisation of estimated NRAs was short lived in terms of the long-run trend in 
estimated NRAs for poultry producers. As evident in Figure 5.3, the NRAs to poultry producers declined 
significantly throughout the 10 years studied. While the average poultry ad valorem tariff remained 
mainly consistent throughout the period, the decline in estimated NRAs is largely attributable to the 
two periods of rand depreciation on either side of the discussed period from 2009 to 2012. Both the 
period of NRA decline from 2005 to 2009 and that from 2012 to 2014 occurred during times when the 
rand was depreciating (orange and red arrows in Figure 5.8).  
The hasty decrease in NRAs in the two periods accompanying the depreciation of the rand highlights 
the deterioration of the policy environment in which poultry producers were operating, driven by 
rapidly rising input costs. This trend was aligned with that of some of the other importable 
commodities discussed, such as wheat grain, and highlights the implicit effects of the exchange rate 
on agricultural producers’ incentives.  
5.3.1.3.3 Fruit Exports 
Given the fact that no export-intervention measures such as export subsidies or taxes are in place for 
exportable fruit products, fruit export producers remain open to global market competition. 
Therefore, with no explicit policy intervention, the implicit effects of the exchange rate on fruit export 
producers characterise the policy environment that faces them. Consequently, the NRAs contained in 
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 largely capture the distortions to producer’s incentives purely as a result of 
fluctuations in the South African exchange rate.  
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For all three of the covered fruit exportables, a definite dip in measured NRAs is evident from 2007 
until 2009 for oranges and until 2010 for apples and table grapes. During this period, exported volumes 
of oranges and apples experienced slight declines, while table grape exports remained at a constant 
level (DAFF, 2016). Furthermore, the exchange rate was depreciating between 2007 and 2009, which 
on the output side would implicitly have been incentive increasing for fruit exporters. Thus, the 
observed dip in NRAs is an anomaly that requires further analysis of the intrinsic workings of the 
individual industries and their respective global market environments in order to be explained.  
However, the long-run trend in NRAs for both apples and oranges remained upward sloping, as did 
export volumes of apples and oranges over the period. Recalling the implicit assistance on the output 
side afforded to exporters via a depreciating exchange rate, export volumes of apples grew by more 
than 50% between 2005 and 2014, while the export volumes of oranges increased by around 48% over 
the same period (DAFF, 2016). This tremendous growth in exports reflects that the prolonged 
depreciation of the rand, which started in 2005 and accelerating from 2012, implicitly assisted apple 
and orange exporters on the output side significantly more than what it concurrently impeded them 
through raising input costs.  
Throughout the period of prolonged exchange rate depreciation, table grape exporters experienced a 
steady decline in export volumes, from 240 656 tons in 2005 to 210 597 tons in 2013, before 
recovering in 2014 to a value of 253 211 tons (DAFF, 2016). This coincided with a decline in estimated 
NRAs from the high level estimated in 2007 to just above 10% in 2014. Although still positive, the 
trajectory of the NRAs to table grapes is suggestive of an export industry that possibly has been 
constrained equally on the inputs side – by the persistent depreciation of the rand – as it has been 
assisted implicitly on the output side. Therefore, although South African exporters have increased in 
competitiveness, as is evident from the decline in the REER (Figure 5.10), table grape exporters have 
been unable to raise export volumes, possibly due to adverse exchange rate effects on the cost of 
production.  
Although declining for the first half of the study, the aggregate NRA to exportable commodities 
experienced a reversal in this trend after 2011. This reversal coincided with a rapid depreciation of the 
rand and a consequent increase in exports and estimated NRAs for both oranges and apples. This, 
together with the positive NRAs for table grapes, drove the aggregate NRA for exportables upward 
post-2011 as fresh fruit maintained their significant share in South Africa’s export portfolio. Thus, 
while the aggregate NRA for exportables initially declined during the studied period, as it had been 
since the mid-1980s (see Figure 5.1), the competitiveness gains realised via the depreciation of the 
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rand have significantly altered the incentives and policy environment under which producers of 
exportable commodities now operate.  
5.3.1.4 Aggregate Distortion Estimates Conclusion 
The commodity-specific discussions have highlighted how each industry reacted uniquely to the 
prevailing policy environment over the 10-year study period, and what drove these reactions across 
industries. However, what is clear on an aggregate level is that, since 2008, primary agricultural 
producers have been operating in a policy environment that is incentive reducing. This negative 
aggregate environment initially was strongly influenced by the negative NRAs to white maize, which 
pulled the NRA to export-competing commodities firmly into negative territory due to its significant 
share in the value of production. However, during the latter years, since 2011, the aggregate NRA to 
primary agriculture were strongly influenced by the persistent decline in support estimates to import 
competing commodities.   
These contradictory trends between the exportable and importable commodity groups observed in 
the second half of the period were primarily as a result of the opposite responses of these two broad 
primary sectors to the rapid depreciation of the South African rand post-2011. While the implicit 
taxation via increased production costs as a result of a depreciated rand in general had an impact on 
both the importable and exportable sectors, the impact of this depreciation on output prices differed.  
The import-competing sector, having been faced with continued reductions in import tariffs, was 
implicitly supported via the rand depreciation on the output side. This was due to imports being 
relatively more expensive domestically, enabling domestic producers of competing products to 
increase their price. However, the NRAs reveal that. although explicit policy measures such as import 
tariffs have succeeded in moving towards a zero-distorting policy environment, the concurrent 
depreciation of the rand has adversely affected import-competing producers, primarily through the 
initiation of an exchange rate-driven cost price squeeze.  
The combination of the above has therefore forced import-competing producers to rapidly adapt to 
global market forces on the output side, while being faced with rising input costs through the 
depreciating exchange rate. This has had a compounding effect on the policy environment facing 
import producers, and resulted in distortion estimates negatively overshooting the ideal zero 
distortion situation. The distortion estimates in Figure 5.1 reveal just this, and are evidence of a sector 
facing decreasing incentives to produce, and that these are in a firmly downward spiral.  
Producers of exportables, on the other hand, have generally been assisted implicitly via the 
depreciation of the rand on the output side, coupled with increasing international competitiveness 
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indicated by the decrease in the REER index in Figure 5.10. This has enabled exporters, particularly 
fruit exporters, to rapidly increase exports to the global market. Furthermore, due to the upward trend 
in the NRA to exportables in Figure 5.1 initiated post-2011, it is clear that the implicit output assistance 
via the depreciating exchange rate has substantially outweighed the implicit exchange rate-induced 
input taxation. This is in stark contrast to the importables sector, and is likely driven by the fact that 
producers of exportables have had to compete in the global market without any form of explicit policy 
assistance. Thus, the sector is engrained with efficiency, enabling it to hugely capitalise on the implicit 
exchange rate-induced output assistance. This is in comparison to the import-competing sector, which 
historically has been supported by explicit border policy measures and has been forced to gain 
efficiency via the reduction of these border support policies in the face of rising costs of production as 
a result of a depreciating exchange rate. 
Given the difference in NRAs between the covered commodities, there are considerable efficiency 
gains to be realised through the phasing out of the differences in inter-industry NRAs. However, the 
phasing out of these differences will require active policy instruments in order to counteract the 
implicit variation in NRAs caused by the South African exchange rate. These variations are 
unpredictable and are being increasingly politicised, as the dynamic macroeconomic and political 
environment often culminates in a change in value of the South African rand. This makes the 
formulation of effective policy focused on agricultural producer incentives near impossible to 
prescribe and implement.  
What the distortion estimates to primary agriculture have highlighted in this study, however, is that 
the majority of primary agricultural production value in South Africa are being generated by industries 
with disincentives to produce that are intensifying. Furthermore, if the trends between the NRA to 
importables and NRA to exportables are continued, the policy incentives could soon reach a point at 
which contradicting results in terms of foreign exchange earnings are being achieved.  
Albeit implicitly driven via the exchange rate depreciation, this contradicting situation in theory would 
occur when the NRA to exportables turns positive, with the NRA to importables continuing its trend 
in negative territory. Under this situation, positive NRAs would be incentivising exporters to produce 
foreign exchange-earning exportable commodities. At the same time, producers of importables are 
facing decreased incentives to produce, reflected in negative NRAs, and thus forcing domestic demand 
of importables to be met via increased imports and a consequent outflow of foreign exchange.  
Therefore, the extent to which producers, particularly from formerly explicitly protected sectors, are 
disincentivised by the depreciation of the South African rand requires further investigation. 
Disaggregating all forms of policy assistance for agents within a specific value chain can shed light on 
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the extent to which policy incentives are transmitted and absorbed throughout a value chain. In line 
with the objectives of this study, the following discussion highlights this disaggregation of the 
distortion estimates for the South African wheat value chain through an in-depth discussion of the 
results of the NRAs to wheat farmers, wheat millers and wheat consumers, as presented in Figure 5.7.  
5.3.2 Disaggregated Results 
As highlighted in Section 2.6.2, the South African wheat value chain was extensively regulated through 
a single marketing channel between 1937 and 1996. Following the transition to a free market, the 
wheat milling industry grew increasingly concentrated, with fewer firms controlling the market. This 
culminated in a wheat flour cartel being active from 1999 until 2007, through which wheat flour millers 
were able to extract excessive rents from the market at the expense of both wheat grain producers 
and wheat flour consumers.  
The aggregate NRA to wheat grain production in Figure 5.2 remained negative throughout the 2005 
to 2014 aggregate period, reflecting that the production of wheat up to the point of processing was 
disincentivised during this time. Importantly, this aggregate measure reflects the incentives faced by 
both farmers and wheat traders, as both of these agents are involved in “delivering” wheat to the 
processing market. This aggregated estimate provides no information on the incentives facing wheat 
millers and wheat flour consumers, and therefore fails to shed light on intra-industry distortions 
between value chain agents.  
In line with the objectives of this study, Figure 5.7 presents the distortion estimates for wheat farmers, 
wheat millers and wheat flour consumers, highlighting the large disparities between the incentives 
facing these three value chain agents between 2000 and 2014. The continued negative NRA for wheat 
farmers reflect the fact that all forms of tariff support were drastically reduced from 2001, along with 
an exchange rate-driven cost price squeeze (Section 5.3.1.3.1). However, the trends seen in the NRAs 
to wheat millers and wheat flour consumers need to be considered together and within the context 
of the competitive nature of the wheat milling industry.  
5.3.2.1 Competitiveness and Market Structure 
The market structure of the wheat milling industry has been and continues to be notoriously 
concentrated between four firms, namely Pioneer Foods, Tiger Brands, Premier Foods and Foodcorp 
(Mncube, 2013). However, although the industry is highly concentrated, the only agent within the 
industry that was deemed to be competitive via the relative trade advantage (RTA) measure was 
wheat millers, as found by Van der Merwe et al. (2016) in their investigation of the competitiveness 
of the South African wheat industry. Their results, however, highlight a significant decline in the 
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competitiveness of wheat millers from the early 2000s until 2007. Figure 5.11 depicts the RTA for wheat 
flour from 2000 until 2012, calculated by Van der Merwe et al. (2016). This is presented together with 
RTA measures for wheat flour, as calculated by Boonzaaier (2017), in order to have a comparable time 
period to that being analysed. Positive RTA values indicate competitiveness compared to international 
peers, whereas negative values signify a lack of competitiveness. Zero RTA values indicate marginal 
competitiveness.  
 
Figure 5.11. RTA competitiveness measure of wheat flour, South Africa, 2000 to 2015. Comparison between 
Boonzaaier and Van der Merwe data. 
Source of data: Van der Merwe et al. (2016) and Boonzaaier (2017) 
The RTA trend depicted in Figure 5.11 highlights a clear decline in the international competitiveness 
of wheat millers during the last four years that the wheat cartel was active (2003 to 2007). However, 
when competitiveness is viewed in relation to the NRA measures of wheat millers, a striking 
relationship is revealed. Figure 5.12 combines the NRAs for wheat millers calculated in this study with 
the competitiveness RTA measures calculated by Van der Merwe et al. (2016) and Boonzaaier (2017) 
respectively.  
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Figure 5.12. NRA to wheat millers and RTA of wheat flour, South Africa, marketing years 2000/2001 to 
2013/2014. 
Source of RTA data: Van der Merwe et al. (2016) and Boonzaaier (2017) 
Source of NRA data: Author’s own calculations 
Figure 5.12 shows the peak of the NRA to wheat millers as well as the competitiveness peak of these 
agents during the 2002/2003 marketing year. The NRA value of close to 0.95 in this year reflects the 
fact that wheat millers were receiving close to double the price for their wheat flour than they would 
have been receiving in a free market. Unsurprisingly, the competitiveness of South African wheat 
millers was at its highest point of the 14-year study period during this marketing year. In line with this, 
Mncube (2013) found that cartel members’ profits were approximately double during the collusion 
years than they were in the post-collusion years. 
Arising from this is the intuitive question about how the large positive disparity arose for wheat flour 
in an open market system. Mncube (2013) highlights the fact that, due to the concentration in the 
wheat milling industry, the four major firms also had substantial control over imports of wheat grain 
and ensured they paid the lowest possible import price for this wheat grain. This contributed to 
supressing the domestic producer price for wheat grain and thus ensured a lucrative processing 
margin potential. Furthermore, the cartel (in place up until 2007) ensured both fixed selling prices and 
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market allocation of wheat flour. This further increased margins on the output side of the processing 
level and thus enabled excessive rents to be extracted.  
It therefore should come as no surprise that the logical deduction from Figure 5.12 is that the presence 
of an over-enabling market and policy environment for wheat millers is what drove their international 
competitiveness. The decline of this incentivising policy support for wheat millers leading up to the 
cartel bust in 2007 corresponds nearly perfectly to the decline in the measured competitiveness levels 
over the same period. This consequently raises questions about the real competitiveness of South 
Africa’s wheat milling industry if it were to be operating in an open, zero-distorted policy environment 
free of collusion. The results suggest that, during the “bust” year of the cartel, the measured NRA to 
wheat millers was just under 4% while the RTA was 0.09, which indicates near marginal 
competitiveness.  
However, for the last six years of the period, NRAs were once again substantial and indicate that, in 
some years, wheat millers were receiving close to 40% more for their flour than would be the case 
under a free market. In addition to this, the competitiveness of wheat millers was once again strongly 
positive, in line with the incentivising policy environment. Although on a significantly smaller scale, 
these recent trends after the cartel investigation reflect the same environment that was evident 
during the cartel years, viz. positive NRAs and positive RTAs. This gives rise to the question whether 
the reforms and regulations initiated post-2007 have been successful in ensuring that collusion cannot 
manifest between millers.  
While not directly in the scope of this thesis, the link between incentive distortions and 
competitiveness is interesting and requires extensive further research. However, from the results 
contained in this section, an important consideration that needs to be borne in mind in 
competitiveness studies is the degree of policy distortions in place and how these are contributing to 
either inflating or deflating the relevant industry’s measure of competitiveness. One cannot simply 
assume that indicators of high competitiveness imply a highly competitive core industry, especially if 
the core industry is being faced by a policy and market environment that is incentivising production 
with price levels up to 90% higher than those under free market operation. The inverse of this 
statement is also justified and is of great relevance to this study due to its application to wheat 
farmers.  
5.3.2.2 Intra-industry NRA Comparisons  
The NRA trends presented in Figure 5.7 display three key trends. Firstly, the NRA for millers remained 
positive for all marketing years studied, although it declined up to the cartel “bust” year in 2007/2008 
before increasing again thereafter. Secondly, the NRAs to both wheat farmers and wheat flour 
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consumers remained consistently negative throughout the period, with wheat consumers exhibiting 
substantially greater negative NRAs than wheat farmers. Lastly, the estimated NRAs between wheat 
millers and wheat consumers exhibited a strong negative correlation (-0.84), while the estimated NRAs 
between millers and farmers displayed a moderately positive correlation (0.51).  
When considering the impacts of the nominal exchange rate on individual value chain agents, as in 
other importable industries, wheat farmers would be implicitly supported on the output side by a rand 
depreciation due to higher rand domestic prices for wheat grain. However, on the input side, the 
production costs of imported inputs would rise following a currency depreciation. A similar intuition 
would hold for millers, as imported flour costs would increase which would implicitly protect millers. 
Consumers, on the other hand, would face decreased support from a rand depreciation, as domestic 
flour prices would tend to increase, leading to higher retail prices for consumers.  
The only explicit border policy change that occurred during the period was the lowering of the import 
tariff on wheat grain from 16% (% of CIF) in 2001 to less than 1% in 2004. Between 2004 and 2014, 
the import tariff saw no significant adjustments and remained between 0% and 3% (SAGIS, 2017). 
Isolating this tariff reduction shows that, although the removal of the tariff should technically lower 
the NRA to farmers, as a positive price wedge is being removed, the NRA to farmers in fact increased 
from 2000/2001 to 2003/2004. Theoretically, if the NRA to farmers was negative in the presence of 
an import tariff, as it was in 2000/2001 (-17%), the removal of a tariff should lead to a further decrease 
in the NRA, as the domestic producer price would decrease. 
This anomaly in the movement of the NRA to farmers in response to the tariff removal gives rise to 
the question what the real impact of the tariff was on farmers. This is highlighted particularly when 
considering the exchange rate appreciation that occurred between 2001 and 2004, which would have 
implicitly decreased output support for farmers while implicitly increasing input support for farmers. 
Given the trends in the previously discussed importable commodities, the exchange rate tends to 
influence support estimates far greater on the input side than on the output side. 
The overriding exchange rate effects on farmers’ NRAs are exhibited throughout the rest of the period, 
as tariff protection was largely negligible. Evident from the exchange rate series in Figure 5.8 and the 
NRA to farmers estimates in Figure 5.7 is that, during time periods of exchange rate depreciation, the 
estimated NRA to farmers declined, whereas the NRA to farmers increased during times of 
appreciation. Thus, it is clear that the implicit impacts on wheat farmers’ price incentives were driven 
primarily by the exchange rate and not necessarily by the import tariff in place. This questions the 
effectiveness of the protection provided to farmers by the wheat tariff.  
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The NRAs for wheat millers, on the other hand, exhibited an increase in NRA following the removal of 
the wheat grain import tariff and the appreciation of the rand over the same period. The appreciation 
of the rand, while resulting in decreased implicit output protection for millers, would furthermore 
increase input support through the decreased costs of imported inputs. Given that the major input 
into the milling industry is wheat grain, the removal of the import tariff leading up to 2004, together 
with the exchange rate appreciation, would have significantly decreased the input costs of millers and 
thus enabled greater processing margins to be realised.  
However, the NRA for millers post-2003/2004 exhibit a rapid decline to close to zero in 2007/2008, 
signalling the breakup of the cartel. Interesting, however, is the fact that this decline occurred over a 
period (2003 to 2008) when the South African exchange rate did not depreciate nearly as much as in 
more recent years (2011 to 2014). Furthermore, this decline occurred during times when the removal 
of the wheat grain import tariff would have explicitly assisted wheat millers. Therefore, given the 
cartel’s price-fixing agenda, the NRAs “conscious” decline suggests that there was perhaps 
anticipation from within the cartel of investigation and thus an impetus to align prices increasingly 
with those in the free market. This tendency contributed to reducing the disincentives facing 
consumers, as is evident from the opposite directions in which the NRA to millers and NRA to 
consumers moved over the period.  
Therefore, there is evidence from these results to suggest that, while it was in place, the wheat cartel’s 
presence absorbed the wheat import tariff benefits and consequently blocked its incidence on wheat 
grain farmers. Furthermore, wheat grain farmers were increasingly faced with implicit exchange rate 
incentive distortions, which predominantly affected production inputs, as the output impacts were 
governed by farmers’ price-taking position at the liberty of the cartel and the lower quality of wheat 
grain imports. In addition to this, consumers were made to pay heavily for the anti-competitive 
behaviour of wheat millers through increased retail prices.  
5.3.2.3 Conclusion on Disaggregated Estimates  
The aggregate NRA measure to primary wheat grain production has indicated the challenging and 
worsening policy and market environment in which wheat production occurs in South Africa. While 
this was highlighted as being driven by the concurrent incidence of a depreciating exchange rate and 
the removal of tariff protection, the impact of intra-industry distortions could not be investigated 
given the nature of the aggregate measure. The empirical results of the disaggregated NRA approach 
enabled a key intra-industry comparison to be made between wheat farmers, wheat millers and wheat 
flour consumers with regard to the respective distortions facing these three value chain agents.  
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The ensuing disaggregated results have highlighted the extreme disparities in the way in which the 
market and policy environment altered the incentives of the three agents in the wheat value chain. 
While the discussion of these results in Section 5.3.2.2 centred on the impact of tariff removal, 
exchange rate depreciation and the presence of the wheat milling cartel, the results potentially have 
far wider reaching implications for the wheat industry and the manner in which policies are directed 
at specific value chain agents.  
Despite it often being praised as a processing sector of high international competitiveness, the 
disaggregated results from this study highlight the substantial policy and market assistance afforded 
to wheat milling in South Africa. On the other hand, having had output price tariff protection all but 
removed over the period, together with input cost inflation via a depreciating exchange rate, wheat 
producers are often criticised for their inefficiency compared to their global peers. While this criticism 
is not unfounded on the basis of the competitiveness measures in the literature, the industry 
structure, as well as the intra-industry distortion estimates from this study, provide possible reasons 
for this perceived inefficiency.  
The evident “bulge” of market power between the few firms at the processing level in the wheat value 
chain remains a toxic situation for all stakeholders in the industry, including the millers themselves. 
This market structure, in which a large number of wheat producers service a small number of millers 
who subsequently supply a large number of wheat flour consumers, concentrates market power and 
lobbying power at the processing level. As this study suggests, this situation enables millers to 
essentially self-regulate their market and, in doing so, force wheat producers to remain price takers 
while being able to dictate wheat flour prices through their control of supply. This market situation 
thus empowers millers to essentially extract all market and policy assistance out of the industry at the 
processing level, thereby blocking the majority of positive benefits from reaching wheat farmers and 
wheat flour consumers.  
The intra-industry distortion estimates for the wheat industry reinforce this proposition, especially 
due to the fact that the period included NRAs for years either side of a cartel bust. If the years leading 
up to the cartel bust are interpreted as years during which wheat millers limited their self-regulating 
ability, up to the point where market regulation was instituted due to the Competition Commission’s 
investigation, the negative impact of this self-regulation is evident. Where market regulation was 
enforced through the Competition Commission’s investigation into the wheat cartel, millers’ incentive 
distortions were largely negligible, while those facing consumers were at an all-time absolute low. 
Thus, the manner in which self-regulation by millers due to conducive market conditions distorted the 
incentives of consumers is evident. Furthermore, the means by which millers were able to utilise the 
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favourable policy environment in order to gain international competitiveness is highlighted by their 
loss of international competitiveness as a direct result of the decrease in market and policy support 
leading up to the year in which the cartel was bust.  
Therefore, when considering the impact of explicit policy changes, such as the removal or 
implementation of a tariff, it is of great importance to consider the market structure of the specific 
industry, together with distortions facing the respective value chain agents within the industry. This is 
in contrast to the conventional approach of evaluating policy success or failure using measures that 
often culminate in a competitiveness index. What the disaggregated results of this study have 
highlighted is the need to consider quantitative support indicators when evaluating the performance 
of value chain agents. Although the wheat millers remain internationally competitive, a clear driver of 
this competitiveness is their position in the market and their ability “absorb” market and policy 
support. This is highlighted through the persistently large positive nominal rates of assistance 
estimated in this study. Therefore, their core industry competitiveness without substantial NRAs 
needs to be questioned.  
On the other hand, wheat producers, who comprise a large number of farmers, are perceived to be 
uncompetitive and are often criticised for inefficient resource use. However, their position in the 
wheat value chain means they have minimal lobbying power, while remaining price takers. 
Furthermore, farmers remain exposed to exchange rate-driven input cost price squeezes, while not 
necessarily receiving the implicit positive output price benefits accompanying exchange rate 
depreciation. However, they persist with wheat production, albeit within a market and policy 
environment which disincentivises this activity. In addition to this, the study’s results highlight how, 
over the 14-year period covered in the disaggregated approach, wheat farmers all but lost tariff 
protection within the first three years and were then faced with a sustained period of exchange rate 
depreciation, all while being price takers to a wheat-processing cartel.  
Therefore, from the results of this study it is clear that two situations characterised the wheat value 
chain for the duration of the study period. Although being perceived to be uncompetitive 
internationally, wheat farmers on the one hand persisted with production under a forever challenging 
market and policy environment that persistently disincentivised wheat production. On the other hand, 
millers, who had been perceived to be exceptionally competitive internationally, had been left to self-
regulate their market and collude while receiving substantial market and policy incentives to do so. 
These two situations are thus a conundrum for the wheat industry in South Africa and require further 
research in order to ensure better-directed support policies for agents. However, a review of the 
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current means used to evaluate the success or failure of the core competence of an industry is needed 
to choose which of the two situations is the better evil.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The content of this chapter forms the pinnacle of the entire thesis. In the presentation and discussion 
of the results of the empirical model, the aggregate distortion indicators have highlighted the 
contrasting policy environments facing primary producers of import-competing commodities in 
contrast to primary producers of exportable commodities. While individual industries face unique 
challenges, the NRAs highlight how, in general, producers of exportables are being incentivised by the 
general policy environment while producers of importables are being taxed. Although explicit border 
protection measures did play a role during the period, the major factor driving these different 
incentive levels was the contrasting impact that the long-term depreciation of the South African rand 
had on producers of importables as opposed to producers of exportables.  
The seminal value chain extension applied to the South African wheat value chain uncovered 
extraordinary distortion estimate disparities between wheat farmers, wheat millers and wheat 
consumers. The NRA to farmers reflect a group of value chain agents who, during the period, had all 
major border support removed while being faced with rising input costs driven by the depreciation of 
the South African rand. This limited farmers’ abilities to make significant productivity gains and 
increase their international competitiveness, and was further worsened by their price-taking position 
at the liberty of a wheat milling cartel. 
The disaggregated support estimates for wheat millers and wheat flour consumers displayed a strong 
negative correlation, which highlights the negative impact that the collusion of millers had on 
consumers. In addition to this, the decline in support estimates to wheat millers. corresponding with 
the decline in their international competitiveness indicators leading up to the year of the cartel bust, 
questions the core competitiveness of the wheat processing sector if it were to operate under a zero-
distorted environment.  
Both the aggregated and disaggregated results thus confirm that, on aggregate, primary agricultural 
production in South Africa was disincentivised between 2005 and 2014. This was driven by the 
worsening disincentives in place for the production of importable commodities, driven primarily by an 
exchange rate cost price squeeze due to the long-term depreciation of the South African rand. This 
emphasises the vulnerability and exposure of South African agricultural producers to exchange rate 
shocks, albeit in an international trade environment tending towards free trade.  
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Furthermore, the disparities between inter-industry NRAs and intra-industry NRAs within the wheat 
industry highlight the potential efficiency gains to be realised through the phasing out of these 
disproportionate distortions. In addition, the disaggregated results indicate the need for urgent 
attention to be paid to addressing the disproportionate NRA levels between agents in the wheat value 
chain, which are approaching the levels that were seen during the active years of the wheat cartel.  
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 Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 Introduction 
This study has produced updated and detailed estimates of the distortions to primary agricultural 
producers’ incentives in South Africa, as well as to three selected value chain agents in the wheat 
industry. From the results it is clear that, in the years from 2005 to 2014, primary agricultural 
producers experienced opposing incentives to produce, depending on the trade status of their 
commodity. While the producers of exportables experienced positive incentives to produce over the 
period, producers of importables were faced with negative incentives to produce. Although explicit 
border support measures and the lack or reduction thereof affected the distortion estimates, the 
implicit impact of the long-term depreciation of the South African rand was identified as a major driver 
of the estimated results. The relative exposure of the respective agricultural industries covered in this 
study to the currency depreciation strongly determined the magnitude of the distortion estimates and 
consequently highlighted the scope for efficiency gains to be realised through the phasing out of inter-
industry producer incentive disparities.  
Furthermore, the study’s results provide critical insight into the manner in which the market power 
“bulge” at processing level in the wheat value chain has harmed both producer incentives as well as 
the incentives of consumers to consume wheat flour. The results highlight the need for effective 
market regulation within the wheat industry, as well as question the core competitiveness ability of 
the respective value chain agents.  
This chapter presents a final overview of the study by providing a brief summary of each step of the 
study’s approach. This is followed by a concise summary of the major findings and the implications 
that these findings have for policy makers and industry role players. Lastly, the scope for further 
research is presented in a manner that will enable this thesis to be a catalyst in driving a broader policy 
formulation approach.  
6.2 Thesis Overview  
Strongly related to the political economy of agriculture, this thesis has firstly highlighted the 
arguments present in the literature regarding the rationale behind government intervention in 
agriculture. This involved an analysis of the historical motives and patterns of intervention, as well as 
the discrepancies in this intervention between developed and developing countries. Centred on the 
general support for agriculture in the developed world and the consistent taxation of agriculture in 
the developing world, the structural transformation accompanying economic growth and 
development provided substantial explanations for the motives behind the intervention patterns. 
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Having provided a backdrop to the motives and patterns of state intervention in agriculture, the thesis 
then progressed to documenting global attempts that had comprehensively attempted to measure 
the magnitude of this intervention and furthermore to quantify the impact on producer and consumer 
incentives. This involved firstly providing a theoretical discussion of the theory of price distortions 
before highlighting the welfare implications of price distortions. The applicability of the theoretical 
approach to price distortions was then linked to agriculture, with the insights from Anderson et al. 
(2008) key in this regard.  
The literature study portion of this thesis progressed to providing a historical perspective of price 
distortions in agriculture, before reviewing three major studies that had successfully quantified price 
distortions in agriculture across countries. While each was successful in its own regard, the primary 
purpose of the review of the studies was to highlight the suitability of the Anderson methodology in 
achieving the stated objectives of this thesis. In addition to this, the review enabled the downfalls of 
the respective studies to be examined, which paved the way for the seminal application of a 
disaggregated approach aligned to the methodology of Briones Alonso and Swinnen (2015) to be 
applied to the South African wheat industry. A motivation for a disaggregated approach to estimating 
distortions to incentives was then presented, followed by a brief outline of the structure and dynamics 
of the South African wheat industry.  
Given the extensively documented theoretical context and comprehensive selection of the empirical 
approach used in this thesis, both the aggregated and disaggregated empirical methodologies were 
presented in a general form. However, due to the empirical nature of this thesis, a detailed discussion 
of the application of the respective general frameworks to the South African case was conducted, with 
a strong focus on adequately highlighting the sources of data used. This tailored approach synthesised 
the theoretical discussion as well as the empirical methodology into a framework applicable to South 
African agriculture and positioned to fulfil the thesis’s core objectives through the generation of a 
range of distortion estimates.  
The research results and findings were presented and discussed comprehensively, with a strong focus 
on the trend drivers of the respective commodity distortion estimates. Further policy and political 
explanations were also sought during the discussion in order to provide an objective presentation of 
the possible undercurrents observed in the distortion estimate results.  
6.2.1 Summary of Major Findings  
The key findings of this thesis were two-fold and separated into the aggregated distortion estimates 
for primary agricultural production and the disaggregated distortion estimates for the three value 
chain agents covered in the wheat value chain.  
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On an aggregate level, the clear result is that, between 2008 and 2014, primary agricultural producers 
operated in a policy environment that was incentive reducing. Driving these negative incentives to 
produce was the implicit strain placed particularly on the importables sub-sector as a result of the 
continued depreciation of the South African rand. While not necessarily a result of explicit policy 
factors as opposed to political factors, this depreciation provided implicit assistance to the exportable 
sub-sector through higher output prices. However, as highlighted in the detailed discussion of the 
exchange rate indicators, the nominal depreciation could further assist exporters if input price 
inflation were to be brought in line with that of South Africa’s trading partners. This would ensure that 
maximum competitiveness gains are realised by exporters as a result of the nominal exchange rate 
depreciation.  
The results of this thesis on the disaggregated wheat value chain highlight the tremendous disparities 
between the incentives facing wheat producers, wheat millers and wheat consumers. Although driven 
by a lack of efficient and effective market regulation at the processing level, the magnitude to which 
the wheat flour cartel was able to assert market dominance at the expense of both wheat grain 
producers and wheat flour consumers is indeed alarming. The disaggregated results highlight the need 
to avoid evaluating aggregate distortion estimates in isolation, and to ensure adequate consideration 
is afforded issues of market power and perceived competitiveness. However, as it stands, the results 
of the study provide empirical proof that, within the wheat value chain from 2000 until 2014, both 
wheat grain farmers and wheat flour consumers operated in an incentive-reducing environment, while 
wheat millers operated in an environment with substantial incentives to produce.  
6.3 Implications for Policy Makers and Industry Players 
6.3.1 Aggregate Results  
Given the major findings of this thesis being as a result, firstly, of the long-term depreciation of the 
South African rand (aggregate results) and a lack of efficient market regulation (disaggregated results), 
the implications for both policy makers and industry players are several. The results do not oppose 
the zero-approaching trends in explicit border protection for the respective primary agricultural 
commodities, but rather call for consideration of both this tariff-reducing approach and broader 
macroeconomic occurrences.  
The extensive literature study component of this thesis adequately highlighted the welfare benefits 
experienced when transitioning towards a zero-distorting environment. The focus was primarily on 
tariff removal as a catalyst for altering incentives for agricultural producers. Although incentive 
distortions as a result of exchange rate policy are provided for both within the literature and in the 
applied methodology of this study, these provisions focus on a dual exchange rate system where 
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importers and exporters face different exchange rates. However, the results of this thesis highlight 
how even in a floating exchange rate system, as is the case in South Africa, the sustained depreciation 
of the rand had a significant effect on the incentives of production facing primary agricultural 
producers.  
Therefore, given the South African situation, the transition towards zero explicit trade barriers needs 
to be considered in combination with the macroeconomic and political environment of the domestic 
economy. The impact of tariff removal on the domestic agricultural sector was unsurprisingly found 
to have reduced output protection, particularly for agricultural importable commodities. This was 
coupled by the overarching impact of the weakened exchange rate, namely a significant rise in the 
cost of production. This left producers of agricultural importables having to try to make significant 
productivity gains in order to compete internationally despite reduced import protection while 
experiencing rising input costs driven by the depreciation of the South African rand. This toxic situation 
tremendously limits the abilities of the producers of importables to adapt to global competition in the 
domestic market, and highlights the need for policy makers not to overlook the macroeconomic 
challenges reflected in the exchange rate facing producers. 
When determining border protection rates it is thus imperative for policy makers to consider the 
relative distortion impacts of the exchange rate on the producers of agricultural commodities. 
Furthermore, following changes to the macroeconomic environment as a result of the political or 
global economy, an adequate review is needed from the government’s perspective in order to 
determine the policy incentives facing the producers of individual commodities. Failure by 
government to eliminate the traditionally isolated approach to border protection will compound the 
challenges facing producers.  
6.3.2 Disaggregated Results  
On aggregate, the situation described above was found to be no different in the wheat industry, with 
wheat production strongly disincentivised. The disaggregated results furthermore highlight the need 
to efficiently regulate markets and to include the market structure and its implications when 
constructing policies. The results of this thesis paint a bleak picture for the wheat industry and the 
manner in which policy incentives have been distorted throughout the value chain.  
While the competitiveness of value chain agents often underpins their presumed efficiency, the 
distortions facing individual agents needs adequate parallel consideration. Although shown to be non-
competitive in various studies, wheat production in South Africa continued throughout the period. 
This happened in the face of decreased output protection through the removal of tariff protection, as 
well as sustained input price pressure as a result of the depreciation of the rand. The culmination of 
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this situation was reflected in the negative distortion estimates to wheat farmers, thus reinforcing the 
challenging market and policy environment under which farmers had to produce. This challenging 
environment in which farmers found themselves was furthermore compounded by their price-taking 
position in the market. Yet, although being faced by a policy environment exerting downward pressure 
on their production margins, non-competitiveness was concluded through isolated competitiveness 
indicators and used as an argument against the primary activity and the support thereof. 
On the other hand, wheat processing took pride as the lone activity in the wheat value chain that was 
perceived to be globally competitive and assumed to be highly efficient. This perception of high 
competitiveness and efficiency prevailed for an activity operating in a market and policy environment 
that highly incentivised wheat processing. Furthermore, the market structure and the lack of efficient 
regulation enabled collusion between processors, empowering them to exert market dominance and 
tailor the market and policy environment in their favour. Concurrent with the high positive distortion 
estimates are high measured competitiveness indicators for processors over the period. These 
competitiveness measures shaped policy makers’ stance towards industry value chain agents.  
However, this study shows that, leading up to the year in which the cartel was bust, the ability of the 
cartel to tailor the market and policy environment in its favour and thus incentivise processing rapidly 
diminished. This coincided with a rapid decline in the estimated competitiveness of wheat processors 
– to a level of marginal competitiveness during the year in which the cartel was bust. Thus, it is not 
unfounded to assert that the driving reason behind the wheat processors’ high competitiveness was 
the lack of market regulation and the ensuing market and policy incentives provided to processors. 
Simply stated, the only reason why wheat processors were competitive is because they were receiving 
high levels of support. This perceived competitiveness only further increased their lobbying power and 
resulted in their ability to further tailor market and policy incentives for themselves, predominantly at 
the expense of wheat flour consumers. What should be of concern for market regulators from the 
results after the year in which the cartel was bust is that distortion estimates are once again highly 
positive for wheat millers, as are competitiveness indicators. This is indicative that the situation 
currently prevailing is similar to what prevailed during the known cartel years. 
The disaggregated results therefore provide more questions than answers. The first is the obvious 
question of whether or not the wheat processing sector is being adequately regulated after the cartel 
bust. The second question challenges multiple literature studies on the South African wheat industry 
that have concluded that wheat should essentially not be produced in South Africa. While the 
conclusions of this thesis are by no means sufficient to refute the findings of these studies, the results 
introduce a new dynamic into the argument pertaining to the core competitiveness of value chain 
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agents in a zero-distorting environment. From a policy maker standpoint, it is rather core 
competitiveness that should be considered when designing and implementing policies, as this 
measure duly excludes distorting “noise” as a result of aspects such as market power. However, in 
order to measure this core competitiveness, extensive empirical research will be needed in order to 
develop a distortion-free competitiveness indicator.  
6.4 Recommendations for Further Research  
Given the data-intensive nature of this thesis, the primary challenge faced throughout the study was 
the availability of data. Although multiple industry organisations assisted extensively in providing the 
detailed data required, the time-consuming nature of the data collection and analysis limited the study 
from covering a wider range of South African agricultural commodities. In addition, the lack of 
availability of reputable data throughout specific value chains limited this study to selecting a singular 
value chain in order to estimate disaggregated distortion estimates. Therefore, on both the aggregate 
and disaggregate level, multiple extensions of this study’s framework are possible to agricultural 
industries that were not covered in this thesis. Such extensions would increase the reliability of the 
picture portrayed in this study of primary agriculture distortions in South Africa, as the non-covered 
portion of the sector’s estimate would be empirically estimated, rather than by making an assumption. 
Furthermore, additional value chain applications would enable distortions within value chains to be 
contrasted between industries; for example, the distortions facing a wheat processor could be 
compared to those being faced by a sugar or maize processor.  
The results of this study suggest significant efficiency gains to be realised if inter-industry distortions 
were to be phased out. In addition, the disaggregated results of the wheat value chain show significant 
scope for intra-industry distortions to be phased out within the wheat industry, which would also lead 
to more efficient resource use. However, the results are indicative and are in no way able to quantify 
the magnitude of the efficiency gains or potential welfare impacts to be realised from the phasing out 
of distortion differences. Thus, the indicative nature of this study’s results should serve as a precursor 
to research concerned with the measurement of potential efficiency and welfare gains.  
From a policy analysis standpoint, the reasons behind the inter-industry differences between primary 
agricultural industries as well as intra-industry differences within the wheat value chain need further 
explanation. Conclusive evidence needs to be sought in order to determine whether there is 
preferential policy treatment behind the distortion disparities, or whether the disparities are driven 
by the inherent structural characteristics and adaptabilities of certain industries as opposed to others. 
Furthermore, establishing an adequate link between the competitiveness and market power of agents 
within a value chain in relation to their estimated incentive distortions could form an integral part in 
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unpacking the drivers of the inter- and intra-industry distortion differences. Once the key drivers of 
the respective disparities are identified, it will be possible to take a far more informed approach when 
attempting to eliminate the differences and ensure efficient resource use.  
Lastly, a direct implication of the disaggregated results is the impact that supressing wheat farmers’ 
incentives has on the production of other crops. Given that wheat is one of the major crops included 
in various crop-rotation strategies6, the persistent disincentives faced by wheat farmers are likely to 
have significant “ripple” effects on the production of other field crops7. However, the apparent link 
between and magnitude of these ripple effects needs extensive research, both within the field of 
natural sciences and that of economics. Such research will likely serve to benefit the lobbying position 
of farmers applying crop rotations involving wheat. 
It is highly likely that these differences in distortions within the wheat industry will be found in other 
industries. Government and industry role players should thus collaborate in order to ensure that an 
attainable and practical framework – similar to that applied in this thesis – is researched further in a 
wider range of industry value chains in South Africa. In this regard, it is imperative that a dynamic and 
comparable framework is used in order to ensure comparisons both between industry value chains 
and over time.  
  
                                                          
6 In the Western Cape, the predominant wheat growing region in South Africa, wheat is of paramount 
importance in multiple crop rotation strategies.  
7 For example, if wheat cultivation is halted, this will require a substitute crop to be cultivated in it’s place which 
could be less beneficial to the entire rotation strategy than what wheat was.  
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